

HEADQUARTERS 55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (Hv)
APO 520 US ARMY

8 June 1944
1950B

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 87)
:
TO OPERATIONS ORDLR NO. 87)

Maps: GSGS No. 4072 EUROPE Air (MUNCHEN) 1:500000.
GSGS No. 3982 BUROPE Air (MUNICH) 1:250000.
GSGS No. 4416 GERMANY (MUNCHEN) 1:100000.
Target Chart No. 13-103-W (ALLACH MOTOR WORKS etc).
Illustration No. 3 (f) 18a/1 (ALLACH).
No. 3 (f) 18a/9 (ALLACH).
Target Information Sheet OP Nu. GY4662, 18 Oct 43 (ALLACH).
Target Information Sheet ALLACH MOTOR etc, 27 Dec 43.

1. ENEMY SITUATION.

a. FLAX.

(1) The Bayerische Motoren Worke at ALLACH lie at the NW angle of the heavily defended area of MUNIICH. Enemy capability of flak defense will be absorbed by coordinated attacks by all Wings of Fifteenth Air Force. Axis of attack and turn ordered for 55th Wing bring Groups attacking ALLACH within range of Heavy Gugs. Intense accurate heavy flak is certain to be encountered, but strict adherence to axis and course will keep quantity to the minimum.

(2) MUNICH East M/Y, first Alternate Target: will refer to flak map. Maximum quantity of IAH flak will be encountered in area of this first Alternate Target.

(3) Second Alternate Targets: M/Y at FERRARA, CASTEL MAGGIORE, CASTEL DEL EMILIA, SAN RUFILLO, BORGO PANIGALE, BOLOGNA (MAIN), FAENZ, and FORLI: No change in flak defenses.

b. ENEMY AIRCRAFT. Enemy Capability of interception is considerably reduced from quantity available in February - April 1944 attacks in MUNICH area.

(1) Interception by German and Italian e/a based in North ITLLY is possible, but not probable in view of fighter escort coverage.

(2) Interception in KLAGENFURT area is not expected and if encountered will be minimum in quantity.

(3) Current advice relative to e/e based in MUNICH area is that maximum of 50 SEF end 60 TEF may be encountered by all

Wings attacking in arca. Coordinated attack by ell Wings will reduce enemy capability of concentration upon any one Wing or any one Group.

(4) Interception of formation by e/a based in North ITALY on route back, especially their concentration upon straggler or crippled a/c, is a greater possibility then interception by these e/a on route out.

c. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGET.

(1) Current significance of the Bayerische Motoren Worke at ALLACH though great, is less in its contribution to enemy war resources in a/c engine production as in the potential effect of heavy destruction of the MUNICH area in the light of the current war situation. GERMANY, after experiencing reverses of major importance on the RUSSIAN front, has in the past three weeks sustained a severe reverse in ITALY, and now faces the moral as well as the military affect of invasion from ENGLAND. Pending resumption of the RUSSI' offensive, sustained attacks resulting in severe damage to so important a center as MUNICH, in the rear of the Western invasion will severely strain enemy resources and morale.

(2) Political situation in GERMANY has seriously strained the already existing distrust of PRUSSIA by people of BAVARIA. This attack will further weaken enemy will to resist.

2. FRIENDLY SITUATION.

a. Coordination of this attack is as follows:

- (1) 5th Wing: 2 Groups frag OBERPFAFFENHOFEN A/D.
- (2) 47th Wing: 4 Groups attack OBERPFAFFENHOFEN A/D.
- (3) 49th Wing: 3 Groups attack NEUAUBING Dornier
airframe works.
- (4) 304th Wing: 2 Groups attack MUNICH Bayerische
Motoren Werke.
2 Groups attack MILBERTSHOFEN Ordnance
Depot.

b. The 306th Fighter Wing will provide penetration cover, maximum target cover, and withdrawal cover. Friendly fighters will outnumber enemy fighters by 2 to 1 ratio in target area, and in still higher proportion on penetration and withdrawal.

c. Commanding General of 306th Fighter Wing has advised that fighter escort will approach bomber formations in obviously friendly attitude for purpose of identification. Combat crews will be prepared for recognition of P-38, P-47, and P-51 a/c and for identification of these a/c as escort.

4. Fifteenth Air Force explicitly directs that the route, key points, and timing of each and every unit of Strategic Air Forces in this attack be thoroughly studied, understood, and clearly stated in briefing.

5. Target charts and maps will be preserved for further use.

6. Attention is called to Paragraph V, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION, Annex No. 1 to Operations Order for 9 June 1944, A- 2 Section, Hq Fifteenth Air Force.

By order of Colonel ACHESON:

DONALD W. RIDDLE,
Major, AC,
A-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

1 cy ae CG, A-2 Duty 0, Fifteenth /F.
1 cy CG, 306th Fighter Wing.
1 cy ea CG, A-2, A-3, PI, 55th Bomb Wing.
2 cys ea Gp, 55th Bomb Wing.