

HEADQUARTERS 55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (Hv)
APO 520 US ARMY

24 November 1944
1645A

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 263)

TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 263)

This is Plan Able

Maps: GSGS No. 4072 EUROPE Air (MUNCHEN, BOLZANO) 1:500,000
GSGS No. 3982 EUROPE Air (MUNICH, INNSBRUCK) 1:250,000
Pathfinder Supplement, Positive Relief Chart, Negative Relief Chart,
South Central EUROPE 1:2,892,000
Pathfinder Chart No. RPC 8,8A,8-B,8-C,8-D,8-E,8-F,8-G, MUNICH 360° 1
and 2.
(Note: Nos. 8-A and 8-E will not be taken into air on mission)
Supplement to Chart No. 5-A, 15AF, H2X, MUNICH, GERMANY

1. See Paragraph 1, Intelligence Annex No. 262, 23 Nov 1944.

2. ENEMY SITUATION

a. FLAX

(1) MUNICH: The MUNICH West M/Y is situated in the center of the 278 Heavy Guns defending MUNICH. On this night mission, on which target will be attacked only if it is overcast and by PFF, it is to be expected that flak will not be at its highest potential of accuracy, since radar controlled flak is less accurate than visually aimed, and since chaff may be expected to be correspondingly more effective. On axis ordered, and with expected winds, time in flak on ordered axis will be approximately 5½ minutes. Refer to Map 4E106 (20 November 1944). Route as ordered is clear of flak except that the 8 Heavy Guns at CASARSA must be avoided.

(2) INNSBRUCK: see Intelligence Annex No. 262, 23 November 1944, paragraph 2,a,(2).

b. SEARCHLIGHTS: As every flak battery contains adjacent searchlights, and as every flak battery which fires must use its searchlights, this type of defense will be encountered. However, since assigned target will be bombed only if overcast, searchlights will not be effective with reference to flak defense, If they are used they may be effective as aid to night fighters if the latter are committed, inasmuch. as the searchlights will have the effect of silhouetting the bombers.

c. ENEMY AIRCRAFT: The enemy's capability of defense with night fighter a/c in the MUNICH area is formidable. His potential scale of effort is 40-50 TEF. Such effort is probable if weather conditions are satisfactory. It is considered that local airdrome and weather conditions will determine the enemy's scale of effort, and that only extremely poor conditions will cause him to withhold his night fighters or to prevent them from establishing contact with bombers if e/a are airborne.

d. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGETS: See Intelligence Annex No. 262, 23 November 1944 ,paragraph 1,c.

3. FRIENDLY SITUATION

a. Coordination of attack: See Intelligence Annex No. 262, 23 November 1944, paragraph 2,a.

b. No fighter escort is provided.

c. Escape Intelligence: See Escape Bulletins Nos. 4 and 5.

By command of Brigadier General ACHESON:

DONALD W. RIDDLE,
Major, AC,
A-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

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