

HEADQUARTERS 55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (Hv)
APO 520 US ARMY

18 January 1945
1750A

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 18)

TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 18)

This is plan Baker

Maps and Target Material

GSGS No: 4072 EUROPL AIR (FISME PAZ)

Target Charts:

No: 8-4-NA (ZAGREB)

No. 8-107-NA (MARIBOR)

No. 8-32-NA (CELJE)

Minimum Briefing Chart:

No. MBC 8-4 (MARIBOR)

Minimum Photochart:

No. MP 8-4 (MARIBOR)

Illustration:

No. S.177/6 (ZAGREB)

Report:

No. H(C)217 w/photo (ZAGREB) No. H(C)221 (CELJE)

Photograph, ZAGREB, YUGO

1. This plan directs attack against the most important targets in YUGOSLAVIA in cooperation with Allied Forces. The objective of the attack is the destruction of communications facilities to hamper the GERMAN Army as it fights a holding action in YUGOSLAVIA. The focal points of communications are BROD and ZAGREB, and the weight of the Strategic Air Force is concentrated at these two foci,

2. ENEMY SITUATION

a. FLAK

(1) ZAGREB: See E Map 4E411, 4 Jan 45; latest written Report 4E421, 6 Jan 45. When last attacked 5 Jan 45, S/MIH flak was encountered. The growing importance of this target is reflected in the steady increase of the flak defenses. 78 Heavy Guns are now present, representing an increase of more than 100% of the 1 Dec total. Briefing Officers will not stress number of guns, but will state that Moderate to Intense flak is to be expected.

(2) MARIBOR: See E Map 4E132, 25 Nov 44 and report 4E278, 19 Dec 44. When last attacked 29 Dec 44, S/MAH flak was encountered.

(3) CELJE: Written Report 2816, 13 oct 44 states that no Heavy Guns are present at this target.

b. ENEMY AIRCRAFT: No opposition by e/a is expected on this attack.

c. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGETS: It is emphasized that only the East and West yards at ZAGREB are cleared for this operation. Target recognition must be certain. Officers accomplishing target identification briefing will be thorough and accurate,

(1) ZAGREB is the largest enemy supply and communications center in YUGOSLAVIA. It constitutes a funnel for troops and materiel shipped to the BROD area by either the GRAZ-MARIBOR or the ZELTWEG-DRAVOGRAD railroads. Its still wider connections involve lines West to ITALY, East to the BUDAPEST front, and South toward BELGRADE and (via KARLOVAC) to the DALMATIAN coast.

(a) ZAGREB East Sidings: see Intelligence Annex No. 4, 4 Jan 45, Paragraph 2,c,(3). Content at latest cover was 507 units of stock.

(b) ZAGREB West Sidings: See Intelligence Annex No. 4, 4 Jan 45, Paragraph 2,c,(4). Content at latest cover was 312 units of stock.

(2) MARIBOR: See Intelligence Annex No. 306, 26 Dec 44, paragraph 2,c,(2).

(3). CELJE: Due to its position on the VIENNA-LAUBLJANA-TRIESTE rail line, CELJE is one of the most important rail junctions in YUGOSLAVIA. There is a single track line from CELJE to KLAGENFURT via DRAVOGRAD, a double track line to MARIBOR via GROBEINO, and a double track to ZIDANI MOST. Facilities are limited to a goods siding 1000' long and 4 tracks wide and a 100'x350' locomotive depot. An attack on CELJE would have as its most important objective the severance of the through tracks. Secondary objectives to be accomplished by a successful attack include the destruction of the car content of the yard and the locomotive depot.

3. FRIENDLY SITUATION

a. COORDINATION OF ATTACK

(1) 5th Wing (maximum effort): 3 Groups attack BROD North M/Y; 3 Groups attack BROD South M/Y.

(2) 47th Wing: 2 Groups attack BROD North M/Y; 2 Groups attack BROD South M/Y.

(3) 49th Wing: 2 Groups attack BROD RR Bridge; 1 Group attacks BROD Road Bridge.

(4) 304th Wing: 2 Groups attack BROD RR Bridge; 2 Groups attack BROD Road Bridge.

(5) Droopsnoots of the XV Fighter Command (Provisional) attack the DOBOJ South RR Bridge.

(6) XV Fighter Command (Provisional) will conduct a fighter sweep in the ZAGREB area to interdict transport traffic.

b. ESCAPE INTELLIGENCE: Current Bulletins, including No. 12.

By command of Brigadier General ACHESON:

DONALD W. RIDDLE,
Lt Col, AC,
A-2.

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