

U. S. Army

1830B

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MAPS : GSGS No. 4072 EUROPE Air (PRAHA) 1:500,000
GSGS No. 4072 EUROPE Air (TATRY) 1:500,000
GSGS No. 4072 EUROPE Air (WIEN) 1:500,000.
Target Chart No. 13-33-NA (BLECHHAMNER North)
Briefing Chart No. 13-33-NA
Target Chart No. 15-17-NA (BOHUMIN)
Target Chart No. 14-55-NA (WINTERHAFEN O/R)
Target Chart No. 14-22-NA (VINNA SOUTHEAST - for M/Y)
Illustration No. 1 (a)(iii) 43/1/2/3/4
Target Information Sheet GQ 1561, 13 June 1944
Photographs No. 5018, 5019, 60PR/324/15 Apr 1944
H (I) Reports No. 185, 232, 258 (BLECHHAMMER)

a. FLAK

(2) BOHUMIN O/R (First alternate Target) lies within range of heavy guns on North sector of flak defense of MORAVSKA/VITKOVICE. See E Section Map No. 1524, 30 May 1944, for pinpoint position of these guns. If MORAVSKA/VITKOVICE is voided, no more than scant heavy flak should be encountered if BOHUMIN O/R is attacked.

(4) If VIENNA M/Y (Third Alternate Target) is attacked, Intense flak will be encountered, but since attack will be by PFF the standard of accuracy may be below normal, with IIH flak being encountered.

b. ENEMY AIRCRAFT. Intelligence Annex Fifteenth Air Force estimates resistance as follows:

(1) 30-40 e/a may intercept main force in ZAGREB area.

(2) 125 SEF and 125 TEF (less e/a which may be committed against 47th Wing) in VIENNA-BUDAPEST area. These e/a are likely to be mostly ME-109, FW-190, ME-410, ME-110, a few JU-88, possibly a few DO-217. Some of those e/a may follow toward target area.

(3) In target area 60-75 SEF plus 50-60 TEF.

(4) Second sorties in VIENNA-BUDAPEST belt in reduced numbers as compared to sorties on route to target. These e/a may follow well to South to pick off stragglers.

(5) 25-30 SEF moving to ZAGREB area from North ADRIATIC bases.

A very formidable scale of effort is to be expected, possibly to a total of 500 sorties. However, combined operations with Eighth Air Force in Central or Eastern GERMANY are contemplated on the date of this attack. If accomplished, the a/c of the Eighth Air Force will draw off a considerable number of this total. Also, it is expected that night bombers will attack the FEUERSBRUNN A/D (in VIENNA area) night of 6/7 July 1944; if this attack is successful it will reduce number of fighters operational in the VIENNA area by about 40.

c. Enemy will probably use smoke screen in target.

d. Significance of target: Target Information Sheet GQ 1561 states that "the destruction of the BLECHHAMMER plants would be the most serious single blow the GERMAN oil supply could suffer from air attacks. After the conspicuous success of Fifteenth Air Force attacks on oil targets within 650 miles of FOGGIA, remaining oil targets of major production at greater distance must be destroyed. In June 1944 BLECHHAMMER North was producing 120,000 tons per year, with capacity of 750,000 tons. Completion of strategic plan to destroy synthetic plants to same degree that crude has been eliminated will, within a period of a few months, have decisive effect upon the capability of the enemy to continue war.

2. FRIENDLY SITUATION

a. Coordination of attack:

(1) 5th Wing, 6 Groups, attacks BLECHHAMMER South O/R.

(2) 47th Wing: 1 Group frags ZAGREB A/D; 3 Groups attack ZAGREB M/Y.

(3) 49th Wing, 3 Groups, attacks BLECHHAMMER North O/R.

(4) 304th Wing, 4 Groups, attacks ODERTHAL O/R.

- b. 306th Fighter Wing provides maximum penetration, target, and withdrawal cover.
- c. The attack on ZAGREB is planned for its diversionary effect, to draw e/a off main force on penetration.
- d. Combined operations with Eighth Air Force attacking targets in Central or Eastern GERMANY are planned in coordination with this attack.
- e. As part of this attack, to reduce e/a operational against formations, Wellingtons are expected to posthole FEUERSBRUNN A/D night of 6/7 July 1944.
- f. If VIENNA is attacked by PFF method bombs should not be dropped indiscriminately in center of city, as reports indicate that population is extremely pro-Allied. Every effort should be made to identify assigned Third Alternate Target and to drop on industrial area.
- g. Crews should be briefed on tactics of enemy fighters: to force friendly fighters to drop tanks, after which e/a attack unescorted bombers, especially stragglers.
- h. Essential Elements of Information: Crews will be briefed to note e/a types, markings, tactics, and if possible to identify (by observing direction of flight of e/a before attacking) A/Ds on which e/a are based. It is unnecessary to report content of M/Y's when content is less than 500 units.
- i. Escape Intelligence Officers will brief on Escape, covering all areas on route.

By order of Colonel ACHESON:

DONALD W. RIDDLE,
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A-2.

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