

HEADQUARTERS 55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (Hv)  
APC 520, U. S. Army

9 June 1944  
1930B

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 88 )  
 )  
TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 88)

This is Plan Baker.

Maps: GSGS No. 4072 EUROPE Air (VENEZIA Section) 1:500,000.

Target Charts: No. 4-116-NA (TRIESTE).

    No. 4-82-NA (FAENZA).

    No. 4-113-NA (RIMINI).

1. ENEMY SITUATION.

a. FLAK.

(1) TRIESTE. Flak Map and Report "E" 1442, dated 22 May 1944 show a number of batteries, all of which at that time were unoccupied. On the attack on TRIESTE/OPICINA on 19 April slight inaccurate flak was encountered. The enemy is known to have strengthened his defenses in Northern YUGOSLAVIA so it is likely that defenses here have been increased. Flak to be encountered should range from SAH to possible MAH.

(2) RIMINI, FORLI, FAENZA (Alternate Targets). FAENZA and FORLI were attacked last on 5 June and no flak opposition was encountered. Latest reports indicate 2 heavy Guns at RIMINI, although the last attack did not encounter any flak defenses. South from RIMINI directly along the coast are ANCONA and SENIGALLIA. These areas should be avoided.

b. ENEMY AIRCRAFT

(1) An attack on TRIESTE places aircraft within operational range of the UDINE bases for enemy fighters. Interception enroute or on return is not likely. It is not anticipated that there will be any enemy opposition over target.

(2) If alternates are attacked interception is possible in the FAENZA- FORLI areas. Last attacks drew no fighters. Air opposition should not be maximum. There is possibility of interception by from 20 to 25 ME-109s.

c. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGET.

(1) TRIESTE - This target is of vital importance to the enemy as a distribution point for supplies and raw materials. The M/Y and the Port act as outlet for traffic from the UDINE, KLAGENFURT and ZAGREB sector. With the oil storage facilities here, it is necessary that the enemy, with his present emergency need for oil, transport supplies of oil to the active fronts and the home industrial areas. Destruction of this target will eliminate an outlet for traffic from GERMANY and, in view of the recent attacks against ITALIN routes, will constitute a major blow at the enemy's communications system.

(2) RIMINI, FORLI, FAENZA - All three of these targets, with their M/Ys and the bridge at RIMINI, are links in the main route from Northern ITALY to the South via the East coast. As a result of the attacks on routes in Northern and Northwestern ITALY, the enemy has only two routes open: one being the line from PARMA through SPEZIA to VIAREGGIO; the other the East coast line through these alternates. Destruction of any of the alternates attacked will sever the East route.

## 2. FRIENDLY SITUATION.

a. This is a coordinated attack against oil Storage and M/Ys.

(1) 5th Bombardment Wing (2 Groups) attacks MESTRE M/Y.

(2) 47th Bombardment Wing (4 Groups) attacks TRIESTE Oil Refineries.

(3) 49th Bombardment Wing (3 Groups) attacks PORTO MARGHERA Oil Storage Facilities.

(4) 306th Fighter Wing (4 Groups) attacks PLOESTI Americano Romano Oil Refinery.

b. The 306th Fighter Wing will provide penetration escort, target cover and withdrawal support.

By order of Colonel ACHESON:

DONALD W. RIDDLE,  
Major, AC,  
A-2.

## DISTRIBUTION:

1 cy ee CG, 1-2 Duty 0, Fifteenth AF.  
1 cy CG, 306th Fighter Wing.  
1 cy ea CG, A- 2, A-3, PI, 55th Bomb Wing.  
2 cys ea Gp, 55th Bomb Wing.