

HEADQUARTERS 55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (HV)  
APO 520 US ARMY

16 December 1944  
1815A

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 291 )

TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 291 )

This is Plan Able

Maps and Target Materials: See lists cited in Intelligence Annexes Nos. 268, 1 December 1944, and 281, 11 December 1944. Add: Pathfinder Supplement No. RPC 4-F, No. RPC 4-G (BLECHHAMMER -- ODERTAL)

1. Plan Able envisages maximum force on important enemy oil targets, with one Bombardment Wing on communications targets. The policing attack on BLECHHAMMER is designed to effect further damage to vital installations and to keep entire plant inactive. Inasmuch as BLECHHAMMER South has the greatest potential capacity of any O/R in GERMANY (in the Fifteenth Air Force area) the objective fully justifies the effort.

2. ENEMY SITUATION

a. FLAK

(1) BLECHHAMMER South: Refer to map E2697 (5 Oct 44) as amended by report E2877 (17 Oct 44). The route as ordered, avoids the Northern one-third of the defenses. Since the weather forecast shows a probability of clear weather, Intense Accurate flak may be expected. The tail wind will be favorable to the formation and will make the expected time in flak 5 minutes.

(2) OSWIECIM: Refer to map 4E217 (9 Dec 44). This area is defended by 5 Grossbatterien (batteries of 12 or more guns). The favorable tail wind makes the expected time in flak 42 minutes. Intense Accurate flak may be expected.

(3) MORAVSKA/OSTRAVA: Refer to map E2717 (6 Oct 44) as last amended by report 4E192 (4 Dec 44). Expected time in flak will be 4 minutes. Intense Accurate flak may be expected. Careful observation of defended areas as reported by air crews between BLECHHAMMER and OSTRAVA defenses is desired.

b. ENEMY AIRCRAFT

(1) The enemy is still capable of interception by 50 SEF in VIENNA area, decision to commit, and number to be committed, depending upon requirements of support of enemy ground forces.

(2) Nil or negligible e/a opposition between VIENNA and BLECHHAMMER is estimated.

(3) In target area (BLECHHAMMER) interception by 25-30 SEF is possible. These fighters are likely to be from training units and probably not of the same quality as that experienced elsewhere in GERMANY.

c. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGETS: See Intelligence Annexes Nos. 268, 1 December 1944, and 281, 11 December 1944.

d. PROFITABLE TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY: Fifteenth Air Force directs that no bombs will be dropped in YUGOSLAVIA or HUNGARY. Inasmuch as the resistance movement in CZECHOSLOVAKIA is widespread it is equally inadvisable to bomb localities in that occupied territory except identifiable military objectives. No profitable targets of opportunity are listed; bombs should be dropped on assigned Primary or Alternate Targets.

### 3. FRIENDLY SITUATION

#### a. COORDINATION OF ATTACK

(1) 5th Wing (6 Groups) attacks BLECHHAMMER North O/R.

(2) 47th Wing: 2 Groups attack rolling stock in SALZBURG East M/Y; 2 Groups attack rolling stock in WELS Main M/Y.

(3) 47th Wing (3 Groups) attacks ODERTAL O/R.

(4) 304th Wing (4 Groups) attacks ODERTAL O/R.

b. XV Fighter Command (Provisional) provides penetration, target, and withdrawal cover for formations attacking BLECHHAMMER and ODERTAL, escort for penetration for the 47th Wing, and strafes rail traffic from ROSENHEIM to WELS.

c. POW CAMPS: No change.

d. ESCAPE INTELLIGENCE: No change.

By command of Brigadier General ACHESON:

DONALD W. RIDDLE,  
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A-2.

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