

HEADQUARTERS 55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (Hv)
APO 520, U. S. Army

12 June 1941
2100B

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 90)
TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 90)

Maps: GSGS No. 4072 EUROPE Air (MUNCHEN) 1:500,000
GSGS No. 3982 EUROPE Air (MUNICH) 1:250,000
GSGS No. 4416 GERMANY (MUNCHEN) 1:100,000
Photographs: Mosaic No. 40-148-1 (MUNICH, NEUBIBERG A/D)
Illustration: No. 3/Air/94c/3 (MUNCHEN/OBERWIESENFELD)
No. 6(a) (i) 26/3 (MUNCHEN etc.), 3 (f) 21/7, /9
Flak Map: (Sent with Operations Order No. 87)

1. ENEMY SITUATION:

a. FLAK

(1) MILBERTSHOFEN (Primary target) lies within that section of MUNICH which, on course and rally ordered, brings the formation within effective range of 61 heavy guns, emplaced in 2 x 3, 2 x 4, 1 x 5, and 7 x 6 occupied batteries. Flak map 1537, 31 May 1944 pinpoints these batteries, flak photo graph sent with Operations Order No. 87 shows areas of density. IAH will be encountered.

(2) INNSBRUCK is defended by 63 heavy guns. If this alternate target is attacked IAH will be encountered.

(3) TREVISIO is defended by 18 heavy guns. MAH is maximum enemy capability.

(4) MESTRE is defended by 12 heavy guns S to MAH is maximum enemy capability.

b. ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Intelligence Annex Fifteenth Air Force advises as follows:

(1) Encounters by 40 - 50 ME-109 a/c in ADRIATIC area and between here and Southern ALPS is very likely.

(2) Little opposition over ALPS South of SALZBURG is to be expected.

(3) From SALZBURG to and over target area estimate 70 - 80 enemy fighters, including about 20 TEF.

(4) In ADRIATIC area on return estimate that 20-25 second sorties will intercept.

(5) More and more information is available to confirm previously known tactics of enemy to seek out stragglers and loose on unescorted formations. Radio silence is of utmost importance in limiting proportions of opposition likely to be encountered.

(6) See Special Intelligence Report No. 55, 11 June 1944, Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force and disseminate this information in briefing.

c. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGET.

(1) Due to adverse weather conditions, the attacks by Fifteenth Air Force on MUNICH area on 9 June 1944 were not sufficiently effective, necessitating further attacks on these priority targets.

(2) See Annex No. 1 to Operations Order for 9 June 1944, A-2 Section, Fifteenth Air Force, especially Paragraph II, Targets, E. MILBERTSHOFEN, Paragraph IV, Enemy Situation, Paragraph V, Essential Elements of Information, and Paragraph VII Escape Intelligence. It is recommended that Escape Intelligence Officer brief on Escape.

2. FRIENDLY SITUATION

a. Coordination of this attack is as follows:

(1) 5th Bombardment Wing, 4 Groups attack OBERPFAFFENHOFEN A/D installations, 2 Groups frag OBERPFAFFENHOFEN A/D dispersal areas.

(2) 47th Bombardment Wing, 4 Groups attack ALLACH main works.

(3) 49th Bombardment Wing, 3 Groups attack NEUAUBING e/c factory.

(4) 304th Bombardment Wing, 4 Groups attack BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE.

b. Penetration cover is furnished by 2 Groups of fighters of the 306th Fighter Wing. Target and withdrawal cover will be furnished by 4 Groups of the 306th Fighter Wing.

By order of Colonel ACHESON:

DONALD W. RIDDLE,
Major, A.C,
A-2

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 cy ea CG, A-2 Duty O, Fifteenth AF.
- 1 cy CG, 306th Fighter Wing.
- 1 cy ea CG, A- 2, A-3, PI, 55th Bomb Wing.
- 2 cys ea Gp, 55th Bomb Wing.