

HISTORY

OF THE

460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

September 1, 1944

to

September 30, 1944

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Chain of Command:

TO: Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force, APO 520, U.S. Army

THROUGH: Commanding General, 55th Bombardment Wing (H), APO 520,  
U.S. Army

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, US ARMY

(September 1 - 30, 1944)

NARRATIVE HISTORY

During the month of September, fourteen missions were dispatched. With three exceptions these were of long range and to targets of high priority. There were six missions to Hungary, one to Austria, two to Germany, one to Poland, one to Greece, one to Yugoslavia and two to Italy.

The following missions were led by the 55th Wing Commander, the 460th Group Commander and his staff:

LT. COL. WILLIAM B. CAMPBELL, GROUP S-3

2 Sept 1944, Nis M/Y, Yugoslavia

LT. COL. HAROLD T. BABB, DEPUTY GP COMD'R

4 Sept 1944, Adige/Ore RR Bridge, Italy  
12 Sept 1944, Wasserberg A/C Fact., Leipheim, Germany

COLONEL GEORGE ACHESON, WING COMMANDER

10 Sept 1944, Osterreichische Zaurerwerke Diesel Engine Wks.,  
Vienna, Aust.

LT. COL. HAROLD T. BABB, GROUP COMMANDER

23 Sept 1944, Tagliamonta/Casarsa RR Bridge, Italy

During the raid of September 10th, led by Colonel Acheson, Lt. Colonel Campbell was severely wounded over the target. Colonel Acheson then took over the controls while Lt. Colonel Campbell received first aid, including morphine and a tourniquet. He then took over the plane once more; brought it back to the Group base and made a normal landing.

Narrative Reports and Bomb fall Plot Photos, covering the fourteen missions flown in September are attached as Annex #1.

Although six missions less were flown than in the previous month, there was an increase in casualties. These were as follows:

Killed in Action:	7 Officers - 7 Enlisted Men
Missing in Action:	30 Officers - 47 Enlisted Men

The number of officers and enlisted men who distinguished themselves in aerial combat reached a new high level. Seven hundred and sixteen awards and decorations were given and these included a cluster to the DFC, Purple Heart, Air Medals and Oak Leaf Clusters.

Included in the above, the following awards were made to the Group Commander and Group Operations Officer:

Lt. Col. Harold T. Babb, - - 1st cluster DFC, GO 3653, 26 September 1944.

Lt. Col. William B. Campbell - - Purple Heart, GO 42, 10 September 1944.

The command of the Group changed hands on 20 September 1944, when Lt. Colonel Harold T. Babb took over under General Order No. 45 and Colonel Bertram C. Harrison was transferred to the 55th Bombardment Wing (H) as Executive Officer.

The strength of the Group covering officers and enlisted men for the month of September is as follows:

At Beginning:	348 Officers,	1654 Enlisted Men
Net Increase:	*40       "	*29       "
Net Decrease:	-       "	--       "
At End	: 388 Officers	1683 Enlisted Men

A significant fact is that during the period under review, no less than twenty-four (24) new crews joined the Group. The difference between this number (240 O. & EM) and 69 O. & EM) shown above (\*), is accounted for by crews returning to the United States and by casualties. It is pointed out that while the incoming personnel arrived as crews, those returning went back broken into elements of previous crews.

With these arrivals, the building program sprang into life again and in some areas, the last of the pyramidal tents are disappearing and the camp-site could soon be rechristened tufa-town.

A few incidental photos concerning the Group are included as Annex #2. A study of combat intelligence, as carried out in the 460th Group, appears in "S-2 Sees It Through" by Major Roger Warner, Group S-2. This is included as Annex#3.

On 18 September 1944, the 460th Group completed its one-hundredth mission with an attack on a railroad bridge at Budapest, Hungary. The Group had long since passed from the freshman to the veteran stage, among the Liberator groups based in Italy. The record of these one hundred missions, one of target after target destroyed or seriously damaged; oil at Ploesti, railroads at Bucharest, aircraft factories at

Munich and Vienna, of 56 aircraft destroyed in the air and 13 on the ground.

As Colonel Bertram C. Harrison, then Group Commander, stated: "The 460th has indeed piled up an enviable record for itself - - a record which could never have been realized without the complete cooperation and understanding we have between the ground and combat forces. It's a record of which we can all be proud - - it's a record which has defeated the enemy wherever we have met him."

55th Bombardment Wing (H) has brought out a Statistical Summary of the first 100 missions of the 460th Bombardment Group, between 19 March and 18 September 1944. This analysis is attached as Annex #4.

NARRATIVE MISSION  
REPORTS AND  
BOMB PLOT STRIKE PHOTOS

of

460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF

APO 520, U.S. ARMY

\* \* \*

(September 1 - 30, 1944)

TABULAR SUMMARY OF 14 MISSIONS

<u>MISSION NUMBER</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>
91	1 Sept.	Szolnok R.R. Bridge	Hungary
92	2 Sept.	Nis, M/Y	Yugoslavia
93	4 Sept.	Adige/Ora R.R. Bridge	Italy
94	5 Sept.	Szob R.R. Bridge	Hungary
95	6 Sept.	Nyiregyhaze M/Y	Hungary
96	10 Sept.	Osterreichische Saurerwerke Diesel Engine Works	Vienna, Austria
97	12 Sept.	Wasserberg A/C Factory	Near Leipheim
98	13 Sept.	Oswiecim Oil & Rubber Plt.	Poland
99	17 Sept.	Budapest/Magtar O/R	Hungary
100	18 Sept.	Budapest South R.R. Bridge	Hungary
101	20 Sept.	Hatvan M/Y	Hungary
102	22 Sept.	N.E. Industrial Area of Munich	Germany
103	23 Sept.	Tagliamonta-Cararsa R.R. Br.	Italy
104	24 Sept.	Salonike West M/Y	Greece

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

2 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #91, Operations Order #167.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 1 September 1944, at 0705 hours, 31 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the Szolnok RR Bridge, Hungary. The Group was led by Major Robert L. Spear, C.O., 761st Bomb Sqdn (H), and the second attack unit by Major Robert H. Martin, C.O., 760th Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. The Group assembly and rendezvous with the 485th was accomplished without incident. The Wing formed over Spinazzola at 0821 hours as briefed, the 460th flying in #4 Wing position. The fighter escort, P-51s, first sighted near (4520N-2025E) at 1020 hours furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They were last seen near the Danube River at 1153 hours.

3. From 22,600', 31 a/c were over the primary target, the Szolnok RR Bridge at 1103½ hours. 16 a/c dropped 40 tons of bombs on the primary target. Because of failure in target identification, 9 a/c from the 2nd attack unit dropped 21½ tons of bombs on the bridge at the IP, and 4 a/c dropped 6½ tons of bombs on the bridge nearest the town. The RR bridge, primary target, hit and believed made impassable by 1st attack unit. 2nd attack unit put down a good pattern on the RR bridge nearest the town of Szolnok but were to the right of it. One a/c jettisoned bombs at (4622N-1944E), one a/c jettisoned its bombs just past the IP and one a/c jettisoned one bomb in the Adriatic. The bombs were 1000 lb RDX, fused .1N & no delayT. The automatic pilot was used by both attack units.

4. SIH flak was encountered at the primary target.

5. The route was flown as briefed. Weather: On route: 2/10th cirrus at 20,000' and 2/10th alto-cirrus with tops at 6,000'. At target, 6/10th cumulus with bases at 6,000', tops 18,000'. On return, 3/10th cirrus at 19,000' and 3/10th alto-cumulus with 10,000' tops. Visibility: 10 miles throughout.

6. 31 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1355 hours.

7. 1 a/c suffered slight damaged from flak. There was no casualties.

8. 10 a/c attempted photos. Three significant prints are attached.

9. Observations: Landing strip, (4523-2023) at 1000 hrs, 20000'. Landing strip (4530-1940) at 1113 hrs, 20000'. Danube (4514-1922) 3 tugs & 48 barges at 1145 hrs, 20000'. A/D Kecskemet, 6 large e/a camouflaged, 1114½ hrs, 18000'. M/Y Kecskemet, 400 cars at 1110 hrs, 18000'.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, Air Corps,  
S-2

2 Incls.  
Incl 1 - TC  
Incl 2 - Photo



HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

3 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #92, Operations Order #168.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 2 September 1944, at 0710 hours, 31 scheduled A/C were dispatched to bomb the Nis M/Y in Yugoslavia. The Group was led by Lt. Colonel William B. Campbell, Group Operations Officer, and the second attack unit by Major William H. James, Jr., S-3, 763rd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly and Wing rendezvous were accomplished as scheduled, with the 460th in the lead position. Escort of P-51s, was first contacted at (4310N-1840E) at 0935 hours and provided excellent penetration, target and withdrawal cover. The escort was last seen at (4205N-1950E) at 1055 hours.

3. From 18,000', 31 a/c were over the primary target at 1020 hours. 29 a/c dropped 71.75 tons of 500 lb GP bombs, fused .1N & .025T. There was an excellent concentration in the M/Y at the eastern end. Direct hits on the briefed MPI. Due to malfunctions, one a/c salvoed its bombs at the IP when it opened its bomb bay doors and another a/c was unable to release at the target and returned its bombs to the base. Two other a/c failed to drop all their bombs on the target. One of these a/c jettisoned one bomb at the IP when the bomb bay doors were opened and another a/c had two bombs hung up and returned them to the base. The lead ships of both attack units used the automatic pilot on the bomb run.

4. SAH flak was encountered over the primary target.

5. The route was flown as briefed. Weather: Clear on take off and on the return over the base. Over Yugoslavia, 2-3/10th alto-cumulus with bases at 18,500', forced the formation to bomb at 18,000' instead of the briefed altitude of 20,000'. Visibility: ten miles throughout.

6. 31 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1235 hours.

7. Ten a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,

Major, Air Corps,  
S-2

2 Incls.  
Incl 1 - TC  
Incl 2 - Photo

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

5 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #93, Operations Order #169.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 4 September 1944, at 0935 hours, 31 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the Adige/Ora RR Bridge in Italy. The Group was led by Lt. Colonel Harold T Babb, Deputy Group Commander, and the second attack unit by Major Richard E. Anderson, S-3, 761st Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly and rendezvous with the 485th was accomplished as scheduled. The Wing formed over Spinazzola at 1041 hours, the 460th flying in the #2 position. The fighter escort, P-51s, first sighted at 1224 hours at (4420N-1340E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1441 hours at (4350N-1350E).

3. One a/c returned early due to an engine failure. Bombs were jettisoned in the Adriatic.

4. From 21,800', 30 a/c dropped 74 tons of 1000 lb RDX bombs, .1N no delayT fusing on the primary target, the Adige/Ora RR Bridge. Although there are many overages and shorts, there was a good concentration of bombs on the fringe of the smoke covering the target.

5. The Group did not encounter flak on the mission, but intense heavy flak was observed in the Trento-Avisio area.

6. The route was flown as briefed. Weather: On take off, 3-5/10th cumulus decreasing to 2-4/10th over the Adriatic. Over the target, 2-3/10 cirrus with visibility, 15-20 miles throughout. On the return, weather was the same in reverse.

7. 29 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1550 hours. One a/c landed at a friendly field (Lereto).

8. 10 planes attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

9. Observations: Caorle (4536N-1234E) 14 M/V at 1230 hrs, 21,000'.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, Air Corps,  
S-2

2 Incls.  
Incl 1 - TC  
Incl 2 - 2 Photos.

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

6 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #94, Operations Order #170.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 5 September 1944, at 0650 hours, 31 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the Szob RR Bridge in Hungary. The Group was led by Major Charles C. Ward, C.O., 763rd Bomb Sqdn, and the second attack unit by Captain Robert F. Carroll, Ass't S-3, 762nd Bomb Sqdn.

2. Group assembly and rendezvous with the 485th were affected without incident. The Wing formed over Spinazzola at 0801 hours, with the 460th flying in #2 position. The fighter escort, P-51s, first sighted at 0956 hours at (4540N-1710E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They were last seen at 1150 hours at (4520N-1930E).

3. One a/c returned early because of engine failure. Bombs were jettisoned in the Adriatic.

4. From 16,800', 30 a/c were over the primary target at 1050½ hours. 29 a/c dropped 72.5 tons of 1000 lb RDX bombs, .1N no delayT fusing on the RR bridge. There were two good concentrations of bombs within 200 feet of both ends of the bridge cutting the tracks. The bridge itself is covered by smoke from previous bombing and it is therefore possible that the bridge has been hit. There was another good concentration on the east end of the M/Y. Due to release malfunction, one a/c failed to release bombs on the primary target. This a/c went on to the alternate target, the Subotica M/Y, dropping 2.5 tons there. Bombs were seen to strike in the yard area. Because the automatic pilots were inoperative, both attack units used PDI on the bomb run.

5. The Group did not encounter flak on the mission but SIH flak was observed at Mor (4723N-1812E) and Tovaros (4740N-1820E).

6. The route was flown as briefed. Weather: On take off, clear over Italy and the Adriatic, 1-2/10th cumulus and 2-3/10th cirrus over Yugoslavia and Hungary. On return, 1-2/10th cumulus over N. Yugoslavia increasing to 8-10th cumulus, tops 9-11,000' over central Yugo. Clear over the Adriatic and Italy. Visibility, 15-20 miles throughout.

7. 30 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1340 hours.

8. 9 a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

9. Observations: Vac (4745N-1908E), 15 barges at 1051 hrs, 17000'. (4420N-1700E), 5 mirrors flashing at 0940 hrs, 12000'. (Observation made by an early return and crew could not identify the code) (4745N-1835E), 2 large factories and many small bldgs.. Numerous autos in the area, 1044 hrs, 16,300'. Novi Sad, large pontoon bridge across river, 1150 hrs, 16,000'. (4707N-1752E), 7 SEF, 1 bomber on A/D at 1032 hrs, 17,000'. Submarine just beneath the surface 8 miles offshore SE of Pescara, heading 330 degrees, at 1329 hours, 5000'. (Flash report already sent. Observation by a/c returning from friendly field after previous days mission.)

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, Air Corps,  
S-2

2 Incl.  
Incl 1 - Photo  
Incl 2 - TC.

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

7 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #95, Operations Order #171.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 6 September 1944, at 0700 hours, 31 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the Nyiregyhaza M/Y in Hungary. The Group was led by Major Robert L. Spear, and the second attack unit by Major Robert H. Martin, C.O. of the 761st and 760th Bomb Sqdns respectively.

2. The Group formed without incident but the scheduled rendezvous was not accomplished due to the 485th being two minutes early. The 460th joined the Wing formation at 0816 hours, five miles out of Spinazzola. The fighter escort, P-51s, first sighted at 1000 hours at (4538N-1830E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1330 hours at 4312N-1640E).

3. From 15,500', 31 a/c dropped 77 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N & .025T fusing on the primary target, the Nyiregyhaza M/Y, at 1114½ hours. There was an excellent concentration of bombs around the roundhouse with many hits in the roundhouse itself and across the M/Y at that point. Another concentration of bombs fell in the vicinity of the road bridge south of the roundhouse also cutting the tracks. Due to rack malfunction, two a/c had two bombs hung up which were later returned to base. Both attack units used the automatic pilot on the bomb run.

4. No flak was encountered over the target, but SIH flak (20 black bursts) was experienced between the IP and the target. SIH flak was observed at Debreczen (4733N-2140E).

5. Three e/a were observed on the mission. One ME-109 was seen at 1125 hours at 4725N-2200E). This e/a was O.D. in color with yellow wing tips. Two other SEFs were shot down by P-51s at 1135 hours at 4715N-2130E). The Group did not encounter e/a.

6. The route was flown as briefed. Weather: On route, 8/10th alto-cumulus over the Adriatic and 3/10th cirrus stratus over Yugoslavia and Hungary. On return, 4-6/10th strato-cumulus, visibility 10-15 miles throughout.

7. 31 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1435 hours.

8. 4 a/c were slightly damaged by flak. There was no casualty.
9. 10 a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.
10. Observations: Kecskemet (4654N-1942E) 12 four-engine a/c and 2 SEFs on A/D at 1036 hrs, 15,500'. Apatin (4540N-1858E) 30 barges at 1007 hrs, 15000'. (4625N-2010E) 35 MTs headed SE at 1158 hrs, 15,000'.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, Air Corps,  
S-2

2 Incls.  
Incl 1 - TC  
Incl 2 - Photo



HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

11 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #96, Operations Order #172.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 10 September 1944, at 0655 hours, 31 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb Osterreichische Saurerwerke Diesel Engine Works at Vienna, Austria. The Group was led by Colonel George Acheson, Wing Commander, and the second attack unit by Lt. Jeremiah M. Nashner, Flt. Commander, 763rd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly and rendezvous with the 485th were accomplished as planned. The Wing formed over Spinazzola at 0758 hours, the 460th in the lead position. Fighter escort, P-51s and P-38s, first sighted at 0915 hours at (4415N-1450E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover to the Italian mainland.

3. Two a/c returned early for the following reasons: (1) #4 engine out, (2) three superchargers out. One of these a/c jettisoned bombs in the Adriatic, the other a/c returned bombs to base.

4. Because 8-10/10th undercast obscured the primary target, the Group bombed the alternate target, the SE Industrial area of Vienna by PFF. 29 a/c dropped 72.5 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N & .01T fusing from 24,000' at 1039 hrs. Photographs reveal that bombs fell in a residential area, causing no damage of military importance.

5. The Group encountered IAH flak over the Vienna area for 6-8 minutes. Crews report black and white bursts. SIH flak was reported at Lendava (4635N-1615E).

6. Fourteen e/a were reported by crews. Two ME-109s were seen near Lake Balaton at 1112 hours. These e/a were painted a dark brown. Eight FW-190s were seen at 1103 hours at (4720N-1715E) and are reported to have had yellow tails and noses. Over the target, two silver ME-110s and two ME-109s were seen. Just after bombs away, one of the ME-109s made a pass from 6 o'clock low on an a/c of the Group which had been damaged by flak and was straggling at the time. Fired upon by the tail gunner, the ME-109 was seen to explode.

7. The route was flown as briefed except that the bomb run was begun north of the briefed IP on an axis of attack of 122 degrees instead of the briefed 66 degrees. Weather: On take off, clear over Italy and the Adriatic. 8-10/10th strato-cumulus over No. Yugoslavia

and the target, tops 7-9,000'. On return, 8-10/10th strato-cumulus to Yugoslav coast with scattered clouds over Italy. Visibility, 12-15 miles throughout.

8. 27 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1355 hours. One a/c with severe battle damage, crash-landed at Gioia. The crew escaped injury in the landing. One of our a/c is missing. It was last seen on the Yugoslav border on the return route. (EEA report filed).

9. 20 a/c were damaged by flak. All crew members sustained wounds; one hand, one head, five leg, one side, two knee and one arm wound.

10. 10 a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

11. Observations: Vienna area, two landing strips just after target at 1042 and 1043. 35 ME-109s on one strip and 3 ME-109s on the other, 24,000'.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, Air Corps,  
S-2

2 Incls.  
Incl 1 - TC  
Incl 2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

13 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #97, Operations Order #174.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 12 September 1944, at 0815 hours, 31 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the Wasserberg A/C Factory nr Leipheim, Germany. The Group was led by Lt. Colonel Harold T. Babb, Deputy Group Commander, and the second attack unit by Captain Britt S. May, Assistant S-3.

2. Group assembly and rendezvous with the 485th were accomplished as scheduled. The Wing formed over Spinazzola at 0928 hours, the 460th flying in the #2 position. Fighter escort, P-38s and P-51s, first sighted at 1128 hours at (4532N-1243E) furnished penetration and target cover. They were last seen at the target at 1309 hours.

3. Two a/c returned early for the following reasons: (1) engine failure, (2) runaway prop. One a/c jettisoned bombs in the Adriatic, the other a/c's propeller ran away over the base and bombs were jettisoned in the fields nearby. Two crew members bailed out at this time. There was no casualty.

4. At 22,100', 29 a/c were over the primary target, the Wasserberg A/C Factory at 1309 hours. 27 a/c dropped 65 tons of 1000 lb GP bombs, .1N & .01T fusing. A heavy concentration of bombs on the target caused extensive damage. Four direct hits were scored on the a/c factory building, the assigned KPA, a direct hit on an unidentified building south of the main factory building causing explosions, many direct hits on the warehouses and storage buildings both north and south and across the tracks from the factory. Due to engine failure, one a/c jettisoned bombs at the IP, and three a/c had 10 bombs hung up that were later jettisoned: 6 bombs in the Adriatic and 4 bombs in the Alps. Automatic pilot was used by both attack units on the run.

5. The Group did not encounter flak over the target. MIH flak was reported at Bolzano (4630N-1120E) both white and black bursts. In the Munchen area, crews reported a heavy smoke screen in operation at 1233 hours.

6. Eight e/a were seen on the mission. Over the Italian coast, on route, 2 ME-109s were seen at 1150 hours, and 2 SEFs were seen five

minutes after target time. P-38s chased these e/a away. At an A/D 10 miles N. of the target, 4 e/a were observed taking off. These e/a are believed to have been jet-propelled, because of the type of trails left.

7. The route was flown as briefed. Weather: On route, 1-4/10th strato-cumulus, tops 4000', visibility 15 miles. Over target, 2/10th cumulus, visibility 20 miles. On the return route, 2-3/10th cumulus, visibility 15 miles.

8. 26 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1610 hours. One a/c landed at a friendly field near Bari to refuel and has since returned. Two a/c landed at friendly fields, Pescara and Foggia.

9. 10 a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

10. Observations: a. Ingolstadt A/D, 40 SEF & TEF at 1255 hrs, 22000'. b. Villorba A/D (4545-1215), 40-50 SEF at 1120 hrs, 20,000'. c. Aviano A/D, 2 TEF & 2 SEF at 1135 hours, 20,000'. d. Roverado A/D (4603-1236), 11 SEF & 4 TEF at 1145 hrs, 21400'.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, Air Corps,  
S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - TC

Incl 2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

14 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #98, Operations Order #175.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 13 September 1944, at 0615 hours, 30 of 31 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb Oswiecim Oil & Rubber Plant in Poland. One a/c with magneto trouble, failed to take off. The Group was led by Major Charles C. Ward, C.O., 763rd Bomb Sqdn, and the second attack unit by Major Charles F. Lincoln, C.O., 762nd Bomb Sqdn.

2. Group assembly and rendezvous with the 485th was accomplished as scheduled but the 464th & 465th were in this Group's assembly area. The Wing formed over Spinazzola at 0741 hours, six minutes late. Fighter escort, P-38s and P-51s, first sighted at 0935 hours at Virovitka, furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They were last seen at 1340 hours on the Yugoslav coast.

3. Five a/c returned early for the following reasons: (1) two superchargers out, (2) carburetor flooded, (3) supercharger out, (4) insufficient gasoline, (5) oxygen leak and engine throwing oil. These a/c all returned bombs to base.

4. At 23,000', 25 a/c dropped 62.5 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N & .025T fusing, on the primary Target at 1122 hours. The main concentration of bombs fell in the south-central portion of the refinery. Hits were scored in the labor camp, construction stores and shops. Plant was obscured and further detailed analysis not possible. The first attack unit used the automatic pilot on the bomb run but the second attack unit used PDI because it was flying too close to the first attack unit.

5. The Group encountered IAH flak for 7-8 minutes over the target. Black, white and red bursts were observed. Rocket flak was also encountered, one burst being 6-7 feet wide with a streamer 10 feet long, red in color and oval in shape. Other flak: MAH Mor (4723N-1812E), SIH Gyer, MAH Bicake (4745N-1833E), SIH Komaron, MAH at (4732n-1822e), AND sih ne END OF Lake Balaton. Smoke pots were in operation along the west side of the target, smoke being 5/10th density.

6. 9 e/a were seen on the mission. At 1000 hours, one ME-109 at (4700N-1730E). Six ME-109s (black) were seen immediately after target and on one FW-190 (brown-grey) at Lake Balaton at 1015 hours.

ME-109 at Lake Balaton was OD color, yellow tail with a white square on the vertical stabilizer. An ME163 was seen North of Budapest at 1040 hours.

7. The route out was flown as briefed but the return route was flown right of the briefed course passing over the western edge of Budapest and the NE end of Lake Balaton. Weather: On route, 2-3/10th strato-cumulus over Italy and Adriatic increasing to 9-10/10th over Yugoslav Mts and decreasing to 3-5/10th over the target. Weather on return was the same except over Italy which had increased to 6-7/10th cumulus. Visibility: 15-20 miles.

8. 20 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1445 hours. Two a/c landed at friendly fields (Bari & Vis). One of these a/c (Vis) has since returned to base. One a/c ditched in the Adriatic with three crew members lost. Two a/c are missing: These a/c were both hit by flak over the target. They were last seen over the target, one a/c with the #4 engine smoking and losing altitude. (EEA Reports filed)

9. 14 a/c were damaged by flak. Two crew members sustained leg wounds from flak.

10. 10 a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

11. Observations: a. Stauding (4944N-1805E), industrial area and a/c factory very active at 1100 hours, 20,000'. b. Crews report that a Capt. Horn, pilot of a B-24, was broadcasting on VHF and giving headings, altitude, ETAs, etc. This occurred for an hour and a half on the return trip. Our crew made unsuccessful attempts to jam the frequency.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, Air Corps,  
S-2

2 Incls.  
Incl 1 - TC  
Incl 2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

18 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #99, Operations Order #179.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 17 September 1944, at 0745 hours, 30 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the Budapest/Magyar O/R in Hungary. The Group was led by Major Richard E. Anderson, S-3, 761st Bomb Sqdn, and the second attack unit by Captain Franklin E. Reaves, Ass't S-3, 760th Bomb Sqdn.

2. Group assembly and rendezvous with the 485th were accomplished as briefed. The 460th joined the Wing at 0908 hours on course ten minutes after departure from Spinazzola. Fighter escort, P-38s, first seen at 1059 hours at (4614N-1800E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1300 hours at (4434N-1622E).

3. Three a/c returned early for the following reasons: (1) engine failure, (2) & (3) lost formation. These a/c returned bombs to base.

4. At 24,000', 26 a/c were over the primary target at 1156 hours. 25 a/c dropped 63.5 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N & .01&.025T fusing. One a/c, unable to join our formation, flew with the 485th and dropped 2.5 tons on the target with that Group. An excellent concentration of bombs completely covered the target with many direct hits on cracking units and finished product storage tanks, causing numerous large fires and explosions. Ten hits were also scored on the M/Y east of the refinery damaging about 20 cars. Due to rack malfunction, one a/c failed to drop bombs on the target and jettisoned bombs in a field about 40 miles SW of the target. Four a/c had six bombs hung up which were jettisoned in the Adriatic. The first attack unit used the auto pilot on the bomb run but the leader of the second attack unit was not able to do so because of malfunction.

5. The Group experienced M-IIH flak over the target. Bursts were black and white and approximately five minutes in duration.

6. Seven e/a were seen on the mission: Six ME-109s were seen at the Rally Point at 1200 hours and one TEF (Single fin) at (4500N-1700E) at 1045 hours.

7. The route was flown as briefed. Weather: On take off, 3-5/10th strato-cumulus increasing to 7-9/10th over the Adriatic. Over

Yugoslavia, 8-10/10th strato-cumulus with 1-3/10th cumulus over the target. Weather on return was the same except over Adriatic with 3-5/10th strato-cumulus and 6-8/10th over Italy. Visibility: 15 to 20 miles.

8. 27 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1435 hours.

9. Four a/c were slightly damaged by flak. One crew member sustained a scratch on his elbow from flak.

10. Ten a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

11. Observations: Budapest/Matyasfold A/D, 30 ME-109s at 1156 hrs, 24,000'. Kecakaset A/D (4707N-1946E), 20 SEF and 2 large planes at 1134 hours, 23,000'.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN E. MAGARET,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Act'g GroupS-2

2 Incls  
Incl 1 - TC  
Incl 2 - Photos



HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

19 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #100, Operations Order #180.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 18 September 1944, at 0621 hours, 31 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the Budapest South RR Bridge in Hungary. The Group was led by Major Charles F. Lincoln, C.O., 762nd Bomb Sqdn, and the second attack unit was led by Major William H. James, Jr., S-3, 763rd Bomb Sqdn.

2. The Group assembled over the base at 0715 hours assembly being accomplished at 12,000' to avoid cloud cover at the briefed altitude. Rendezvous with the 485th was accomplished at 0725 hours, seven miles SSW of the base, the 485th flying over to our area to rendezvous. Wing rendezvous was not accomplished as briefed but later at (4502N-1704E) at 0926 hours. Fighter escort, P-38s, first sighted at (4450N-1640E) at 0905 hours furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at (4615N-1750E) at 1230 hours.

3. As the formation began the bomb run, the target was visible but shortly thereafter, it was obscured by strato-cumulus clouds. It remained obscured until about twenty seconds before bombs away and so an extremely short actual bomb run resulted. At 23,100', 31 a/c were over the primary target at 1124 hours. Eight a/c dropped .19 tons of 1000 lb RDX bombs, .1N no delayT fusing, and twenty a/c dropped 39 tons of 2000 lb RDX bombs, .1N no delayT fusing. The heavy concentration of bombs fell on the west approach to the bridge cutting the tracks. Some fell over and extended to the river. Three a/c failed to release bombs on the target for the following reasons: (1) bomb bay doors inoperative, (2) #2 engine failure, (3) bomb rack malfunction. Two a/c jettisoned bombs (4x2000) in fields near Budapest and one a/c returned bombs (2x2000) to the base. Two a/c failed to drop three bombs on the target. One bomb (1x2000) was jettisoned near the IP and the other two bombs (2x1000) was jettisoned in the Adriatic. Both attack units used auto. Pilot on bomb run.

4. The Group experienced IIH flak over the primary target, the concentration being to the left and below the formation. Flak was experienced for 4 to 5 minutes with red and black bursts observed.

5. The route was flown as briefed. Weather: On take off, 7-9/10th strato-cumulus, tops 10-12,000' breaking to 1-3/10th over

Yugoslavia and Hungary. Same weather on return except 6-8/10th cumulus over Italy, bases 5-6000'. Visibility, 15-25 miles.

6. 29 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1420 hours. Two a/c landed at Vis to refuel and have since returned.

7. Six a/c were slightly damaged by flak. One crew member sustained a slight eye wound.

8. Ten a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

9. Observations: a. A/D (4655N-1940E), 1 B-17 & 5 SEF on field at 1028 hours, 23,000'. b. A/D Budapest South, 21 SEF & 4 transports at 1128 hours, 22,000'.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN L. MAGARET,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Acting Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - TC

Incl 2 - Photo

Incl 3 - Negative 9/17/44

Incl 4 - Negative 9/18/44

Incl 5 - Negative 9/19/44

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

21 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #101, Operations Order #182.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 20 September 1944, at 0735 hours, 31 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the Hatvan M/Y in Hungary. The Group was led by Captain Britt S. May, Ass't S-3, and the second attack unit was led by Captain Henry L. Downey, Flt Comdr, 761st Bomb Sqdn.

2. The Group formed in the assigned Quadrant but did not make the 360 degree turn over the cone of silence. The Group joined the Wing formation over the Italian coast. Fighter escort, P-38s & P-51s, were first sighted on the bomb run. They furnished withdrawal cover to (4610N-1750E), leaving the formation at 1151 hours.

3. From 12,500', 31 a/c were over the primary target at 1151 hours. 16 a/c (the first attack unit plus 3 a/c) dropped 40 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N & .01T fusing, and 14 a/c of the second attack unit dropped 34.75 tons of M-17 incendiary clusters. M/Y well covered. Many hits on goods wagons concentrated in west side near foot bridge. Eight hits in and around station. Five hits in factory to east of M/Y. Incendiaries concentrated in area of sheds in N.E. corner. Another concentration in area of station and turntable. Another among goods wagons on west side of M/Y. Due to malfunction in the toggle switch, one a/c failed to bomb and jettisoned ten bombs (500-RDX) 3000' south of the target. One a/c had one bomb (incendiary) hung up. This a/c returned bomb to base but upon landing, the bomb fell through the bomb bay doors onto the runway. The first attack unit used the auto pilot on the bomb run but the second attack unit used PDI.

4. There was no flak defenses at the primary target. In the Dunafoldvar (4648N-1855E) - Paks (4638N-1854E) area, SIL flak was encountered. Fifteen barrage balloons were reported at Paks.

5. The route was flown as briefed. Weather: On route, 4-6/10th alto-cumulus, bases 11-13000' over Italy. Scattered strato-cumulus and 2-4/10th cirrus over Yugoslavia and the target. On return, 2-4/10th cumulus over Yugoslavia increasing to 6-8/10th over the Adriatic and Italy. Visibility: 15-20 miles.

6. 31 a/c returned to the base with a mean landing time of 1510 hours.

7. 10 planes attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

8. Observations: a. (4732N-2003E) 25 MTs heading SE, 1130 hrs, 12,500'. b. (4650N-1911E) 50-car train heading SE, 1104 hrs, 12,000'. c. (4754N-2022E) 50-car train heading N, 1031 hrs, 12,000'. d. 4509N-1715E) Bos Gradiska, pontoon bridge over Sava River, 1019 hrs, 13000'. e. (4801N-1951E) Kis Tereny, S 50-car train arriving from south, 1140 hrs, 12000'. f. (4658N-1901E) Szalkszentmarton, 5 full trains at 1210 hrs, 11,500'. g. Gyengyoz, 500 cars in M/Y and many MTs in convoy heading to town at 1141 hrs, 11,400'. h. A/D Kecskemet, 20 TEF on field at 1110 hrs, 12000'. (All M/Ys in vicinity of Budapest very active).

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, Air Corps,  
S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - TC

Incl 2 - Photo

Incl 3 - Neg. 9/20/44

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

23 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #102, Operations Order #185.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 22 September 1944, at 0805 hours, 31 scheduled a/c were dispatched. The Group was led by Major Charles C. Ward, C.O., 763rd Bomb Sqdn, and the second attack unit by Major George S. Davis, Jr., S-3, 762nd Bomb Sqdn.

2. Group assembly and rendezvous were accomplished without incident. Fighter escort, P-38s & P-51s, first sighted at (4406N-1421E), at 1045 hours, furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at (4650N-1237E) at 1315 hours.

3. Four a/c returned early for the following reasons: (1) three superchargers out, (2) #1 engine malfunction, (3) Spark plug blown out of #2 engine, (4) #4 engine vibrating. Two a/c returned bombs to base, one a/c jettisoned in Adriatic and one a/c jettisoned six bombs and returned four to base.

4. Because of cloud conditions which interfered with visual bombing of the primary target, the NE Industrial Area of Munich was attacked. At 23,150', 27 a/c were over this target at 1248 hours. 26 a/c dropped 64.75 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N & .01T fusing. The first attack unit used PFF. Photographs indicate bomb strikes in the railroad repair shops. Due to release malfunction, one a/c failed to bomb the target and jettisoned bombs fifteen minutes after the target. One a/c had one bomb hung up that was later jettisoned in the Adriatic.

5. The Group encountered IAH flak over the target for approximately seven minutes. Black, white and red bursts which hung in the air, were observed. Flak was reported at 4748N-1303E) and 20 smoke generators were in operation screening a five-mile radius of what appeared to be an airdrome.

6. The route was not flown as briefed. On route between the key point and the next turn point, the formation was to the right of course, passing near Salzburg. The return route was flown the reciprocal of the briefed route out. Weather: On take-off, 6-7/10th alto cumulus, tops 9000' which extended to the North Adriatic where it was 2-4/10th alto cumulus and 1/10th cirrus. Over the Alps, 4-7/10th cumulus with 5-6/10th cumulus and 2-3/10th cirrus over the target. On

return, weather was same except 1-3/10th cumulus over the Adriatic. Visibility, 20-30 miles.

7. One e/a was seen on the mission. This ME-109 was on the tail of a P-38 in the target area.

8. 27 a/c returned to the base with a mean landing time of 1540 hours. Two a/c failed to return and crews report both of them headed for Switzerland. These a/c were severely damaged by flak over the target, one a/c observed with the #3 engine smoking and the other a/c with the #3 engine and bomb bay smoking. (EEA Reports files)

9. 19 a/c were damaged by flak. One a/c received over 200 flak holes and had the left elevator almost completely shot away. This a/c was able to return to base. The tail gunner was killed by flak over the target.

10. 10 a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

11. Observations: a. Brioni (4455N-1345E) 2 large M/Vs at 1353 hrs, 12000'. b. Munich Oberweisenfold A/D, 50 a/c at 1248 hts, 23,000'. c. A/D (4604N-1237E) 20 SEF at 1120 hrs, 21000'. d. (4558N-1234E) 100-car train headed NW at 1132 hrs, 23000'.

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, AC,  
S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - TC

Incl 2 - Photo

Incl 3 - Neg 9/22/44

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

24 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #103, Operations Order #186.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 23 September 1944, at 0740 hours, 31 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the Tagliamenta-Casarsa RR Bridge, Italy. The Group was led by Lt. Colonel Harold T. Babb, Group Commander, and the second attack unit by Major Robert H. Martin, C.O., 760th Bomb Sqdn.

2. Group assembly in the original area was on time. Rendezvous with the 485th over Altamura was also on time. In position, the 460th followed the lead group through an extra turn which brought both to wing rendezvous slightly late.

3. 31 a/c were over the primary target, the Tagliamenta-Casarsa bridge, at 1113 hours. From 13,500', 25 a/c dropped 49 tons of 2000 lb bombs (load 18RDX&34GO) and 5 a/c dropped 11 tons of 1000 lb GP bombs, fusing .1N-no delay. Target was cloud obscured during the last thirty-five seconds of the bomb run. Bombs were released on Synchronization already set up. The first attack unit reports good concentration on eastern half of bridge, extending to approaches. Direct hits reported. Cloud obscured observation of results of second attack unit. Auto pilot was used by both units. Due to rack malfunction, one a/c jettisoned one 2000 lb bomb in a field three minutes before the target, and one a/c returned two 2000 lb bombs to the base.

4. The route was flown as briefed. Weather: On take off, 2-5/10th strato-cumulus, tops 4000', with 5-6/10th and 6-7/10th cirrus over central Adriatic. Over the target, 7-8/10th cumulus. On return, weather was the same in reverse, visibility 10-15 miles throughout.

5. 31 a/c returned to the base with a mean landing time of 1345 hours.

6. 10 a/c attempted photos. All prints are cloud obscured. One print showing bombs falling towards the bridge is attached.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, Air Corps,  
S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - TC

Incl 2 - Photo

Incl 3 - Neg 9/23/44



HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

25 September 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #104, Operations Order #187.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 24 September 1944, at 0750 hours, 31 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the Salonika M/Y, Greece. The Group was led by Major Charles F. Lincoln, C.O., 762nd Bomb Sqdn, and the second attack unit by Major William H. James, Jr., S-3, 763rd Bomb Sqdn.

2. The Group assembled as planned and made rendezvous with the 485th over Altamura at 0911 hours. The first attack wave, (485-460) was over Spinazzola at 0923 hours, three minutes late.

3. Three a/c returned early for the following reasons: (1) two superchargers out, (2) #1 engine oil leak, (3) four superchargers out. Two a/c returned bombs to base and one a/c jettisoned ten bombs in the Adriatic.

4. As the Group leader neared the Primary Target, it was discovered that the altimeter and air speed indicator were inoperative. For these reasons, the Deputy Group leader, Major Glenn L. Chamberlain, took over the lead position at 1059 hours. 28 a/c were over the Salonika West M/Y at 1116 hours. From 23,400' 27 a/c dropped 67.5 tons of 500 lb GP bombs, .1N-no delay tail fusing. There was a good concentration of bombs in the direct center of the M/Y, but full extent of the damage cannot be ascertained due to smoke on the east choke point probably cut through lines. Some bombs dropped short. Due to malfunction, one a/c failed to bomb the target and later jettisoned bombs in the Adriatic.

5. The Group encountered IAH flak for approximately six minutes over the primary target and on the rally. Several flak cars were firing from the main RR line running NW from Salonika. Bursts were black with some incendiary bursts. Other flak: SAH at Konitsa (4003N-2042E) & Ioannina (3940N-2050E).

6. The route was flown as briefed. Weather: On take off, 6-8/10th strato-cumulus clearing to 2-3/10th just after take off, with a few scattered cumulus over the Adriatic. Target area, clear. On return, weather was the same with 6-7/10th cumulus over Italy. Visibility: On take off, 10 to 15 miles, thence, 20-30 miles.

7. 28 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1335 hours.

8. 16 a/c were damaged by flak. Two crew members received flak wounds, one calf and one thigh.

9. 10 a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

10. Observations: a. Salonika Hbr, one large transport and 10 MVs at 1116 hours, 23,400'. Oil refinery at (4050N-2235E). b. Corfu Hbr, 1 freighter and 3 escort vessels at 1020 hours, 13000'. c. (4040N-2240E) A/D with 20-30 multi-engine a/c at 1118 hours, 22000'.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, Air Corps,  
S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Photo

Incl 2 - TC

H I S T O R I C A L

P H O T O S

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"S-2 SEES IT THROUGH"

by

MAJOR ROGER WARNER  
S-2, 460th BG

## S-2 Sees It Through

By Major ROGER WARNER, S-2  
460th Bomb Group (H)

Combat Intelligence, as known and practiced in the Fifteenth Air Force, is a comparatively new development in the American Army. It is a leaf taken out of the RAF's book of experience, and rewritten to suit American organization, tactics and temperaments. Groups have done without it in combat, to their own detriment. It was not understood, for instance, in its present highly developed state by the 19<sup>th</sup> Group in their operations in the Pacific. It has been misunderstood, or its importance minimized, by some Group Commanders newly arrived in this theatre of operations.

S-2 is a staff officer, a statement obvious but important, in that relationship of staff to command is basic. Staff inevitably will reflect command. Without an interest in intelligence, a willingness to give it an even break with other staff functions, and an appreciation of what it can mean in combat, the Group Commander cannot receive from his S-2 section the work they are capable of doing for him. He may receive less than the best, because he thinks he can get along well enough without it. The kind of battle courage that prompted Farragut to shout, "Damn the torpedoes," was misapplied by the Group Commander who said, "Damn the flak," and proceeded to fly through it unnecessarily on routes to and from his targets.

The Group Commander may be thankful to S-1, who relieves him of boring paper work, may revere S-3, his brother flying officer, and request "good old S-4, who keeps the airplanes in flying condition, but at the same time look upon S-2 as some modern and unnecessary decoration. To work efficiently, S-2 must have from the beginning an even break with the other staff officers in working relations with his commanding officer and in the physical accommodations allotted to his section. If, in the turmoil of setting up in the field, the actual working needs of S-2 are lost sight of, or discounted, he fights an uphill and discouraging fight against his own commanding officer. He does his work of preparation for missions, interrogating and reporting the hard way. The time is delayed when he can bring out the best work of which his section is capable.

Intelligence in the 460th Bomb Group (H) went through growing pains. This article will discuss symptoms and deal with the situation as it exists at the end of six months of operation, long after the pains have passed away. It will record improvements that took place meantime.

The first concern of the Group S-2, naturally, was the varying qualities and talents of the officers and enlisted men he found in his section. At once his situation differed from that of the department

head in a business. The business executive could pick and choose his people, ascertaining their capabilities first and hiring them for the jobs in mind. In the army, the department head must work with people assigned to him more or less blindly, from this place and that, in this cadre and that. Only after he had observed them over a period of time, and had developed their capabilities, could he hope to weld them into a strong department.

S-2 officers in the 460th Bomb Group (H) varied in age from twenty-three to fifty-two. Civilian background included student, farmer, storekeeper, salesman, accountant, restaurant owner, radio announcer and executives in insurance, manufacturing and public relations. All had graduated from AAFIS, Harrisburg, Pa., and five had been through AAFSAT, Orlando, Fla., with the key personnel of the Group. All had the background of months of practical experience in the field with RTU Groups. At Chatham Field, Ga., where the Group trained, almost twice the minimum requirements in Intelligence had been accomplished in the abbreviated 2nd and normal 3rd phase periods.

Yet change from training to combat called for new talents and imposed new stresses and strains. New duties had to be performed by the officers best qualified. There would be specialization in Escape, Enemy Fighter Tactics, Recognition, Censorship, History, Reports and Counter-Intelligence. The old, familiar jobs of briefing and interrogation were sharpened to meet the needs of combat.

In combat the Group, rather than the squadron, became the important tactical unit. Briefing, like flying, was a group function. Group S-2 briefed the first twelve combat missions. This was not, on his part, presumption that he could do a better job than another S-2 office. It was rather an attempt to profit by his own mistakes, understand and meet the wishes of the Commanding Officer and arrive at an adjustment with S-3 on briefing procedure. These having been accomplished, briefing was turned over to teams, four in number, each composed of an S-2 officer to brief combat crew officers and an S-2 officer to brief gunners in their separate room. Before the Group became operational, there had been dry runs on briefings, in which all S-2 officers took part. Now, in the actual work, one officer after another was tried and coached and criticized. Regardless of rank, the officer better qualified to give the "main," or officers' briefing, was selected. An assistant, a lieutenant, might brief the officers and the Squadron S-2, a captain, the gunners. Group S-2 and Ass't S-2 remained one of the teams, and took their turns in the briefings. The fact that some officers proved unsuitable for briefings, did not end their usefulness to the Group. There were many jobs to be done. There was work for all.

Actual preparation for briefing, as smooth and perfected by months of operation, begins the night before the mission. S-3 and S-2 do the job together. Bombardier, Navigator, Intelligence, usually in

the War Room, study together, help each other, think from 20,000 feet. As soon as the field order comes in, the night shift of S-2 enlisted men quit their card game. The route is posted on the master map in the War Room. The material in objective folder is studied, the maps, charts and photographs to be shown in the balopticon selected, marked with route or MFI, and their sequence decided upon. (A handy tool here is a cardboard frame which shows exactly how much of a chart may be projected.) Sectional maps in sets, one each for lead navigators, deputy and box leaders, are marked with flak along and near the route to be flown. Target charts and photographs to be issued to bombardiers are set aside. Escape kits, ten to a musette bag, are in readiness, as are proper receipts to be signed by the co-pilots.

During the night the route, with relevant flak areas, is posted on the maps in officers' and gunners' briefing rooms. Neat labels show key points, initial print, primary and alternate targets and targets of the rest of the Air Force. The stage is set, the curtain is drawn. When the night shift knows its business, briefing officers can walk into the room next morning, confident that every detail behind the curtain is correct.

Briefings at the 460th seldom last more than half an hour. Often, they are shorter. Four officers regularly take part - Navigator, S-2, S-3, Weather. The Commanding Officer may or may not speak. Short separate briefings follow. What S-2 has to say, plus his discussion and description of primary and alternate targets, may consume more time than is taken by any other officer. Yet what S-2 leaves out of his portion of the briefing is almost as important as what he puts in. His night work is that of selecting, editing, arranging those facts and displays which will put his story over most clearly to the combat crews. The Intelligence Annex is a valuable tool. It may be amplified by facts about the war situation or the target derived from other sources. Information in the Annex is not presented in the sequence written. An outline of a typical briefing for officers follows:

- A. The military importance of the target and its relation to the war situation.
- B. The coordinated attack to be made by Air Force.
- C. Fighter escort.
- D. Enemy defenses, flak and fighters.
- E. The description of the targets, with check points from I.P.
- F. Escape pointers, showing in balopticon safe landing areas if they apply. (All crews have a background of several hours instruction in escape and prisoner of war conduct.)

One officer conducts the entire briefing of gunners, giving route, fighter rendezvous, weather, in addition to intelligence. In general, he follows the outline above, though target description is not as detailed. He includes a review of enemy fighters and the escort with their markings.

S-2's part in a briefing is not oratory, and it should have none of the tricks of oratory, or the high-strung fervor of the football coaches pep talk. Instead, S-2's manner should be businesslike and his diction straight-forward. He need not strive for effect, for his subject is inherently interesting. He is instructing men about to fly on a mission of great military importance and possibly great danger, and should conduct himself with modesty. Humor should be used sparingly, if at all. Forced humor is likely to fall pretty flat in front of an audience routed out of bed before daylight, hurried through breakfast, faced with hours of difficult flying, the certainty of flak and the possibility of fighters.

The Chaplain customarily opens briefings with a short prayer. The wisdom of combining prayer with operational instructions may be questioned. It has been a 460th custom from the beginning. If it gives confidence to young men facing dangerous tasks, it is worthwhile. The fact that crews have missed the Chaplain when he has been away and have asked for his return is one measure of the value of his prayers.

Briefing deserves a setting in keeping with its importance. The room must be large enough to seat the audience without crowding. Briefing map and screen for balopticon must be at proper height. Desk for notes must have proper lighting and there must be arrangements for blackout. If, in addition, the shape of the room makes possible appropriate decoration, a subtle but important element of dignity is added to every meeting in it. Combat crews, usually under strain during briefings, react to their surroundings, whether consciously or unconsciously, and sometimes they are very sensitive to them. There was, for instance, the pilot who requested that the dingy mail. Used as a curtain over the map, be turned with the yellow side rather than the black side towards the audience. Black be considered funeral. His request was granted.

The main briefing room of the 460th was the hay barn of a large farm. Unbroken walls of rough tufa rock and high roof of tile gave it somewhat the proportions of a chapel. Along the right wall neatly lettered white plaques display the names of the missions flown by the Group. They have passed one hundred. Here the National colors hang during briefings. Shortly the opposite wall will be used for more missions. A separate display records the numbers of enemy aircraft credited to the Group.

The Gunners' Briefing Room, next door, was a wine cellar. It has low arched ceilings, and arched bays on either side. Its walls have been decorated with the National colors, the Fifteenth Air Force symbol, and with a well-chosen and well painted mural of enemy and friendly fighters. This room is available for daytime classes with balopticon. It needs no blacking out.

Interrogation in the 460th started as a Group function. Circles of fin rack chairs were arranged in the original briefing room and an



S-2 officer assigned to each. The system had obvious advantages. It was quick, because as soon as one crew was through, another took its place, regardless of squadron. It was flexible, in that significant facts discovered by one S-2 officer could be checked at once by other interrogators. It made for control and quick reporting. Analysis of interrogation forms could begin almost at once. About as soon as the interrogation was concluded, a consolidated report could be ready.

The early change from Group to squadron interrogation was concession to the layout of the airbase rather than a criticism of the method. The farthest hardstand on the line was almost three miles from Group Headquarters, and transportation was at a premium. Crews had to turn in flying equipment, ride the three miles before interrogation, and another half mile afterwards to their camp area. The change to Squadron interrogation increased the comfort of men who fly. But it slowed interrogation and made prompt reporting, by Squadrons and Group, more difficult. The situation was further complicated by the lack of transportation. Group S-2 had none, and found extreme difficulty in borrowing. Squadron S-2's had none. To begin with, an enlisted man would start from the squadron S-2 tent on foot, with the interrogation forms, hoping to catch a ride to Group Headquarters. The returning of escape kits and purses by these methods was haphazard and unguarded.

The whole unsatisfactory situation was eventually cured by two factors, both of which contributed speed. One was the assignment of a battered command car to Group S-2. Evidently a veteran of North Africa, Sicily and the Italian invasion, it would still run most of the time. In it, interrogation forms and escape kits were collected promptly from Squadron S-2 tents.

The other factor of speed was a new attitude towards interrogation on the part of Squadron S-2s, a streamlining of the whole process. In training, the interrogation form had been a means of indoctrinating crews in the importance of accurate observation. As a process of education, it could be gone over patiently and thoroughly with each crew member. In combat, it was only an aid in collecting military information -- and that quickly. In the 460th the form became a guide, a general outline, rather than a ritual. Group S-2 pointed out to the Squadron S-2s that certain facts about most missions are not open to doubt and can be skipped or passed over quickly, after the first few crews had been interrogated. Thus weather, flak and general results are seldom in question. "But what did you do with your bombs?" requires a specific answer. Observations may be of greater importance or little, in which case the crews can be turned off - tactfully. A special form for the lead navigator covers group assembly, wing rendezvous, escort, time over target. Lead navigator draws route flown on the track chart. Weather is collected from selected crews. When encounters with enemy a/c occur, they must be recorded in detail. Claims are developed in a separate meeting with Squadron S-2 the next

day. Information of our own a/c in distress is sifted thoroughly, for it becomes the basis of Escape and Evasion Reports. Squadron S-2s, as aide to interrogation in their tents on the line, post maps with the route briefed and display target charts or photographs on which the briefed MPI is marked. Squadron officers arrange their interrogation and refreshment tents as they please. The only standard thing is that two crews may be seated and interrogated at once.

Because of leaves, trips to Rose and detached service, it often happens that there is only one S-2 officer on duty in the Squadron. Perhaps because most S-2 officers are older than most flying officers, and their experience in business administration wider, the Intelligence section has been depleted from time to time by assignment to other duties. Thus, it supplied the Group PRO Officer, the Group Adjutant, and for a time, a Squadron Executive Officer. In the beginning, it would have been impossible to get along with one S-2 officer per Squadron. The necessary time schedule of reporting would have suffered. But as the interest in Intelligence has grown, and its importance become more thoroughly realized, Squadron S-2 has not lacked able, volunteer assistants. The Squadron navigator and bombardier, provided they are not flying, are glad to help at interrogation, as are pilots. These officers, like the S-2, know the crews personally, call them by their first name, an aid to ease of interrogation.

The battle seasoning of combat crews has been a great factor in swift, accurate reporting. As they flew more and more missions, their powers of observation became acute. It can be said truthfully that the original crews were given to understatement rather than to boasting. Their reports could be depended upon. Only battle experience has improved the replacements to the extent that their answers can be taken seriously. To begin with, sometimes, they wouldn't be sure where they had gone, what they had seen, what they had done.

At the 460th, the Circling Report is telephoned to Wing Headquarters by the Laster Sergeant who is head of the Group Section. This report makes no attempt to estimate the number of airplanes, virtually an impossibility when the formation is spilt into boxes or individual aircraft. Group S-2 and his assistant visit the line some minutes before the formation is due, in order to distribute special forms for lead navigator, issue any last-minute instructions. They interview the first ship or ships, down for the Flash Report. Putting in the Flash Report gives them a quick picture of what has happened, a background against which they can interpret the Interrogation Forms. Their procedure is to greet the officers, but question the gunners. A target chart or photograph is carried along as an interrogation aid.

It took a little while for the sergeants to realize the S-2 was interested in the bombs of the Group, not of a particular aircraft.

"Where did the bombs go?" Once a gunner, leaning out of the waist window was asked that familiar question.

"Six went right on the target, sir. I couldn't see the rest."

"Sergeant, did the Group hit the target?" persisted S-2.

"Couldn't see, sir. But six out of ten of our bombs did. I call that pretty damn good."

When the target is simple and results cannot be doubted, the Flash Report can be telephoned at once. When there is confusion about what happened, two or three airplanes must be visited and perhaps airplanes from both attack units. Usually Flash Report can be filed within ten minutes of a mean landing time, and sometimes ahead of mean landing time.

Within an hour of mean landing time, and often sooner, the interrogation forms collected from all four Squadrons, are in Group Headquarters. Analysis begins at once. In the beginning Squadron S-2s took turns in analyzing and reporting. This method was too slow. Now the same officers, Ass't S-2 and a Reporting Officer, do this work day after day, using short cuts learned by experience. Within an hour and a half from mean landing time, the Mission Report is ready. On a simple, clean-cut milk run, it has been filed within an hour.

Narrative Reports are compiled the same evening, or the next morning. It is a custom in the 460th to check the Narrative Report with the officers who led the mission, thus bringing out any unusual occurrences and thus incorporating his experience and judgement in the narrative.

There has been a tendency on the part of some flying officers to look upon narrative reports and, for that matter, upon bomb plots as means of exploiting the accomplishments of the Group and their own personal prowess. They have confused the function of digging out and reporting military information, which is S-2's, with the function of securing publicity, which is the MRO's. They have accused "INTOPS" of understatement. They have awakened the Photo Interpreter out of a sound sleep, and sitting on either side of his groggy form, have tried to make his plot additional bombs which his professional judgement told him were not there. Under these circumstances S-2 has had to protect his remaining shreds of intellectual honesty. He has pointed out that his reports and his photographs are military information for the use of the whole Air Force, that upon his findings the Commanding Generals of Wing, of the Air Force, might well base tomorrow's decisions as to the next day's missions, that his reports are as near unemotional truth and cold, hard fact as he can make them. That usually sufficed. Yet because they are military information, these same unemotional reports have furnished the basis for more than one individual award, and in the end, for a Group Citation.

S-2's own office, the War Room, has been in three pieces. It began in the present Security Room, which had been a granary. After grain and most of the rats has been removed, S-2 files began to take shape, as did situation maps. Classes and the first briefings were held in this room. Next, the War Room with a file of some six hundred Objective Folders was moved to the second floor, back of the Headquarters, an arrangement convenient for the Commanding Officer but annoying to almost everybody else. It meant that S-2 was separated from much of his working material and most of his personnel. It meant frequent trips up and down stairs, during the night, from the Security Room to War Room, and passing through a dormitory in which twenty officers were trying to sleep. Worse, separated the offices of S-3 and S-2. It was far from a sound working arrangement.

The final move was back to the Security Room, where a new War Room had been built. This room was situated between the offices of S-3 and the Security Room, which is where it belonged. Just outside the present War Room are files of Objective Folders, the photographic files, files of maps and target charts by the thousands. The Master Map, the map of record, is the feature of the War Room, and perhaps S-2's most important single piece of equipment. On it, flak areas are carefully recorded from "E" reports, from INTOPS, from the Group's own painful discoveries. Air fields and their fighters are checked day by day against all latest information. Safe landing areas, bomb lines, prisoner of war camps are posted. Commanding Officer and Staff refer to the Master Map frequently, sometimes many times a day. From it, if necessary, the Group could lay its own battle plans, write its own Intelligence Annex, choose the route, determine the proper axis of attacking and the better rally. No wonder, the Master Map in the War Room has become the center of the Group's planning.

A wide, well-lighted corridor of the Security Room contains the situation maps, kept for the benefit of the Group Staff and, more particularly, of the Combat Crews. As the war has grown in number of theatres and intensity, these maps have attracted more and more attention. Security Room is on the way to the distant shower baths, which may result in some increase in traffic; but soap and towel are not required admission tickets. It has become the habit of officers and enlisted men to check the situation maps daily. The maps are supported by the latest teletype news and incorporate the most recent radio news reports. In this same corridor are posted photographs of the previous day's bombing results. In the center of the area, a large table holds the newest intelligence publications of Wing and Air Force. At the side of the area, another table displays Air Force Escape and Evasion memoranda arranged by countries, and over the table is the latest Air Force map of safe landing areas. This material is for ready reference. It makes possible during briefings when time is at a premium, a quick escape review rather than the exhaustive escape lecture. Here is the logical follow-up to the lectures on escape and prisoner of war conduct given to new crews and repeated for all crews.

As the months have gone by, many changes and improvements in Intelligence in the 460th took place. Some of them, like the War Room, Security Room and the two Briefing Rooms, were permanent installations. They made for more efficient operation over a period of time. Other changes in working methods resulted from suggestions made by officers and enlisted men as they went about their work. Improvements have come about because each individual on the team was trying to better his own work and the work of the whole S-2 section for the benefit of the Group.

It is difficult to say where S-2 learned his job. Certainly, the schooling at Harrisburg, good as it was, could only introduce him to the many things he needs to know - and to feel. Advice and warnings given there only suggested the situations, psychological and diplomatic, in which he finds himself day and night, month after month, as his Group faces combat.

Along with the rest of the Group, often he will lack supplies, the very working materials of his trade. He must stretch what he has, or substitute. He will become expert in making stoves out of oil drums, tables out of scrap lumber, drawing boards from packing cases, filing cabinets from frag boxes. If he lacks a certain kind of map, he will draw it. Like any good soldier in the field, he will invent, or borrow, or requisition by midnight.

S-2's primary duties are clearly defined: "to keep the Commander, and all others concerned, informed of the enemy situation and capabilities." But the most valuable tool he can take with him into action is prescribed in no field manual and described in no text book. It is his regard for his combat crews. This will carry him through personal discomfort, weariness and discouragement. It is, perhaps, his best justification for being. It keeps him human, keeps him from becoming an automaton, expert at compiling facts and spouting figures. It can make his very presence a course of power in combat.

"I have a serious criticism to make of your briefings," said the pilot with some forty missions to his credit.

S-2 was all attention. Here, at last, was truthful comment on what he had been trying to do.

"What is it?" He asked in all humility.

"Well, you see it's this way. The things you tell us are true, all right. That's good! But the way you say them, and the tone of your voice, makes us go out of there thinking everything is going to be all right. That's bad!"

End

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

OF THE

460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

FIRST 100 MISSIONS

COMPILED BY

55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (H)

\* \* \* \*

DEDICATED TO

Colonel ROBERT T. CROWDER, Commanding Officer, 460th Bombardment Group, missing in action on a mission over Bucharest, 15 April 1944, who, by his conspicuous gallantry and exemplary leadership, has distinguished himself as a great commander and an inspiration to all under his command; and to the combat crews and ground personnel, who, by their enterprise, resourcefulness, and consistent efficiency under trying conditions, have produced the results herein.

28 September 1944.

Commanding Officer	-	Colonel BERTRAM C. HARRISON
Deputy C. O.	-	Lt. Col. HAROLD T. BABB
Executive Officer	-	Lt. Col. JAMES W. DAVENPORT
Adjutant	-	Lt. WILLIAM S. DONALDSON, JR.
Operations Officer	-	Lt. Col. WILLIAM B. CAMPBELL
Asst, Operations Officer	-	Captain BRITT S. MAY
Asst. Operations Officer	-	Captain JAMES L. CROSSLEY
Bombing Officer	-	Major JAMES B. CRAIN
Navigation Officer	-	Captain JACKSON D. LARGE
Intelligence Officer	-	Major ROGER WARNER
Engineering Officer	-	Major JOE H. MC GRAW
Surgeon	-	Major BAXTER H. TIMBERLAKE
Chaplain	-	Captain CARL R. DODDS
C.O. - 760th Bomb Squadron	-	Major ROBERT H. MARTIN
C.O. - 761st Bomb Squadron	-	Major ROBERT L. SPEAR
C.O. - 762nd Bomb Squadron	-	Major CHARLES F. LINCOLN
C.O. - 763rd Bomb Squadron	-	Major CHARLES C. WARD



C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S

- I. SCOPE OF OPERATIONS
- II. BOMBING ACCURACY
- III. VICTORIES AND LOSSES
- IV. EARLY RETURNS AND NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES
- V. STATUS OF COMBAT CREWS AND AIRCRAFT
- VI. SUMMARY

55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (H)

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS BY THE 460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

100 MISSIONS

FROM 19TH MARCH - 18TH SEPTEMBER 1944

I. SCOPE OF OPERATIONS:

When the 460th Bomb Group flew its 100th mission on September 18th, hitting the Budapest South Railroad Bridge in Hungary, it was exactly six months since it began its operations overseas in the Fifteenth Air Force, thereby capping an enviable record of combat performance. During this period missions were flown to every important target in nine European countries, namely, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

Our priority targets included both strategic and tactical operations and can be divided into six major spheres:

1. Oil refineries and oil storage installations.
2. Aircraft factories and facilities in Germany, Austria, and Hungary.
3. Marshalling yards on German supply routes to the Yugoslavian and Roumanian fronts, and operations in support of General Tito's Partisan forces in Yugoslavia.
4. Communication routes of supply in Northern Italy.
5. Tactical bombardment in support of our amphibious forces in Southern France, both before and on "D" day.
6. Harbors and shipping in Italy and France.

During the six-month period of operations, 3260 aircraft were dispatched, an average of slightly less than 33 aircraft per mission. There were 255 early returns, 7.5%, or approximately 1 out of 13 aircraft dispatched. 2741 aircraft bombed the assigned target or target of opportunity, slightly less than 28 per mission, with an effective sortie percentage of 82.6%, which, incidentally, exceeds the average of all B-24 units of the Fifteenth Air Force during the similar period. Approximately 22,000 hours of combat flying time were accumulated during this period, and 6183 tons of bombs were dropped, approximately 62 tons per mission, an average of 2.3 tons per effective sortie.

An analysis by target area of the 100 missions flown is as follows:

Italy	21
Roumania	17
Austria	15
France	13
Yugoslavia	11
Hungary	10
Germany	9
Poland	2
Czechoslovakia	<u>2</u>
	100

Principal targets attacked in Italy were the marshalling yards at Parma, Bologna, Ferrara, Treviso, Genoa, and many others; port installations at Leghorn, Genoa, and Triesta; two-day operations on troop concentrations at Valmontone; and the railroad bridges at Pano and Ferrara. The Ploesti Oil Refineries in Roumania were attacked eight times from May 5th to August 18th, the latest attacks just prior to its capture by the Russian armies. In Austria, our attacks were concentrated on aircraft and component parts factories at Wiener-Neustadt, Nounkirchen, Atsgersdorf, Naudorfl, and the Herman Goering Tank Works at Linz, one of our most successful operations. Also attacked were the air drones and landing grounds at Markersdorf and Zwolfaxing. Four missions were flown to oil refinery installations in the Vienna area, and the July 8th mission to Florisdorf was completed with success despite the most intensive anti-aircraft opposition. We attacked the marshalling yards at Amberiou, Lyons, and Nimes in France, the submarine docks at Toulon, and our operations in France were climaxed by attacks on gun positions at Sete on the 12th and 13th of August, St. Tropez on the 14th, and the Bourg St. Andeol Highway Bridge on the 15th, "D" day. In Yugoslavia and Hungary, our targets included the marshalling yards at Metkovic, Knin, Zagreb, and Nis, as well as the air drones at Zagreb, Mostar, and Belgrade. In Hungary, Budapest was attacked five times; included were the Duna aircraft factories, oil refineries and marshalling yards. Also attacked were the oil refinery installations at Szony and Petfurdo, and the railroad bridges at Szob and Szolnok. Targets in Germany included the Milbertshofen Ordnance Werks, Allach Motor Works and marshalling yards in Munich, the Manzell Aircraft works and Ober Raderach Chemical Works in Fredrichshafen, the North and South Synthetic Oil Plants in Blechhammer, and the jet-propelled aircraft factory in Wasserberg. The two targets each attacked in Czechoslovakia and Poland were the Pardubice Oil Refinery, the Moravska Ostrava Industrial Center, and the Czechowice Oil Refinery and Oswiwcim Synthetic Oil and Rubber Plant, respectively.

## II. BOMBING ACCURACY:

The criterion of successful accomplishment of a Group's task is effective bombing, and in this the 460th achieved admirable

results. In every month, exclusive of March when only one of the missions flown was effective, the 460th led all other Groups in the 55th Wing in precision bombing both within 600' and 1000' of the briefed aiming point, and also attained higher scores than the Fifteenth Air Force average during the similar period. In July, the 460th was the highest Group in the Air Force with 53.7% within 1000' of the briefed aiming point, second in August with 54.8%, and third in May with 29.2%, the only Group to place first, second and third during this period. For a graphic presentation of bombing accuracy in comparison with the Fifteenth Air Force average, see Exhibit #1.

An analysis of the 6183 tons of bombs dropped is shown graphically in Exhibit #2, and it is of note to point out that 4532 tons, 75% of the total tonnage, were expended on oil refineries, industrial installations and marshalling yards.




Exhibit #1




Exhibit #2

III. VICTORIES AND LOSSES:

56 enemy fighters were destroyed in air to air combat during this period, 24 were probably destroyed, and 16 damaged, all of these having been evaluated and approved. Interpretation of reconnaissance photographs of airdromes and landing grounds attacked revealed 10 aircraft were destroyed on the ground and 19 were damaged. Our losses to fighters were 7 aircraft, 21 were lost to flak, 26 are missing, and there were 19 other losses, partly attributable to flak damage resulting in the aircraft being crash landed, ditched, or abandoned, and partly attributable to personnel and mechanical failures. Total losses were 73 aircraft, a rate of 2.3 per 100 sorties. 40 (55% of the total) were lost on missions to German and Austrian targets, which is indicative of the intense flak and fighter opposition encountered in these areas.

The most reasonable measure of gunnery effectiveness is the number of victories achieved and the number lost to fighters based upon the number of encounters experienced. A total of 329 encounters were made by the Group, the greatest number in June when 119 were made, and since has decreased considerably. Only one encounter was made during the last 10 missions in September, and this fighter was destroyed. The 460th achieved an average of 17 victories per 100

encounters compared to the Air Force average of 15.3; our losses were 2.1 per 100 encounters compared to the Air Force average of 4.2, and victories per loss were 8.1 as compared to the Air Force rate of 3.7. Thus, the record speaks for itself; it emphasizes the success of "fire control formation" and the high degree of effectiveness of our gunners in defending their aircraft. A graphic presentation of victories and losses by months is shown in Exhibit #3.




Exhibit #3

IV. EARLY RETURNS AND NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES:

Early returns averaged 7.8% and non-effective sorties 9.8% for the 100 missions. Eliminating the 176 abortives attributable to poor weather both enroute to the target or over the target area, the percentage of non-effective sorties reduces to 4.5%. Both percentages reflect a very low rate, bearing in mind that the Group flew so great a number of missions in a short period of time despite sever flak and fighter damage occasioned on a large proportion of its missions. Taking all of the above into account, plus the fact that an average of approximately 33 aircraft were dispatched on each mission, speaks well of the Group in its persistence to carry out its operations under difficult conditions. A graphic presentation on analysis of early returns and non-effective sorties due to mechanical failure, aircraft

and accessory failure, and other miscellaneous reasons is shown in Exhibit #4.




Exhibit #4

V. STATUS OF COMBAT CREWS AND AIRCRAFT:

The average number of crews assigned varied from 75 in March to 56 in August, an average of 69 for the entire period. 83% of the crews were operational at all times. To indicate the degree of utilization of crews, Exhibit #5 was prepared, and it reveals that each operational crew flew an average of 55 sorties during the 100 missions, and average of 1.1 sortie every 2 missions. During the six-month period, 6 crews were killed in action and 53 were missing in action, many of whom were repatriated when Bulgaria and Roumania joined the side of the Allies, and many who evaded capture and returned. 65 crews completed their tour of duty. The crew strength at the present time consists entirely of replacement personnel.

Assigned aircraft were maintained on an average of 67% during the six-month period, as compared to the 55th Bomb Wing average of 69% and the Air Force average of 70%, shown graphically in Exhibit #6. Since July, the maintenance efficiency has increased considerably, averaging 81% to date in September. Aircraft grounded for parts averaged 10% of the assigned aircraft, however during the past two months it has declined steadily, and in September only 3% of the

assigned aircraft have been grounded for parts. Exhibit #5 likewise reflects the high utilization of aircraft, each operational aircraft flew an average of 80 sorties during the 100 missions, or an average of 2.4 sorties every 3 missions.




Exhibit #5






Exhibit #6

VI. SUMMARY:

Statistics alone can only portray arithmetical accomplishments; summaries which are unusually difficult to understand. What makes a group look good? The true criterion of successful combat performance is reflected in the ability of the Group to strike again and again at the very heart of the enemy's lifeline, his aircraft factories, his oil refineries, his main transportation systems, and his airdromes, often in weather both adverse and treacherous, in the face of mounting opposition from fighters and anti-aircraft guns, and in spite of loss of outstanding crews and key personnel.

Suck outstanding ability is reflected in the 21 accommodations which the 460th Bomb Group received from the Honorable Mr. HENRY L. STIMSON, Secretary of War, General GEORGE C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army, Lt. General CARL SPAATZ, Commanding General of USSTAF, Lt. General IRA C. EAKER, Commanding General of MAAF, Lt. General JAMES H. DOOLITTLE, Commanding General of the 8th Air Force, Major General NATHAN F. TWINING, Commanding General of the 15th Air Force, and Brigadier General GEORGE R. ACHESON, Commanding General of the 55th Bombardment Wing. Also tribute to the Group's achievements are the high number of decorations awarded to its

officers and men. As press dispatches put it when the Wing attained its 100th mission, the 460th, too, "with a tip of its wings to the past, and a salute to those who couldn't stay for the second hundred ..... sets its sights on the future and roars on to greater glory."

Compiled and prepared by  
55th Bombardment Wing  
Statistical Section  
28 September 1944.

Captain LOUIS J. SEALE,  
Statistical Control Officer.

Sgt. Frank O. Smith  
Sgt. Myron W. Berkowitz.