

HEADQUARTERS 55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (Hv)
APO 520 US ARMY

21 November 1944
1730A

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 261)

TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 261)

Maps: GSGS No. 4072 EUROPE Air (MUNICHEN, POLZANO) 1:500,000
GSGS No. 3932 EUROPE Air (MUNICH, SALZBURG, INNSBRUCK) 1:250,000
Target and Briefing Charts No. 13-5-NA (MUNICH etc)
No. 13-45-NA (MUNICH, etc)
No. 13-13-NA (SALZBURG)
No. 14-13-NA (INNSBRUCK)
Target Photochart No. TP 13-3 (MUNICH/NEURIBERG; shows PT)
No. TP 13-4 (MUNICH/ALLACH; shows PT)
Minimum Photochart No. MP 13-44 (MUNICH/ALLACH; shows West M/Y)
No. NP 13-56, 13-71 (SALZBURG)
Minimum Briefing Chart No. MPC 13-138 (MUNICH)
No. MPC 13-56, 13-71. (SALZBURG)
Target No. 3(f)21/ Perspective (July 1943) MUNICH
Pathfinder Supplement, Positive Relief Chart, Negative Relief Chart,
South Central EUROPE 1:2,892,000
Pathfinder Chart No. RPC 8, 8-A, 8-B, 8-C, 8-D, 8-E, 8-F, 3-G, MUNICH
360° 1 and (Note: Nos. 8-A and 8-E will not be taken into air on
mission)
Supplement to chart No. 5-A, 15AF, H2X, MUNICH, GERMANY
Mosaic, MUNICH, Sheets I - IV
Illustration No. 6(d)(vi)58/4, 8, 93/5 (MUNICH W and E M/Y)
6(d)(vi)116/3; 4, 5 (INNSBRUCK)
6(d)(vi)130/1, 2 (SALZBURG)
Target Report No. 206 (INNSBRUCK, w/photographs)
Report No. F(C)210 (SALZBURG, w/photographs)

1. ENEMY SITUATION

a. FLAK

(1) MUNICH: The locations of the targets are such that all 273 heavy guns as reported on 4E100 (13 Nov 44) will be within range of the Wing formation. However, the Wing formation will split and attack two targets at approximately the same time. These tactics will make a change in and will divide the enemy's flak concentration. Intense accurate flak may be expected with the time in flak approximately 5 minutes for the East M/Y and 6 minutes for West M/Y. Strict adherence to route as ordered will avoid the defenses of MUELDORF, REGENSBURG, and ROSENHEIM.

(2) SALZBURG: Refer to E Map 2665 (3 Oct 44) as amended. The latest report, 4E54 (7 Nov 44), shows 43 heavy guns in this area. Time in flak will be approximately 3½ minutes.

(3) INNSBRUCK: Refer to 3 Map 2703 (4 Oct 44). Flak may be expected from the 53 heavy guns. The time in flak will be approximately 3 minutes.

b. ENEMY AIRCRAFT: While the enemy is capable of the transfer of fighter a/c from North and West to the MUNICH area it is considered by A-2 Fifteenth Air Force that at this time he is unlikely to effect such transfer. It is estimated that scale of enemy effort at MUNICH on this coordinated attack will probably be negligible or nil. It is possible that a few e/a of the Italian Republican (Fascist) Air Force may be airborne in North ITALY, but this force has been reduced by recent attack. It will be borne in mind that a/c of the 465th Bombardment Group experienced encounters in the BLECHHAMMER area on 20 November - crews must be briefed on enemy capability and to be alert.

c. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGETS

(1) General: This strategic attack, in which 4 Bombardment Wings, 17 Bombardment Groups, of the Fifteenth Air Force are dispatched to the West and East M/Ys in MUNICH, centers upon the highest priority communications target in South GERMANY. Major rail centers are now second in priority to oil targets, with special emphasis upon the most extensive damage possible to repair, classification, loading, and warehouse facilities. This strategic plan, including both MUNICH M/Ys, is designed for maximum effect on pinpoint targets if visual bombing conditions prevail and equal effect if non-visual bombing is required. The morale effect, in view of the critical position of the enemy as he is faced by sustained attacks on the Western, Eastern, and Southern fronts, will be of high significance it is known that this factor has become of interesting effect on recent attacks on MUNICH (and VIENNA).

(2) MUNICH is principally a transportation center. Through routes lead to VIENNA, INNSBRUCK, REGENSBURG, BERLIN, and PRAGUE. The marshalling yards are serviceable and active. They are exceptionally good pathfinder targets because of the concentration of industries surrounding them.

(3) MUNICH West is five miles in total length and 490 yards in maximum width. The fragilities include sorting sidings, terminal stations, and repair shops. The function is that of a goods and repair depot combined with classification. 1 successful attack would paralyze the handling and repair facilities of the MUNICH M/Y and prevent supplies manufactured in this area from reaching the front.

(4) MUNICH East M/Y is 4500 yards long and 400 yards in maximum width. The facilities include sorting and reception

sidings, a large locomotive depot, and a roads depot and station. Through routes from this yard lead to VIENNA, INNSBRUCK, REGENSBURG, BERLIN, and PRAGUE. It is electrified and works close conjunction with MUNICH West. The principal function of this yard is the classification of wagons into trains for ITALY and the Eastern front. Estimated capacity is 2,300 units every 24 hours. The yard was working to 35% of capacity before the war and is a known transportation bottleneck. A successful attack would make this even more of a problem and destroy such supplies as were present at the time of the attack.

(5) SALZBURG M/Y: See paragraph 1,c, (3) of Intelligence Annex No. 243, 9 November 1944. Delete last two sentences, and substitute therefor: reconnaissance on 19 November 1944 showed the yard heavily loaded, with 1360 mixed units present in M/Y and sidings.

(6) INNSBRUCK M/Y: See paragraph 1,c, (3) of Intelligence Annex No. 249, 14 November 1944. Delete 5th sentence ("Latest reconnaissance present") and substitute therefor: Reconnaissance on 19 November showed more than 500 mixed units present.

2. FRIENDLY SITUATION

a. Coordination of attack:

(1) 5th Wing (3 Groups), 49th Wing (2 Groups), 304th Wing (2 Groups) attack MUNICH West M/Y.

(2) 5th Wing (3 Groups), 49th Wing (1 Group), 304th Wing (2 Groups) attack MUNICH East M/Y.

(3) 49th Wing: 2 Groups attack FARRARA RR Bridge, 2 Groups attack VEROMA Locomotive Repair Shops (This element of the strategic plan is included at the request of Tactical Air Force).

(4) Fighters bomb the important and active OSOPPO Motor Transport Depot, where 400-500 MT are concentrated.

b. XV Fighter Command (Provisional) provides

(1) chaff dispensing a/c for lead element of bombers on each axis of attack,

(2) target cover for each formation attacking MUNICH,

(3) Fighter sweep in the Po Valley to cover the withdrawal of bomber formations from MUNICH.

c. POW Camps: See Intelligence Annex No. 249, 14 November 1944, and add: LIENZ, TITTMONING and MOOSRURG are close to route to

PT; SALZBURG and MURMAH are close to possible route to, or close to, alternate targets.

d. Escape Intelligence: Current Bulletins (I-IV).

By command of Brigadier General ACHESON:

DONALD W. RIDDLE,
Major, AC,
A-2.

DISTRIDUTTON:

1 cy ea CG, A-2 Duty 0, Fifteenth Air Force
1 cy CG, XV Fighter Command
1 cy ca CG, A-2, A-3, PI, 55th Bomb Wing
3 cys CO 464, 485 Gps, 55th Bomb Wing
4 cys CO 460, 465 Gps, 55th Bomb Wing