

HEADQUARTERS 55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (Hv)
APO 520, U. S. Army

21 June 1944
1900B

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 103)

TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 103)

This is Plan B.

Maps : GSGS 4072 EUROPE Air (VENEZIA) 1:500,000
GSGS No. 3982 EUROPE Air (BOLOGNA) 1:250,000
GSGS No. 4164 ITALY (BOLOGNA) 1:100,000, Sheet 87
Target Chart: No. 4-118-NA (BOLOGNA)
Photograph 4043, 60PR/383 60 Sqn/4 May 1944 (CASTEL MAGGIORE),
with D.B. Report No. 65
4163, 15 SG/441/3 PG/ 13 May 1944 (CASTEL
MAGGIORE)
5001, 60 PR/253/60 Sqn/ 24 Mar 44 (CASTEL
MAGGIORE)
3014, 3016, SM 147/682 Sqdn/ 9 June 1944
(BOLOGNA)
D.B. Report No. 103 (with Photograph BOLOGNA)

1. ENEMY SITUATION.

a. FLAK.

(1) BOLOGNA, Main M/Y is defended by 8 batteries of 29 heavy guns. Latest available information, contained in E Section Map 1713, sortie 9 June 1944, shows increase in number of guns and new position of batteries. Moderate to Intense heavy flak is within enemy capability. When last attacked, on 5 June 1944 scant to moderate accurate heavy flak was encountered. Added guns may increase this to Intense.

(2) CASTEL MAGGIORE, according to E Report No. 1264, 25 April 1944, has no heavy flak defense. However, target lies within range of 11 heavy guns (2 x 4 and 1 x 3 batteries) defending BOLOGNA (See Flak map E Section 1713) and the possibility of presence of railway flak must be considered. When last attacked on 5 June 1944, SIH flak was encountered.

b. ENEMY AIRCRAFT. Intelligence Annex Fifteenth Air Force estimates GAF capable of intercepting with 30 ME-109s from FERRARA area. When last attacked, on 5 June 1944, no e/a were encountered at BOLOGNA. While 4 were encountered at CASTEL MAGGIORE. The coordination of this attack will absorb and disperse e/a which become airborne, tending to reduce the number capable of intercepting any one Group.

c. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGETS. Intelligence Annex Fifteenth Air Force advises that at present the German forces are fighting small rear-guard actions to retard Allied advance in a desperate effort to gain time to dig in on PISA-RIMINI line. Supplies are now made up in Divisional or Corps trains in South GERMANY or AUSTRIA, and brought to rail heads along PARMA-RIMINI line, and thence transferred to motor transport. All lines through APPENINES are now blocked, and are not being repaired. Reconnaissance 8 - 16 June 1944 shows change in BOLOGNA main and CASTEL MAGGIORE M/Ys; repairs made, lines open, increase in stock. Attack on these yards is part of plan for another interdiction of enemy supply from North ITALY to battle line.

2. FRIENDLY SITUATION.

a. Coordination of this attack is as follows:

(1) 5th Wing: 2 Groups attack PARMA M/Y
2 Groups attack MODENA M/Y
2 Groups attack FORNOVO DI TARO M/Y.

(2) 47th Wing: 2 Groups attack UDINA M/Y
2 Groups attack CASARSA and LATISANA RR bridges.

(3) 49th Wing: 3 Groups attack TRIESTE oil refinery.

(4) 304th Wing: 2 Groups attack Motor Transport and Repair Depot at CHIAVASSO
Groups attack Fiat Works at TURIN.

b. The 306th Fighter Wing (1 Group) strafes AIRASCA A/D and (6 Groups) provides cover for bomber formations.

c. This attack is in support of ground force operations, materially assisting them by interdiction of flow of enemy supplies.

By order of Colonel ACHESON:

DONALD W. RIDDLE,
Major, AC,
A-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

1 cy ea CG, A-2 Duty O, Fifteenth AF.
1 cy CG, 306th Fighter Wing.
1 cy ea CO, A-2, A-3, PI, 55th Bomb Wing.
2 cys ea Gp, 55th Bomb Wing.