

H I S T O R Y

OF THE

4 6 0 T H B O M B A R D M E N T G R O U P ( H )

1 March 1945

to

31 March 1945

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Chain of Command:

TO: Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force, APO 520, U.S. Army

THROUGH: Commanding General, 55th Bombardment Wing (H), APO 520,  
U.S. Army

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T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

- ANNEX #1. THE COMMANDING GENERAL COMMENTS.
- ANNEX#2. THE GROUP COMMANDING OFFICER COMMENTS.
- ANNEX#3. THE 460TH CELEBRATES FIRST COMBAT ANNIVERSARY.  
NARRATIVE HISTORY.
- ANNEX#4. BIOGRAPHIES.
- ANNEX#5. PHOTOGRAPHS.
- ANNEX#6. OUR CHAPLAIN.
- ANNEX#7. OPERATIONS.  
NARRATIVE MISSION REPORTS.  
BOMB STRIKE PHOTOGRAPHS.
- ANNEX#8. COMMENDATIONS.
- ANNEX#9. INCLOSURES AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.

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ANNEX#1

T H E

C O M M A N D I N G   G E N E R A L

C O M M E N T S

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4 April 1945

AS THE CURTAIN GOES DOWN AFTER THE LAST DAY OF OPERATIONS IN MARCH, I VIEW WITH GREAT PRIDE AND SATISFACTION THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE AIR FORCE DURING THE MONTH IN WHICH WE ESTABLISHED NEW RECORDS FOR AIR OPERATIONS. FLYING THE GREATEST NUMBER OF SORTIES AND DROPPING THE LARGEST TONNAGE OF BOMBS, THE AIR FORCE ALSO ESTABLISHED A RECORD IN DISPATCHING IN ONE DAY THE GREATEST NUMBER OF FIGHTERS AND BOMBERS. LIBERATORS, FORTRESSES, LIGHTNINGS AND MUSTANGS THIS MONTH CARRIED OUT THE LONGEST FLIGHTS EVER FLOWN IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER. IN ADDITION, PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT REACHED AN ALL TIME HIGH IN NUMBER AND DEAPTH OF MISSIONS PERFORMED, CONSISTENTLY SECURING HIGHEST QUALITY PHOTOGRAPHS. THESE OPERATIONS ARE PARTICULARLY GRATIFYING BECAUSE THE RESULTS OBTAINED WERE OUTSTANDING. THE PERIOD 14 TO 26 MARCH WAS UNQUESTIONABLY A PERIOD IN WHICH THE AIR FORCE DID THE FINEST BOMBING IN ITS HISTORY A PERIOD IN WHICH ONLY HIGHEST PRIORITY TARGETS WERE ATTACKED AND DESTROYED. SUCH DEEDS ARE NOT ATTAINED BY WAVING A MAGIC WAND OR BY USE OF A LADDIN'S LAMP, BUT BY HARD WORK, LOYALTY, AND A CONSCIENTIOUS DEVOTION TO DUTY OF THE ENTIRE FORCE. I AM GREATLY IMPRESSED BY THE EFFORT PUT FORTH BY THE SERVICE COMMAND AND THE GROUND ECHELONS OF ALL UNITS. THIS, WITH THE EXPERT PLANNING BY THE ORGANIZATION STAFFS AND THE COURAGE AND SKILL OF THE AIR CREWS, ROUNDED OUT THE TEAM THAT ENABLED THE AIR FORCE TO ATTAIN THIS HIGHEST DEGREE OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. THE FRUITS OF YOUR LABORS ARE DAILY BECOMING MORE AND MORE APPARENT WITH THE CONTINUING VISTORIES OF THE ALLIED ARMS THROUGHOUT EUROPE. LET US KEEP UP THIS UNRELENTING PRESSURE UNTIL THE VISTORY, WHICH IS NOW IN SIGHT IS COMPLETE.

/s/ George R. Acheson  
/t/ GEORGE R. ACHESON  
Brigadier General  
Commanding

TRUE COPY

William C. Palmer  
Capt. Air Corps

ANNEX #2

T H E

G R O U P   C O M M A N D I N G   O F F I C E R

C O M M E N T S

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HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

31 March 1945

THE COMMANDING OFFICER COMMENTS

In March this Group flew 20 combat missions, an operational record that has not been equaled since August, 1944. During the month 713 aircraft were dispatched against enemy targets and crews flew a total of 4,026 combat hours, representing the greatest number of sorties and combat hours flown in any one month in the Group's history.

Commendation in this period for the unusually low venereal rate of the Group was another source of pride and satisfaction in the high standards set by both officers and enlisted men.

On 19 March the Group celebrated its first combat anniversary with a successful attack on the M/Ys at Muhldorf, Austria. The excellent operational record achieved by this organization in the past year is the result of the diligent work of every man, individually and collectively. We look back on a year of real and valuable accomplishments and look forward to a year in which this Group will hit the enemy with everything we have, as hard as we are able, as often as we can.

JOHN M. PRICE  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Commanding

ANNEX #3

T H E 4 6 0 T H C E L E B R A T E S

F I R S T C O M B A T A N N I V E R S A Y

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## 460TH BOMB GROUP CELEBRATES FIRST COMBAT ANNIVERSARY

by  
Lt. Edward J. Devney

With the 15th AAF in Italy. The 460th Bombardment Group, under the command of Col. John M. Price, one time West Point All American tackle, recently celebrated its first combat anniversary with a smashing attack on the railroad marshalling yards at Muhldorf, Austria.

The Group was led on the mission by Brigadier General George R. Acheson, Commanding General of the B-24 Liberator Wing of which the 460th Bomb Group is a member.

General Acheson commented after returning from the anniversary mission, "Today is significant not only in that it is a milestone in the combat history of the 460th Bomb Group, but also, because the Group's good work has paid handsome dividends in the destruction of the tools, materials and facilities that are the enemy's capabilities to wage war. The fine combat record achieved by this organization during the past year is the result of the diligent, conscientious efforts of every member - on the ground and in the air."

Since the Group's first mission, it has dropped more than 10,000 tons of bombs on vital enemy installations and its B-24 Liberator bombers have flown more than 5,700 airplane sorties against the enemy.

Combat crew men of the Group have been awarded more than 6,600 decorations, including one Distinguished Service Cross and twenty-two Silver Stars, during the past year and the Group earned the Distinguished Unit Citation for the destruction of the Zwolfaxing Airdrome near Vienna on July 25, 1944.

Besides its combat record, the 460<sup>th</sup> Bomb Group has also attained distinction in another field, as its base is the now famous, "Bomber City."

When the Group first reached Italy, it found that it was allotted an empty, muddy plateau for a base, far from any town of size and completely without ordinary, basic facilities - nothing but a landing strip and a lot of windswept ground.

The members of the Group, individually and collectively set out immediately to build a permanent base for themselves.

Their success is evident in the model city they have created. Permanent private homes for personnel, mess halls, clubs, training and administration buildings - all built of stone - cover the once empty ground. "Bomber City" is complete with electrical, water and sewage systems and its permanent home-made engineering facilities on the line would make many a States-side engineering officers turn green with envy.

On the occasion of the anniversary, commanding officer, Col. Price said, "We look back on a year of real and valuable accomplishments and look forward to a year in which this Group will hit the enemy with everything we have, as hard as we are able, as often as we can."



NARRATIVE HISTORY

for

(March 1 - 31, 1945)

By

Captain William C. Palmer,  
Group Historical Officer

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HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, US ARMY

(March 1 - 31, 1945)

NARRATIVE HISTORY

1. This month of March more than ever before has demonstrated to the world that air power can completely disrupt nations. The bomber, winged artillery, can now reach any part of the enemy country where military facilities may be located. Though it may come easier now we will remember those turbulent months when men with courage, against great odds, paid sacrifices - for some the supreme.

2. The 460th Bombardment Group (H) continued to throw its power into the battle of southeastern Europe during the month of March with operations on twenty days. In steady cooperation with Red Army troops sweeping up through northern Yugoslavia and into the bastions of the Vienna area, this Group delivered its heaviest tonnage of explosives with the majority of attacks directed against rail yards crammed with military equipment destined for the front. This Group along with its companion groups in the 15th Air Force participated in the obliteration of Germany's Jet-aircraft facilities at Neuberg, Germany. Two operations during the month resulted in crippling blows at the enemy's remaining sources of oil supply in Austria. One successful attack was carried out against conventional aircraft recently built up in this area.

3. The following missions were led by the Group Commander, Deputy Group Commander, Group Operations Officer, Ass't. Group Operations Officer, Group Air Inspector, Group Bombardier and Navigator:

COL. JOHN M. PRICE, GROUP COMMANDER

4 Mar. 1945	Szombathely M/Y, Hungary
13 Mar. 1945	Regensburg Area, Germany
22 Mar. 1945	Heiligenstadt M/Y, Vienna, Austria

LT. COL. JAMES C. WATKINS, DEPUTY GROUP COMMANDER

8 Mar. 1945	Porto Nuovo M/Y, Verona, Italy
23 Mar. 1945	Gmund M/Y, Germany

LT. COL. RAYFORD B. WHITLEY II, GROUP OPERATIONS OFFICER

1 Mar. 1945	Moosbierbaum O/R, Austria
12 Mar. 1945	Vienna Area, Austria
20 Mar. 1945	Amstetten M/Y, Austria

31 Mar. 1945 Villach North M/Y, Austria

CAPT. FRANKLIN R. REAVES, ASST. GROUP OPERATIONS OFFICER

16 Mar. 1945 Amstetten M/Y, Austria

MAJOR GLENN CHAMBERLAIN, GROUP AIR INSPECTOR

12 Mar. 1945 Vienna Area, Austria

15 Mar. 1945 Moosbierbaum O/R, Austria

25 Mar. 1945 Wels A/D, Austria

MAJOR JAMES B. CRAIN, GROUP BOMBARDIER OFFICER

4 Mar. 1945 Szombathely M/Y, Hungary

CAPTAIN HAROLD A. FULTON, GROUP NAVIGATOR

9 Mar. 1945 Graz M/Y, Austria

19 Mar. 1945 Muhldorf M/Y, Germany

22 Mar. 1945 Meiligenstadt M/Y, Vienna, Austria

4. The strength of the Group covering Officers and Enlisted men for the month of March was as follows:

At Beginning:	530	Officers	1994	Enlisted	Men
Net Increase:	-	"	-	"	"
Net Decrease:	4	"	35	"	"
At End	: 526	"	1959	"	"

5. During March fifteen (15) new crews were assigned to the Group. Due to the greatly increased bombing activity, thirteen (13) combat crew members have finished their thirty-five (35) combat sorties and their present combat tour of duty.

6. Captain Stratford Corbett, O-298569, has been appointed Group Intelligence Officer vice Major Roger Warner, O-474499, under 460th Bomb Group Special Orders #60, dated 12 Mar. 1945.

7. In March 668 sorties were flown, of which 610 were effective sorties and 58 non-effective sorties. A total of 1,284.04 tons of bombs were dropped on enemy targets representing the second largest tonnage of bombs dropped in a single month.

8. The Group was free again this month from enemy fighter opposition. The amount of casualties for the month of March is as follows:

Killed in Action:           3 Officers           4 Enlisted Man

Missing in Action:	20	"	30	"	"
Wounded in Action:	2	"	2	"	"

The 460th continues to lead the Wing for the second month in row with no frostbite cases reported. (See Commendation Annex #8)

9. The Group Gunnery School completed another unusually busy month.

378 men fired on the skeet range and expended 8,565 rounds of shot-gun ammunition.

1,235 men had training on the Jam-handy trainer.

At the Group Armament School 1,027 men were in attendance for this month.

1,213 men had instruction in Turret Operation.

Four (4) turret mock-ups were in operation.

214 gunnery training sorties were flown on the Group gunnery range.

114 combat crewmen were indoctrinated in gunnery and combat tactics.

10. On 19 March 1945, the Group celebrated its first year in combat. (See special story, Annex #3)

11. Officers and Enlisted Men continue to receive recognition for outstanding performance of duty in the air and on the ground.

Awards made during the period under review were as follows:

Silver Star	3
Distinguished Flying Cross	24
O.L.C. to Dis. Flying Cross	1
Soldiers Medal	1
Air Medal	316
O.L.C. to Air Medal	441
Purple Heart	1
Total	787

12. The redecoration of the Officers Club was completed. Work was started on the new buildings for the Group Operations and Intelligence Offices.

13. During the period a survey of living accommodations of the Group revealed that all living quarters have floors. At least ninety (90 per cent) have walls and roofs. One hundred (100) per cent have stoves.

14. The Group Dental Surgeon had another busy month. Following is a list of the work performed.

Fillings: 170

Extractions: 19  
Gum Treatments: 27  
Bridge Repairs: 2  
Examinations: 598  
Calculus removal  
& Prophylaxis: 13

15. Special Service Activities continued on a large scale during March. Under the capable supervision of Capt. Charles M. Gongloff and Miss Sarrah Baker the service club is being redecorated and reorganized.

Movies continue to hold the spotlight for entertainment. Two shows a day were held during March with an average attendance of four hundred (400) per showing.

In athletics the 460th shared honors with the 15th Fighter Command in Soccer as Co-champions. The two teams will combine to play against an all-star British team on Easter Sunday. Two men from this Group were picked as participants, Sgt. George Myers and Pfc. William Crilley. The Ping-Pong and Barber Shop Quartet championship was held in Spinazzola. (See Photos in Annex #5)

One U.S.O. show was held in which 1500 men attended. This show featured a mixed quartet and a former All-American majorette.

16. The Chaplain continued to keep busy with his many and varied activities. Total attendance at worship services was 1,120. (Reference "Our Chaplain" Annex #6)

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ANNEX #4

B I O G R A P H I E S

of

Lt. Col. James C. Watkins, Deputy Group Commander

Lt. Col. James W. Davenport, Group Executive Officer

Major George S. Davis Jr., Commanding Officer, 762<sup>nd</sup> Bomb Squadron (H)

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Lt. Col. James C. Watkins, 30, of Putnam Hall, Fla., is deputy group commander of the 460th Bombardment Group. A graduate of Melrose, Fla., High School in 1933, he attended the University of Florida until his entry into the Army Air Forces on February 27, 1937, at Barksdale Field, La. He received flight training at Randolph Field, Tex., and his wings and commission at Kelly Field, Tex., in 1939.

His wife, the former Virginia Busby, resides at 309 Morningside Dr., San Antonio, Tex., and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. P. D. Watkins, reside at Putnam Hall.

Lt. Col. Watkins has been awarded the Air Medal with one oak leaf cluster and is entitled to wear the Distinguished Unit Badge and the European-African-Middle East campaign ribbon.

Lt. Col. James W. Davenport of Jackson St., Harlingen, Tex., is executive officer of the 460th Bombardment Group. On July 2, 1907, he entered the U. S. Marine Corps and received his discharge 15 years later as a second lieutenant. He was wounded in action in the First World War, having seen service with the Second Marine Division. In 1928, he entered the U. S. Army with the rank of second lieutenant and has been with it since the time.

His wife, Mrs. Lois M. Davenport, resides at 518 S. Wilbut Ave., Sayre, Pa., with two of his children, Mis Martha Davenport and Warren D. Davenport. Two other sons are with the armed forces in the European theatre; S/Sgt. James A. Davenport of the Field Artillery and 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Robert F. Davenport, resides at Burdette, N. Y.

Lt. Col. Davenport has been awarded the Bronze Star and is entitled to wear the Distinguished Unit Badge and the European-African-Middle East campaign ribbon with two bronze stars.

Commander of the 762<sup>nd</sup> Bombardment Squadron (H) is Major George S. Davis, Jr.

Major Davis, 26, is a graduate of New Hartford High School, Class of '37. He left his studies at Rider College, Trenton, N. J., where he was a member of the Class of '41 and the Delta Sigma Pi Fraternity, to enter the service at New York, March 22, 1940. After serving as an aircraft mechanic at Hickam Field, Hawaii, he became an aviation cadet and won his pilot's wings at the AAF advanced Flying School, Stockton Field, Cal.

He has been overseas 16 months and he served as a squadron operations officer before becoming squadron commander. He holds the Air Medal with three oak leaf clusters and the Distinguished Flying Cross and is entitled to wear two gold overseas stripes, African Defense service ribbon, the European-African-Middle East theatre ribbon with two bronze battle stars and the Distinguished Unit Badge.

His mother, Mrs. Anne Davis Kelsey, lives at Grant Ave., ~~xxxxxx~~od, L. I. His aunt, Miss Elizabeth Davis, resides in Hartford.

ANNEX#5

H I S T O R I C A L

P H O T O G R A P H S

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ANNEX #6

"O U R C H A P L A I N "

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## Chaplain Clayton H. Stowe

"If it is true that there are no atheists in fox-holes, it can be said with equal truth that there are none in the skies either. The men who daily fly combat missions over Germany and its occupied territory know the precariousness of their position during every moment of a flight - - and added to the natural hazards of flying are the unnatural ones provided in the form of flak and German fighters. When a man finds himself unable to face them in his own strength, he usually turns to God." In these words, Chaplain Clayton H. Stowe of a veteran B-24 Liberator heavy bombardment group in Italy summed up his experience in a combat theatre.

Although a Congregational minister in civilian life, Chaplain Stowe is constantly in contact with his Jewish and Catholic men as well as the Protestants since all of them regard him as their minister. He is quick to acknowledge that in one sense this has proved more enriching for himself, perhaps, than for those he serves, since the diverse religions encountered even in one bomb group make him constantly aware of the spiritual strength a minister must provide.

In the early morning hours at briefing, Chaplain Stowe is there to offer prayers for the safe return of the men. As he put it, "They seem to feel that my prayers place them in closer contact with God." He is at the line when the Liberators take off and again when they return from the mission. Otherwise, his time is filled with varying activities, among which are hospitals and generally acting as counselor-confessor to his men. That the men have confidence in him is amply attested by the fact that most of them at one time or another bring him their problems.

His work in Italy differs greatly from that in the States or in civilian life, if only because it is more rewarding. He personally sees the direct result of his work more clearly than would be the case in the other capacities. Living the same life in close contact with those he serves makes him more acutely conscious of their problems, their anxieties and the motivation for their actions.

"Airmen not only want a religion; it is a necessity for the." He explains this through the enormous step-up in their tempo of living. In civilian life a man loses consciousness of God's presence in his daily living because of the comforts with which he is surrounded. In a combat theatre, not only is a man subjected to constant tension, but even his very life itself is not infrequently in danger. Because of this, his mind inevitably turns toward a source of strength. In fact, the combat men, pilots, navigators, bombardiers, gunners, form by far the large majority of the congregation at services.

Before entering the Chaplain's Corps, Chaplain Stowe was minister of the First Congregational Church at Alpena, Michigan. He is a graduate of Lawrence College, class of 1930, and the Chicago Theological Seminary. His wife, Mrs. Mary Evelyn Stowe, resides at present at 5707 Kenwood Ave. Chicago, Ill., while his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Sheldon C. Stowe, reside at 131 Miller Street, West DePere, Wis.

Annex #7

NARRATIVE MISSION  
REPORTS AND  
BOMB PLOT STRIKE PHOTOS

of

460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF

APO 520, U.S. ARMY

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(March 1 - 31, 1945)

TABULAR SUMMARY OF 18 MISSIONS

<u>MISSION NUMBER</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>
176	1 Mar.	Moosbierbaum O/R, Maribor M/Y	Austria
177	2 Mar.	Linz South Main M/Y	Austria
178	4 Mar.	Szombathely M/Y	Hungary
179	8 Mar.	Porto Nuovo M/Y, Verona	Italy
180	9 Mar.	Graz M/Y	Austria
181	12 Mar.	Vienna Area	Austria
182	13 Mar.	Regensburg Area	Germany
183	14 Mar.	Nove Zamky M/Y	Hungary
184	15 Mar.	Moosbierbaum O/R (Red Force) Wiener Neustadt M/Y (Blue Force)	Austria
185	16 Mar.	Amstetten M/Y	Austria
186	19 Mar.	Muhldorf M/Y, Plattling M/Y	Germany
187	20 Mar.	Amstetten M/Y	Austria
188	21 Mar.	Neuburg A/D	Germany
189	22 Mar.	Heiligenstadt M/Y, Vienna	Austria
190	23 Mar.	Gmund M/Y	Germany
191	24 Mar.	Neuburg M/Y	Germany
192	25 Mar.	Wels A/D	Austria
193	26 Mar.	Wiener Neustadt M/Y	Austria
194	30 Mar.	Kapfenburg Tank Works, (PFF) Graz M/Y (PFF)	Austria
195	31 Mar.	Villach North M/Y	Austria

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

2 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #21, Operations Order #104.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army.

1. On 1 March 1945, 40 of 41 scheduled a/c were dispatched in two waves to bomb the Moosbierbaum O/R, Austria. One a/c in RED Force failed to take off because engine oil pressure was out. RED Force, consisting of 20 a/c, took off at 1010 hours. The Force was led by Major Rayford B. Whitley II, Operations Officer, and the second attack unit by Lt. Robert E. Reed, 763rd Bomb Sqn. BLUE Force, consisting of 20 a/c, took off at 1020 hours. The Force was led by Captain Ray E. Wells, 760th Bomb Sqn., and the second attack unit by Captain Alexander C. Duarte, 763rd Bomb Sqn.

2. RED Force assembled over the base at 1056 hours. Wing rendezvous was accomplished without incident. BLUE Force assembled over Spinazzola at 1104 hours and rendezvous with the Wing was accomplished over Andria at 1124 hours. Fourteen P-51s escorted RED Force only. Escort, first sighted at 1320 hours at (4714N-1712E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1409 hours at (4843N-1642E).

3. One a/c of BLUE Force returned early for the following reason: (1) #1 engine failure. This a/c jettisoned bomb load at (4656N-1653E).

4. The 20 a/c in RED Force penetrated to the primary target. Much confusion resulted when the Wing leader changed his bombing intentions from the primary to first alternate and back again, a number of times. Eventually, a PFF run was attempted on the primary target, but the PFF equipment went out on the lead a/c, when a fuse blew, and the Group was rallied off the run. Here the formation leader instructed the deputy to assume the lead and bomb the first alternate target. On the St. Polton bomb run, another group flew under the 460th, forcing the Group to turn off the bomb run. At this time, it was observed that the primary could be bombed visually. A bomb run was made on the Moosbierbaum O/R. The deputy lead a/c was seriously damaged by flak over the target and dropped his bombs while in a turn. As he dropped, thirteen aircraft of Able and Baker boxes dropped 25.75 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N-.025T fusing, on the target at 1515 hours from 25,000' - heading of 260 degrees. One a/c had one bomb hung up which was returned to base. The second attack unit became separated

from the first attack unit and was unable to make a successful bomb run on any target. This box, consisting of 7 a/c, jettisoned bombs totaling 14 tons at (4734N-1600E), in order to conserve fuel. At Moosbierbaum, photographs show that bombs of RED Force fell 200 feet SE of the New Plant, causing no military damage.

BLUE Force, consisting of 10 a/c, bombed St. Polton, the first alternate target and Maribor. Here again there was confusion as to the bombing intentions of the Wing lead a/c, first the 1st alternate and then one alternate after another being mentioned. During the bomb run on St. Polton, sticking bomb-bay doors prevented the wave leader from dropping, and the entire first attack unit held their bombs. The second attack unit, Charlie box consisting of 6 a/c, dropped 12 tons on this target at 1451 hours from 24,300' - heading of 190 degrees. A/c #1244 of Charlie box turned back before target. The first attack unit flew to Maribor M/Y, where bomb run was made on an axis of 195 degrees. At this target, 12 a/c dropped 22.5 tons of bombs at 1520 hours from 24,800'. Two a/c jettisoned all bombs: 4 bombs immediately before target due to flak damage and two bombs at (4813N-1723E) in order to hold formation. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by both bombing leaders. At St. Polton, the target was cloud obscured, and visual or photographic observations were impossible. Visual observations, only, on Maribor were that some bombs fell in the neighborhood of the RR bridge and others in the town.

5. RED Force experienced IAH flak over Moosbierbaum for two minutes prior to bombs away and three minutes afterwards. Black and white bursts were observed. No flak was encountered over St. Polton. Over Maribor, MAH flak was encountered for three minutes. MIH flak was also experienced at (4626N-1626E).

6. Route was flown as briefed with exceptions noted above. Weather: No low or middle clouds over Italy, Adriatic and Yugo. 1-2/10th high cirrus over Italy, Adriatic and Yugo which slowly increased to 6-8/10th over western Hungary and Austria, bases variable 22-24000' vicinity of Lake Balaton and rising to 26 to 28000' in Vienna Area. Patchy stratocumulus No. of Lake Balaton variable 6-9/10th, which extended to target area. On return, weather was similar with 3-5/10th stratocum over Adriatic No. of Spur, bases 3-4000', tops 5-6000'. Very persistent thick vapor trails from 22000' to 25000'. Visibility, gen. 15 miles.

7. 27 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1730 hours. Eight a/c landed at friendly fields: 7 a/c at Zara and one at Pecs. Crews of seven a/c returned from Zara today. One a/c was lost to flak over Maribor. Three a/c are still missing: #8459, #8862 & #9693. Refer EEA Report filed.

8. Two a/c received major flak damage, and 12 a/c minor damage.

9. 12 a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

10. Observations: It was noted at Moosbierbaum that it had been well hit, with fires and oil smoke throughout the area. Smoke pots were not in operation.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, AC,  
S-2

2 Incls.  
Incl 1 - TC  
Incl 2 - Photo

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

3 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #22, Operations #106.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 2 March 1945, at 0850 hours, 27 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the Linz South Main M/Y, Austria. The Group was led by Major George S. Davis Jr, C.O., 762nd Bomb Sqdn, and the second attack unit by Captain Donald W. Thompson, 761st BS.

2. Group assembly was over the base at 0942 hours and rendezvous with the Wing was over Andria at 0949 hours, the 464th gradually assuming its proper position on route. The lead group, the 485th, hit the key point 4000' lower than the briefed 20,000'. In climbing over the Alps, the 460th and following groups overshot the leader, because of the greater air speed. They made an attempt by "S"ing to allow the lead group to assume its proper position. When this could not be done, the Wing leader asked the 460th to lead over the target, which it did, followed by the 485th and the 464th. The 465th went across the target on a separate bomb run, ahead of the Wing formation. Fighter escort, 30-35 P-38s, first sighted at 1147 hours at (4512N-1312E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1520 hours at (4302N-1533E).

3. The Group leader was in touch with the Wing leader at all times over Channel "C". Channel "A" was effectively jammed, not with music but G.I. jamming. Within the Group Channel "A" was effective.

4. Two a/c returned early for the following reasons: (1) internal failure, (2) #2 engine failure. One a/c returned bombs to base and one a/c jettisoned in the Adriatic. One a/c, a prior return, bombed a target of opportunity, the M/Y at Obr. Drauburg (4645N-1258E). From 18000' two tons were dropped on this target at 1237 hours on a heading of 278 degrees. Bombs were observed to straddle the M/Y.

5. 24 a/c penetrated to the primary target. At 24,000', 23 a/c dropped 45.75 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N-.01T fusing, at 1339 hours. Bomb run was made by PFF on a heading of 180 degrees. Mickey operator gave five course corrections and drift was killed. The bombardier was given five sighting angles and synchronization was good. The second attack unit made a separate run, four sighting angles were given and the operator believes a good run was made. Due to rack malfunction, one a/c failed to bomb and jettisoned eight bombs at

(4757N-1443E). One a/c had one bomb hung up which was jettisoned on the rally. Target almost obscured by clouds. Bomb run was made by PFF. Bombs away pictures from 1st attack unit show that there will be possible hits in warehouse area on south bank of Traun River, across from Linz. Bombs away from 2nd attack unit indicate that they are headed into area east of town.

6. The Group experienced MAH flak for five minutes over the primary target. The bursts trailed the 1st attack unit and into the 2nd attack unit. Moderate flak was seen at Bruck.

7. At 1250 hours, four ME-109s were seen at (4736N-1226E). E/a were black with no markings. They were last seen spiraling down through the clouds.

8. The route was flown as briefed. Weather: on take off with 8-10/10th altocum sixty miles north of the Spur, tops 12-14000', which continued over northern Adriatic and Italy. So. Slopes of Alps generally clear, but 8-10/10th stratocum north of Alps, tops 10-12000'. Target, 8-10/10th stratocum. Similar conditions on return route except north of Spur, 5-7/10th stratocum, bases 2000', tops 3000'. Visibility, generally 15 miles.

9. Nine a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

10. Observations: Muhldorf M/Y, 500-600 cars on ten tracks at 1308 hrs, 23000'. No activity in yard. One line of white cars. Amstetten M/Y, 400-500 cars at 1350 hrs, 22000'. A/D (4752N-1220E), 40 SEF & TEF, also one B-24 on field at 1356 hrs, 22000'.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, AC,  
S-2

2 Incl.  
Incl 1 - TC  
Incl 2 - Photo

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

5 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #22, Operations Order #109.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. At 0735 hours on 4 March 1945, 28 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb Szombathely M/Y in Hungary. The Group was led by Colonel J. M. Price, Group Commander, and the second attack unit by Captain Waring W. Wilson, 763rd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Due to adverse weather over the base, the Group was forced to assemble by boxes to the west of the field at 0917 hours, at 15000'. For this reason, also, the 460th was thirty minutes late for the briefed rendezvous over Andria, and made no rendezvous with the Wing. Radio communications between the Groups of the Wing were satisfactory, although Channel "A" was at times overloaded. Target weather was received from the 485th and relayed to the other groups. Fighter escort, eight P-51s, first sighted at 1200 hours at (4650N-1420E), furnished penetration and target cover. They left the formation at 1324 hours in the target area.

3. 28 a/c penetrated to the primary target. Other groups of the Wing arrived over the IP at the same time as the 460th. To avoid a collision course, the Group made a 360 degree turn before initiating a bomb run. The target was obscured by cloud. Smoke, blown across it from previous bomb bursts to the north, further hid the briefed MPIs from view. In order to have a chance for successful bombing, a 360 degree turn was made to the left and into the wind, which was blowing at 80 knots. A second bomb run, made on an axis of 181 degrees, found the M/Y visible. On this axis, it was impractical for the boxes to hit the three separate briefed aiming points, without crossing under each other. Therefore the Group Commander ordered each box to aim for the center of the M/Y. This order was acknowledged and carried out, the large white warehouses being taken as an MPI. At 22,000' 28 a/c were over the target at 1324 hours. 27 a/c dropped 53 tons of 500 lb RDZ bombs, .1N&.01T fusing, on the target, one of the above a/c bombing with the 485th. Two a/c had four bombs hung up which were jettisoned immediately after target. First bombs of first attack unit hit in M/Y just north of overpass with a direct hit on locomotive shed, and ten to fifteen bits in area of M/Y causing damage to trackage, rolling stock and overpass. Main concentration of 2nd attack unit in M/Y south of overpass in area of large trans-shipment shed. Damage to rolling

stock and trackage. Fires resulted from oil cars hit. Definite number cannot be assessed due to smoke from 1st attack unit. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by the Group leader. The 2nd attack lead did not use auto pilot because of weak gyro. One a/c, separated from the Group, dropped two tons of bombs on Ljubljana M/Y at 1325 hours from 22,000'.

4. SAH flak was encountered over the target area for two to three minutes. Black and white bursts were observed. MAH flak was encountered over Ljubljana by the single sortie

5. Four U/I SEFs were seen in the target area at 1310 hours. Three a/c were not recognized as standard German or American fighters. A/c came in on a pursuit curve from seven o'clock level, closing to 300-400 yards before breaking away when gunners fired. A/c were dark colored with lighter band around fuselage behind the canopy - no return fire was received from these a/c.

6. Route was flown as briefed with exception noted in the target area. Route weather forced deviations from briefed route over the Adriatic. Weather: on take off, 9-10/10th cumulus and stratocum, bases variable 1500 to 3000' with snow flurried lowering ceiling to 500', tops to 12000'. 6/10th to 8/10th over Adriatic, tops 8-10000' becoming 3/10th over Yugo coast continuing inland with many breaks. No. Yugo, generally clear with surrounding area overcast, tops 12-14000'. Similar weather on return, snow flurries over base reducing visibility to 0-5 mi.

7. 19 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1535 hours. Nine a/c landed at friendly fields: 7 at Pantanella, 1 at Torretta and one a/c, #8769, crash-landed at Amendola. Crew members are safe. A/c can be repaired.

8. Three a/c received minor flak damage.

9. Nine a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, AC,  
S-2

2 Incls.  
Incl 1 - TC  
Incl 2 - Photo

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

9 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #24, Operations Order #112.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S Army.

1. On 8 March 1945, 42 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the Porto Nuovo M/Y, Verona, Italy. RED Force, consisting of 21 a/c, took off at 1110 hours. The Force was led by Lt. Colonel James C. Watkins, Deputy Group Commander, and the second attack unit by Captain Donald W. Thompson. BLUE Force, consisting of 21 a/c, took off at 1131 hours. The force was led by Captain Floyd F. Redman, and the second attack unit by Captain Donald D. Wynn.

2. Group Assemblies were without incident at 1155 hours and 1218 hours. There was no scheduled Wing rendezvous. No fighter escort was seen en route to the target. Nine P-38s were observed at 1530 hours at (4400N-1250E) on the return route. Radio communications were satisfactory within RED Force with bombing intentions and weather reports transmitted. BLUE Force was unable to transmit information promptly, and communications were poor generally.

3. One a/c of BLUE Force returned early. It accidentally salvoed bombs in the Adriatic at (4330N-1453E) and turned back.

4. 21 a/c of RED Force and 20 a/c of BLUE Force penetrated to the PT, the Porto Nuovo M/Y.

From 23,500', 20 a/c of RED Force dropped 39.25 tons of 500 lb GP bombs, .1N&.01T fusing, on the target at 1456 hours. Bombing was accomplished by boxes on a heading of 220 degrees. One a/c, a late take off, joined the 465th and flew to the target with this group. Group did not bomb. A/c did not bomb and jettisoned bombs in the Adriatic. The a/c had three bombs hung up which were jettisoned in the Adriatic. Photos show that "A" and "B" boxes dropped their bombs some 3000' NE of the target and that "C" box dropped in the center of the M/Y, causing damage to rolling stock, tracks and warehouses.

From 23,300', 20 a/c of BLUE Force were over the target at 1509 hours. 16 a/c dropped 32 tons of bombs on the target on a heading of 178 degrees. One a/c, with bombs hung up at the PT, dropped bombs on a RR bridge at (4512N-1119E), at 1524 hours from 24,000' - heading of 130 degrees. Hits were scored alongside the structure. Due to release malfunction, two a/c lost their bombs at the IP and one a/c,

with eight bombs hung up, jettisoned in the Adriatic. All attack leaders used auto pilot on the bomb run. Photos of the results of the bombing by BLUE Force are not available. Accurate visual observations were prevented by smoke from previous bombing. Crew members believe there were hits to the left of the briefed MPI, and many in the M/Y on the briefed MPI.

5. MAH flak was experienced in the target area for four to five minutes. Black and white bursts were observed. SIH flak was encountered at Ravigo.

6. One U/I SEF was seen in the target area at 1458 hours. E/a was observed by RED Force, e/a was flying at 7000' and was black in color with silver wings.

7. Route was flown as briefed by both forces. Weather: on take off, 3-4/10th stratocum over Adriatic. Similar conditions up Adriatic to No. Italian coast where 10/10th altocum, tops 14-15,000'. Over So. Slopes of Alps, clouds broke slowly to 5/10th altocum and then 2-3/10th over target, tops 12-14000'. Return route variable 0-3/10th cumulus, visibility 10-15 miles.

8. 41 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1705 hours.

9. 16 a/c received minor flak damage. There were no casualties.

10. 12 a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, AC,  
S-2

2 Incls.  
Incl 1 - Photo  
Incl 2 - 2 TCS

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

10 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #25, Operations Order #118.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

I. On 9 March 1945, 42 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb a communications target in Yugoslavia.

1. RED Force, consisting of 21 a/c, took off at 1000 hours. The force was led by Major Henry L. Downey, C.O., 761st Bomb Sqdn, and the second attack unit by Captain Alexander C. Duarte, 763rd Bom Sqdn. The force assembled over the field at 1035 hours and departed the Italian coast at 1057 hours. No escort was seen by RED Force. RED Force was unable to contact the weather a/c, and had difficulty contacting the Wing leader.

2. Two a/c of RED Force returned early for the following reasons: (1) engine failure, (2) cylinder blown #2 engine. There a/c jettisoned bombs in the Adriatic.

3. Because the primary target was obscured by 10/10<sup>th</sup> cloud, making visual bombing impossible, the Wing leader advised an attack on Graz M/Y. 18 a/c of RED Force were over the Graz M/Y at 1353 hours. From 24,500', 16 a/c dropped 32 tons of 500 lb GP bombs, .1N&.01T fusing, on the target. Bomb run was made by PFF on an axis of 170 degrees. The turn from the IP was directed by PFF. After the target had been identified surely, there was time for only one rate correction. One a/c, due to mechanical failure of an engine, salvoed bombs at the IP and returned to the emergency field at ZARA. Due to rack malfunction, two a/c failed to bomb the target: one a/c jettisoned bomb load ten minutes after target and one a/c returned bombs to base. Photos show that bombs fell 10,000' south of the South M/Y. The RR tracks were out in three places. Crew members stated that bombs also fell in the town of Graz. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by both attack unit leaders.

4. MAH flak was experienced over Graz for two to three minutes.

5. Near Sibenik (4415N-1542E), at 1211 hours, RED Force observed one jet a/c at 23000', 3000' above the formation. This silver a/c was one mile distant at 12 o'clock. Twin vapor trails were noted.

6. Route was flown to east of briefed course to the neighborhood of Graz, with slight variations to avoid weather. (See attached track chart)

7. 18 a/c of RED Force returned to base with a mean landing time of 1610 hours. One a/c, #1657, landed at Zara. The crew was returned to Bari.

8. One a/c received minor flak damage.

## II. BLUE Force

1. BLUE Force, consisting of 21 a/c, took off at 1030 hours. The force was led by Major Francis E. Barrett, 763rd Bomb Sqdn, and the second attack unit by Lt. David L. Willis, 761st Bomb Sqdn.

2. Due to adverse weather, BLUE Force had difficulty in assembly. It departed Spinazzola at 1133 hours. Six to eight P-38s were observed at 1315 hours at (4615N-1513E) and six to eight P-51s at 1404 hours at (4657N-1448E). The force was unable to contact the weather a/c. Communications within the force were good.

3. One a/c of BLUE Force returned early for the following reason: (1) supercharger out. This a/c jettisoned bombs in the Adriatic.

4. Like RED Force, BLUE Force found the primary target covered by 10/10<sup>th</sup> undercast. It was decided to bomb the first alternate target by PFF. This run was discontinued when the PFF navigator was unable to pick up the target. A decision was then made to bomb Graz M/Y by PFF. The PFF Navigator reported that he had this target in his scope. Dropping angles to 50 degrees were given. When the bombardier saw a M/Y through a break in the clouds a sighted correction was made and bombs were dropped. The target bombed proved to be Ljubljana. 20 a/c were over Ljubljana at 1504 hours. From 24,000', 19 a/c dropped 36.75 tons of bombs on this target. Bombing was accomplished on an axis of 260 degrees. Due to rack malfunction, one a/c had five bombs hung up which were jettisoned in the Adriatic. One a/c, with engine failure, jettisoned bombs at (4745N-1545E). At Ljubljana, bombs fell in the barracks area to west of the Sava River, and into the town south of the barracks area. Attack unit leaders used auto pilot on bomb run.

5. BLUE Force did not encounter flak. Several bursts of flak were observed from a vessel at (4500N-1330E) at 1530 hours.

6. At (4655N-1451E) at 1410 hours, BLUE Force observed a dark colored ME-111 at 0900 o'clock low. E/a was at 1000 yds and disappeared towards five o'clock.

7. The route out varied from the briefed route to avoid weather. On return, the BLUE Force left the Italian coast So. Of Trieste and flew direct to base. (See attached track chart)

8. 20 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1715 hours.

9. 14 a/c attempted photos. Two significant prints are attached.

III. Weather as it applied to RED and BLUE Forces: on take off, 4-7/10th cirrus and 3-5/10th stratocum with stratocum increasing to 6-8/10th, tops 10000', breaking slowly to 0-2/10th over central Adriatic. 9-10/10th over east Adriatic and Yugo coast, tops 10-12000' with 2-4/10th high cirrus. 8-10/10th stratocum over Yugo mts and entire No. Yugo and So. Austria area, tops 10-12000'. Target areas, 9-10/10th stratocum, tops 10-12000'. Similar conditions on return to Yugo coast, bases 3-4000' which decreased to 3-5/10th over base. Visibility, generally 15-20 miles except 5 miles over Italian coast on return.

Observation: Thousands of shiny round discs, about three inches in diameter, see above formation which was at 22,000'. First seen over southern Austria for about five minutes and again seen in vicinity of Ljubljana on return.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, AC,  
S-2

2 Incl.  
Incl 1 - 2 photos  
Incl 2 - 2 TCs

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

13 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #26, Operations Order #124.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 12 March 1945, 42 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb a target in the Vienna area. RED Force, consisting of 21 a/c, took off at 0900 hours. The Force was led by Major Rayford B. Whitley II, Operations Officer, and the second attack unit by Lt. Albert E. Sabo, 762nd BS. BLUE Force, consisting of 21 a/c took off at 0910 hours. The Force was led by Major Glenn H. Chamberlain, and the second attach unit by Captain Frank Furrie.

2. RED Force assembled and departed over Andria at 1019 hours, two minutes late due to the 485th's late arrival. BLUE Force assembled and departed over Andria at 1021 hours, two minutes late due to the above incident. Fighter escort, 30 P-51s, first sighted at 1237 hours at (4640N-1432E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1455 hours at (4437N-1604E). Radio communications were reported as satisfactory by both forces with one exception: Red leader was unable to contact Charlie box at any time.

3. Eight a/c, four of each force, returned early for the following reasons: (1) landing gear failed to retract, (2)&(3) oil leaks, (4) supercharger out, (5) oxygen leak, (6) (7)&(8) engine failures. One a/c jettisoned bomb load at (4853N-1600E), one at (4726N-1443E), one ten minutes from IP, two returned bombs to base and three jettisoned in the Adriatic.

4. 34 a/c penetrated to the primary target: at 25,000', 17 a/c of RED Force were over the target at 1348 hours. On an axis of 220 degrees, 14 a/c dropped 27.5 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N-.01&.025T fusing, on the target. BLUE Force of the 485th was strung out at the IP, forcing the 460th wide and necessitating the change from the briefed axis of attack. Bombing was accomplished by PFF. The mickey operator furnished five dropping angles to 50°. Synchronization was good and it is believed that the target was hit. One a/c jettisoned two bombs at (4755N-1450E) in order to hold formation. Three a/c failed to bomb the target: one a/c, with bombs hung up, jettisoned immediately after target; one a/c, with supercharger trouble, jettisoned at (4845N-1550E); and one a/c, due to rack malfunction, returned bombs to base. At 26,300', 17 a/c of BLUE Force were over the target at 1351 hours. On an axis of 216°, 17 a/c dropped 34 tons of

bombs on the target. Mickey operator furnished seven bombing angles to 46° to the bombardier. Synchronization was excellent.

5. M-IIH flak was experienced over the target for five minutes. Black and white bursts were observed with tracking fire on the bomb run. Some flak bursts, both black and white, seemed to spin, holding their shape like a top. Other large white bursts seemed to hold their rectangular form. Flak was observed at Graz, Bruck and Celja. Smoke generators were noted at Enin at 1540 hours, 12000'.

6. Route was flown as briefed with exception noted at IP. Weather: on take off, 4-6/10th thin altocum over south Italy, bases 11000', and 3-4/10th stratocum over base, tops 4-5000'. Middle clouds broke to nil over Adriatic and stratocum persisted with tops rising slowly to 8-10000' off the Spur. Over eastern Adriatic and Yugo coast, 6-8/10th stratocum, tops 10-11000'. Over north Dalmation coast, 2-4/10th stratocum, tops 10-12000' with few large breaks south of Maribor. At target 9-10/10th stratocum, tops 10-12000'. Similar conditions on return route except that from Yugo mts to base, generally clear. Visibility was generally unlimited.

7. 34 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1625 hours.

8. One a/c received major flak damage, two a/c minor damage.

9. Fourteen a/c attempted photos. Photos reveal the complete undercast.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER WARNER,  
Major, AC,  
S-2

1 Incl.  
Incl 1 - TC

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

14 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #27, Operations Order #126.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 13 March 1945, at 0850 hours, 31 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb a target in the REGENSBURG area. The Group was led by Colonel J. M. Price, Group Commander, and the second attack unit by Lt. Richard R. Woodard, 761st Bomb Sqdn.

2. Group assembly was over the base at 0943 hours.

3. Rendezvous with the Wing over ANDRIA was at 0950 hours. Although the 485th cut across the rendezvous point ahead of the 460th, a delay of only forty seconds was caused.

4. Fighter escort, 30 P-38s, first sighted at 1229 hours at (4720N-1248E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1356 hours at (4702N-1420E).

5. Radio communications were good, with the weather a/c and the 485<sup>th</sup>, though the other groups could not be reached. "A" channel was overloaded with unnecessary conversation. It is recommended that communications be relayed back from the group to group within the Wing.

6. One a/c returned early for the following reason: (1) #1 engine out. This a/c returned bombs to base.

7. En route to the target, the deputy leader's PFF equipment was found inoperative and the leader of the second attack unit assumed the deputy lead position of the first attack unit. After passing VILLACH, this a/c assumed the Group lead when Colonel Price's PFF was found inoperative.

8. The turn off the IP was made visually but 10/10<sup>th</sup> cloud cover in the target area necessitated a PFF run. At 21,000', 30 a/c were over the primary target at 1307 hours. On an axis of 3°, 29 a/c dropped 57.5 tons of 500 lb GP bombs, .1N&.01T fusing. Bombing was accomplished by PFF, the mickey operator giving four course corrections and the sighting angles of 70°, 65°, 60°, 50° & 40° being furnished the bombardier.

9. One a/c jettisoned two bombs at (4647N-1300E) in order to hold formation. One a/c, with bombs hung up over the target, jettisoned eight bombs at (4903N-1208E).

10. At bombs away a plume of black smoke was observed rising to 12,000' through the undercast.

11. On route to the target, SAH flak was encountered over VILLACH and to the west. It is believed that RR flak may have been fired. Bursts were black in color and tracked the formation for one minute. It is believed to have been a six gun battery. No flak was encountered at the primary target although flak was observed.

12. Route was flown substantially as briefed. PFF navigation was used extensively, forty fixes being furnished the DR navigator.

13. Weather on take off, 8/10th altocumulus, bases 10 to 11,000', clearing in vicinity of Spur. Rest of route to southern slopes of Alps clear. Thin bands of stratocumulus in valleys along southern slopes of Alps. Over Alps, 4-6/10th stratocumulus, tops 8000', increasing slowly along northern slopes to 9-10/10th, tops 8-10,000'. Over target area, 9-10/10th stratocumulus, tops 8-10,000'. Stratocumulus deck appeared to be breaking rapidly to the west. Return route similar to route out, middle clouds over Italy dissipated. Visibility, 10-15 miles.

14. 27 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1615 hours. Three a/c landed at a friendly field, Zara. The crew of one a/c was returned from Zara via C-47.

15. Three a/c received minor flak damage. There were no casualties.

16. Ten a/c attempted photos. A significant print is attached.

17. Observations: VILLACH M/Y, 300-400 cars at 1208 hours, 18000'. ST LORENZEN M/Y, 300-400 cars at 1402 hours, 18200'. KLAGENFURT M/Y, 600 cars at 1405 hours, 18500'. WELS M/Y, 500-1,000 cars at 1337 hours, 19400'. On the bomb run, small discs of tinfoil were seen, coming from above and thought to be a form of chaff dispensed by P-38s. (See observations in Mission #25)

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
S-2

2 Incl.

Incl 1 - 2 photos  
Incl 2 - TC

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

15 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #28, Operations Order #127.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army.

I. On 14 March, 1945, 41 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the NOVE ZAMKY M/Y, Hungary.

1. RED Force, consisting of 21 a/c, took off at 0840 hours. This force was led by the Group leader, Major Francis A. Barrett, 763rd Bomb Sqdn, while the second attack unit was led by Captain Frank G. Furrie, 760th Bomb Sqdn. BLUE Force, consisting of 20 a/c took off at 0845 hours. The BLUE Force was led by Captain Ray E. Wells, 760th Bomb Sqdn and the second attack unit by Captain Coleman C. Williams, 762nd Bomb Sqdn.

2. RED Force assembled over the field at 0951 hours and BLUE Force at 0952 hours.

3. No Wung rendezvous was scheduled. The Group consisting of a RED and BLUE force departed ANDRIA at 0959 hours.

4. Although no fighter escort was seen, the Group leader had radio contact with the escort from 1145 hours until 1345 hours.

5. Radio communications was excellent between the RED and BLUE forces. Both forces were in contact with the weather a/c. RED Force was able to communicate with the 49th Wing as well as with the other groups in this Wing. BLUE Force was unable to contact the other groups in the Wing.

6. a. One a/c of each force returned early for the following reasons: (1) (RED Force) #3 engine failure, (2) (BLUE Force) caught prop wash while in dense clouds, lost altitude, and could not regain formation. These a/c jettisoned bombs in the Adriatic.

b. One a/c of RED Force turned back north of the Alps in AUSTRIA at (4736N-1430E) after losing an engine. This a/c jettisoned bombs in the hills in AUSTRIA at (4718N-1435E) and landed at ZARA where the crew picked up an a/c of the 465th Group and returned to this base.

7. a. At 21,500' 19 a/c of RED Force were over the primary target at 1333 hours. On an axis of 160° 19 a/c dropped 47.5 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N&.01T fusing. The target was positively identified despite 4/10th cloud cover and haze and was bombed visually.

b. Photos show bombs of lead box covering briefed MPI in SE end of M/Y with 10-15 hits in area of loco depots and nearby work shops. Smoke from previous bombings prevents more detailed report of damage inflicted.

8. Over the target RED Force received MIH flak for three minutes. Bursts were black and fired in barrages. RR flak was believed to be firing from positions on the RR line immediately SE of the target. SAH flak was experienced at D. MIHOLJAC (4545N-1810E) for about a half minute. 8-12 guns were tracking the formation at this point. Moderate flak was observed at MOOSBIERBAUM.

9. In the target area one U/I SEF was seen flying below the clouds at 10,000'.

10. Route was flown as briefed by RED Force. Weather: clear on take off with 6-7/10th stratocumulus over ADRIATIC decreasing to 2/10th over eastern ADRIATIC. Over YUGOSLAVIA 2-4/10th stratocumulus tops 5-6000' and 4-6/10th altocumulus bases 17-18000' which increased slowly to 9-10/10th over north YUGOSLAVIA and extended to BRATISLAVA. 7-9/10th stratocumulus tops estimated at 10-12000' appeared to be under the middle clouds. From BRATISLAVA to target low clouds broke slowly to target conditions. Target 1-4/10th cumulus. On return clear over HUNGARY and north YUGOSLAVIA with cumulus slowly increased and built up to 8-10/10th over YUGOSLAVIA clearing over coast and ADRIATIC. Visibility varied from 10-15 miles.

11. 18 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1630 hours. One a/c, landed at Vis for fuel and has returned to base.

12. One a/c received major flak damage and six a/c minor damage.

13. BLUE Force of 19 a/c penetrated to the area of the IP for the primary target. However, due to haze and clouds it was impossible to establish positive identification of the IP or the target itself which was close to the Russian lines. The formation proceeded to the first alternate target SZOMBATHELY M/Y, but here again weather conditions were unsatisfactory for a visual run. The BLUE Force then attempted to make a visual run on A.F. Alternate #14, ZAGREB WEST M/Y, but the target was also closed in. Since many a/c of the formation were now low on gasoline, the formation returned to the base. 15 a/c

returned bombs to base and three a/c jettisoned bombs in the ADRIATIC. Disposition of bomb load on a/c lost is unknown.

14. BLUE Force encountered MAH flak at KOMARCH. MAH flak was encountered at SZOMBATHELY.

15. Five e/c were observed by BLUE Force: at 1353 hours four U/I SEFs were seen in the KOMARCH area at 11,000'. At 1440 hours one FW-190 was seen at (4730N-1820E) at 500'.

16. a. 17 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1655 hours.

b. One a/c landed at ZARA to refuel and has returned to base.

c. One a/c was lost: 55th Wing at 1800 hours reported crew of this a/c as safe with Partisans after bailing out in YUGOSLAVIA. Other details were unknown. However, 2nd Lt. R.E. Anderson, pilot of 460th Group while at 4230N-1510E) returning from same mission, reports hearing pilot of lost a/c in radio contact with Big Fence at 1615 hours saying that he was low on gas over ADRIATIC flying at 3000'. Big Fence was heard acknowledging and recommending heading of 185 degrees. No other information available at this time.

d. 14 a/c of RED and BLUE forces were equipped with cameras. A significant print of RED Force bombing is attached.

17. Observations: A/D at Zeltweg (4713N-1445E) six SEF on field, and 400 cars in M/Y south of field. Observed at 1231 hours from 21,000'..

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Photo

Incl 2 - Track Chart

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

16 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #29, Operations Order #130.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army.

1. On 15 March 1945, 40 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb the MOOSBIERBAUM O/R in AUSTRIA. RED Force consisting of 20 a/c took off at 0750 hours. This force was led by the Group Leader, Major Glenn L. Chamberlain, Air Inspector, and the second attack unit by Captain Robert E. Reed, 763rd Bomb Sqdn. BLUE Force consisting of 20 a/c took off at 0806 hours. The BLUE Force was led by Major Duncan L. Cushing, C.O., 760th Bomb Sqdn, and the second attack unit by Lt. Richard W. Marclerode, 761st Bomb Sqdn.

2. The forces assembled over the base at 0905 hours. The 460th RED and BLUE forces departed ANDRIA at 0912 hours on time but the 485th was early for the Wing rendezvous and fell into the #2 position instead of the #3 as briefed. This caused confusion and numerous "S" turns by the 460th in an attempt to form the proper Wing formation.

3. Fighter escort of four P-38s were seen by RED Force momentarily at 1140 hours at (4705N-1439E). Six P-38s were seen by BLUE Force at 1235 hours at (4801N-1555E). Escort was not seen at any other time during the mission.

4. Radio communications was excellent in both forces. The Group leader was in contact with the Wing leader and weather information was relayed promptly. However, the escort could not be contacted by the Group leader after the target.

5. a. One a/c of RED Force returned early for the following reason: (1) engines throwing oil. This a/c jettisoned bombs in the ADRIATIC.

b. One a/c of RED Force turned back at (4812N-1500E) with #3 engine failure. This a/c jettisoned bombs at (4800N-1455E) and landed at a friendly field, ZARA. Crew members brought back to this field another a/c of this Group.

6. 18 a/c of RED Force were over the primary target at 1230½ hours. On a heading of 127° 17 a/c dropped 41.75 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N&.01-.025T fusing from 24,500'. A visual run was made on the target but the bombardier had difficulty sighting on the MPI due to an

effective smoke screen defending the target. Photos show bombs of one box in SW area of the refinery causing damage to unidentified buildings. Balance of bombs were short. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by all leaders.

7. Because of rack malfunction, one a/c failed to bomb the target and returned bomb load to base. One a/c jettisoned two bombs 15 minutes before the IP at (4823N-1456E) in order to hold formation. One a/c had one bomb hung up which was jettisoned immediately after target.

8. RED Force experienced IAH flak over the target for three to five minutes. Bursts were black and tracking the formation on the bomb run and rally. Moderate flak was observed at ST MICHAEL (4718N-1500E), a part of the BRUCK defenses.

9. 17 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1455 hours. One a/c, severely damaged by flak at the target, landed at ZARA. All engines were hit and #1 engine knocked out. Two crew members, the navigator and the bombardier, sustained serious flak wounds, both officers being hit in the face, shoulder and chest. The remaining crew members were returned to base by a Wing a/c.

10. a. 20 a/c of BLUE Force penetrated to the primary target but an effective smoke screen and smoke from previous bombings made it impossible to bomb visually as briefed. The force proceeded to the AF Alternate #6, WIENER NEUSTADT M/Y. On a visual run at 126° at 24,800', 14 a/c dropped 34 tons of bombs on this target at 1240 hours. The IP was identified by PFF. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by both leaders.

b. Six a/c, comprising the Baker box, BLUE Force, did not drop bombs on this target. Being without radio contact with the force leader and unable from the high box position to see bomb-bay doors being opened, the box leader did not know bomb run was being made. Bombs of this box were jettisoned as stated in paragraph 11.

c. One other a/c jettisoned four bombs in the Adriatic to hold formation.

d. Photos show two hits on reception siding at south end of the M/Y causing damage to rolling stock. Three other hits damaged siding installations. Remaining bombs were short or over.

11. a. On the return, Baker box, BLUE Force, jettisoned 52 bombs in a field at (4612N-1616E) SW of VANAZOIN at 1319 hours. The box leader, who for reasons stated in paragraph 10b. did not drop

bombs at the target, called BLUE Force leader for instructions when leaving the target area. He was ordered to jettison at first open break in clouds which would enable box to drop visually without hitting a village or hospital area. Opportunity to drop as ordered did not occur until time stated. Meanwhile a/c of this box were running low on gasoline. Accompanying photo shows open field in which bombs landed.

b. Three a/c of this box had previously jettisoned eight bombs in order to hold formation: two bombs at (4810N-1510E), two bombs at (4720N-1520E) and four bombs at (4745N-1456E).

12. 20 a/c of BLUE Force returned to base with a mean landing time of 1515 hours.

13. Route was flown as briefed by both forces. Slight variations were made to avoid route flak and weather. Weather: on take off 4/10th altocumulus bases 10-12000' with 3/10th cirrus continuing over ADRIATIC with 7-9/10th middle clouds appearing in thin layers at 11-13000', tops 16-18000'. North of Alps 10/10th undercast with tops lowering to 10-12000' and breaking to 7/10th over south AUSTRIA. Over primary target broken undercast tops 8-10000' with target 7/10th undercast very hazy and smoke. Over alternate target 7/10th undercast at 17000'. On return route clouds lowered over Alps to the west to 20000' with remainder of route similar to route out. 2/10th cumulus over base on return, bases 3-5000', tops 8 to 10000' with 4/10th altocumulus and altostratus at 14000'.

14. 14 a/c of RED and BLUE forces attempted photos. Significant target prints are attached, together with a print showing field in which Baker box, BLUE Force, jettisoned.

15. Three a/c received major flak damage and ten a/c received minor flak damage.

Observations: ST POLTON, 300 cars at 1230 hours, 24,000'.  
WIENER NEUSTADT M/Y, 400 cars at 1253 hours, 24,000'.  
GMUND M/Y, 300 cars at 1217 hours, 24,000'.

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Track Chart

Incl 2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

17 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #30, Operations Order #132.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 16 March 1945, forty (40) of forty-one (41) scheduled B-24 a/c took off commencing at 0735 hours to bomb a target in AUSTRIA. One a/c could not get off because of excessive oil pressure in #1 engine. The forty (40) a/c off formed two forces. RED Force consisting of twenty (20) a/c was led by Captain Franklin E. Reaves, Assistant S-3, and twenty (20) a/c comprising BLUE Force, were led by Major Gene I. Martin, 762nd Bomb Sqdn S-3.

2. Assembly was completed without incident.

3. RED Force was over ANDRIA at 0835 hours and departed leading the Wing, when the 485th was not seen. A dog leg was made in the vicinity of the SPUR to avoid clouds and at ZARA at 0955 hours the 464th had assumed the lead. BLUE Force was over ANDRIA at 0855 hours, and fell in behind the 485th, the Wing rendezvous being affected with no difficulties.

4. Three a/c of RED Force and two a/c of BLUE Force returned early:

(a) RED a/c #42-51244 turned back near JUDENBERG after #4 engine had internal failure and #1 supercharger failed. Two bombs were jettisoned at (4720N-1450E) and six at (4710N-1450E).

(b) RED a/c #41-28998 turned back at (4829N-1530E) after developing #3 engine trouble and #4 supercharger trouble. Bombs were jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

(c) RED a/c #44-40495 turned back over the ADRIATIC with #4 engine failure. Bombs were jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

(d) BLUE a/c #44-50379 turned back in YUGOSLAVIA at (4508N-1510E) with #4 engine low on power and supercharger trouble. This a/c jettisoned bombs in the ADRIATIC.

(e) BLUE a/c #44-10567 turned back in the rendezvous area with a gas leak. Bombs were returned to base.

5. RED a/c #42-64361 made an oxygen check enroute near ZARA at 0948 hours at 20,000' and found the nose gunner unconscious. Gunner could not be revived so a/c landed at ZARA where emergency treatment revived the crew member. This a/c returned to base after jettisoning bombs in the ADRIATIC.

6. a. Sixteen a/c of RED Force penetrated to the primary target but because of weather conditions, could not bomb visually. A visual bomb run was then attempted on AF Alt. #11 but weather again interfered. The force proceeded to AF Alt. #2, AMSTETTEN M/Y where the target was bombed visually from 25,000' on a axis of 190°. 16 a/c dropped 31.75 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N - .01&.025T fusing at 1247 hours. One a/c had one bomb hung up that was jettisoned one half minute after target time.

b. BLUE Force, delayed forty minutes by weather over the ADRIATIC, was advised by Wing to bomb an alternate target. A bomb run was attempted on AF Alt. #5 and #7 but both targets were undercast. A visual run was then made on AF Alt. #2, AMSTETTEN M/Y. From 25,300', 18 a/c dropped 36 tons of bombs on this target on an axis of 213° at 1219 hours.

c. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by all attack leaders.

d. Photos for the RED and BLUE Forces show approximately forty hits in center and eastern end of West M/Y, ten bombs on western choke point, and hits in lumber yard. Considerable damage was done to rolling stock and trackage.

7. No flak was encountered on the mission by either force.

8. At 1310 hours, BLUE Force, then at (4555N-1520E), observed two ME-210s coming from ZAGREB area. E/a were dark colored and flying at 7,000'. Formation was at 17,500' and e/a did not attack.

9. a. On take off, 8/10th altocumulus at 11500', tops 13,500' extending over ADRIATIC with 6-8/10th stratocumulus over central ADRIATIC. Clear over ZARA with 1-2/10th cumulus over YUGOSLAVIAN MTS. Over north YUGOSLAVIA and south AUSTRIA 0 to 1/10th cumulus and generally clear over ALPS. Large patches of altocumulus covered VIENNA and towns to east.

b. Over target area, clear.

c. On return, generally clear entire route to YUGOSLAVIAN coast with 6-8/10th altocumulus over coast. 3-5/10th stratocumulus over ADRIATIC and 3-5/10th altocumulus. SPUR to base, thunderstorm

activity, scattered rain and some hail. Visibility generally 15-20 miles on take off decreasing to 10-15 miles in target area.

10. 12 a/c of RED Force and 16 a/c of BLUE Force returned to base between 1459 and 1547 hours.

11. Four a/c of RED Force landed at friendly fields: two at ZARA, one at FOGGIA and one at PANTANELLA. Three of these a/c have returned to base, one a/c, #44-49315, remaining at ZARA. The crew returned to base in an a/c of the 456<sup>th</sup> Bomb Group.

Two a/c of BLUE Force landed at friendly fields: one at BARI and one at ZARA. These a/c have returned to base.

12. Fighter escort, 40-50 P-38s, first sighted by RED Force at 1051 hours ten miles south of JUDENBURG, furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1430 hours over the ADRIATIC. BLUE Force first sighted fighter escort, 20 P-51s, at 1133 hours at (4638N-1453E). Escort furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1225 hours at (4750N-1450E).

13. Radio communications was satisfactory with the weather a/c and within the Wing. However, BLUE Force could not clearly receive bombing intentions of the Wing leader.

14. Fourteen a/c, seven of each force, attempted photos. Selected strike photos are attached.

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
GroupS-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Photos

Incl 2 - Track chart

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

20 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #31, Operations Order #140.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army.

1. On 19 March 1945, Forty-two (42) scheduled B-24 a/c took off to bomb the MUHL DORF M/Y in Germany commencing at 0800 hours. The Group formed two forces of twenty-one (21) a/c each. The First Force was led by Brigadier General George R. Acheson, Commanding 55th Bombardment Wing, and the Second Force was led by Captain Coleman C. Williams, 762nd Bombardment Squadron (H).

2. The forces assembled over the base at 0900 hours.

3. No Wing rendezvous was scheduled. The 460<sup>th</sup> departed ANDRIA at 0907 hours without incident.

4. A/c #44-49332 of First Force returned early with engine trouble. Bomb load was returned to base.

5. Forty-One (41) a/c penetrated to the primary target.

a. 20 a/c of First Force were over the primary target at 1222 hours. From 18,000', 18 a/c dropped 43.5 tons of 1000 lb GP bombs, .1N&.01T fusing on an axis of 350°. The target was bombed visually by boxes. Due to rack malfunction, one a/c had three bombs hung up which were jettisoned one mile north of the target.

b. On the a/c of the First Force leader, the C-1 was found inoperative when two thirds of the way on the bomb run, resulting corrections being so erratic that the remainder of the run had to be made manually. Due to this last minute change over to PDI, the lead bombardier was unable to make a range sighting and held his bombs. The Force dropped on the Deputy Leader.

However, receiving no report of bombs away, the Force Leader proceeded to AF Alt. #4, PLATTLING M/Y, where this a/c and #6 a/c of the box dropped 5 tons from 17,900' at 1252 hours on a heading of 240°.

c. 21 a/c of the Second Force were over the primary target at 1224 hours. From 17,000', 21 a/c dropped 52.5 tons of bombs on the target on an axis of 344°, bombing visually by boxes.

d. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by all box leaders with the exception of the lead a/c, First Force, as noted in paragraph 5b.

e. Approaching the primary target, large areas of the M/Y were found to be smoke obscured due to previous bombing, making it impossible to pick up briefed aiming points accurately. Box bombardiers therefore sighted on nearby vulnerable portions of the target not already covered by dense smoke.

f. The First Force dropped in the MUHL DORF M/Y just east of the overpass with at least 25 hits damaging rolling stock and trackage. Huge fires were started. The overpass was probably destroyed blocking entrance to the yard. The Second Force dropped bombs in the station area of the yards destroying rolling stock, causing fires, and damaging warehouses. Another concentration of bombs fell just west of the overpass with nine or ten hits in the M/Y. Five hits were scored on the barracks area.

g. At AF Alt. #4, PLATTLING M/Y, results were not observed in poor visibility but since lead a/c of the two a/c bombing here had to salvo late, it is believed that no hits were scored.

6. Second Force observed four U/I SEFs at 1058 hours at (4433N-1505E) flying at 5,000' on a heading toward the ZAGREB area.

7. Weather on route: extensive stratus and stratocumulus vicinity of bases, bases variable 1600-3500' MSL, tops variable 2000-5000' MSL. Clouds broke slowly to 3-5/10th in FOGGIA area and to clear north of the SPUR. Clear across ADRIATIC and YUGOSLAV coast. 2-4/10th stratocumulus over YUGOSLAV MTS, tops 8000'. 3-5/10th stratocumulus and cumulus over ALPS breaking to 2-4/10th in target area.

On return, 4-6/10th cumulus and stratocumulus over ALPS increasing to 7-8/10th over YUGOSLAV MTS, tops 12000'. Over coast 2-4/10th cumulus, tops 6-8000' which decreased to nil for a short space over water and then increased slowly to 6/10th over western ADRIATIC and the SPUR, bases 3500', tops 8000'. 3-5/10th at base. Visibility, 10 miles in haze over ITALY and ADRIATIC increasing slowly to 15 miles over ALPS and target.

8. Route was flown as briefed to the primary target and thence to AF Alt. #4. Return route was flown as briefed.

9. No flak was encountered.

10. Twenty (20) a/c of each force returned to base between the hours of 1521 and 1551.

a. A/c #44-41050 of First Force landed at ZARA and the crew returned to base in another Group a/c, #44-41073.

11. Fighter escort, 20-30 P-51s, were first seen at 1159 hours at (4720N-1248E). Escort furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1353 hours at (4550N-1500E).

12. Near PLATTILING at 1315 hours, a P-51 was fired upon by waist gunner of a/c #6, lead box, First Force. No damage was noted. The P-51, red nose, red tail, and with yellow bands around wing, came out of sun from three o'clock at 17,500' in apparent pursuit curve, breaking off at 200 yards. After receiving fire on approach the P-51 flew parallel to left wing for few moments before going away.

13. Radio communication was excellent in each force. The Wing leader was in contact with the weather a/c and the 304th Wing.

14. 13 a/c (6 in First & 7 in Second Force) attempted photos. Selected strike photos are attached.

15. Observations: M/Y PLATTILING, 1000cars at 1253 hours, 17,500'. M/Y LJUBLJANA, 400-500 cars in M/Y, 3 trains in east M/Y and 4 trains outside M/Y at 1115, 17,000'. M/Y WELS, 800 cars at 1256 hours, 16,700'. A/D (4818N-1316E), 8SEF on field at 1245 hours, 16,700'.

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Photos

Incl 2 - Track chart.

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

21 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #32, Operations #142.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army.

1. On 20 March 1945, forty-one (41) of forty-two (42) scheduled B-24 a/c took off commencing at 0920 hours to bomb target in Austria. One a/c of the First Force failed to take off after blowing a tire on the taxi strip. The forty-one (41) a/c off formed two forces. The First Force consisting of 20 a/c was led by Major Rayford B. Whitley, Operations Officer, and the 21 a/c comprising the Second Force were led by Captain Ray E. Wells, 760th Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. The 460th assembled over the base at 1022 hours, the 464th making assembly difficult by flying in this area.

3. The Group departed ANDRIA at 1031 hours without incident.

4. One a/c of each force returned early:

a. First Force a/c #42-94848 turned back before the IP due to #4 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned at (4747N-1455E).

b. Second Force a/c #44-49332 turned back at (4255N-1550E) due to #1 engine failure. One bomb was jettisoned in the Adriatic and four were returned to base.

5. A/c 42-51728 failed to assemble with the First Force due to #2 amplifier being out. This a/c joined the 464<sup>th</sup> Group and bombed AMSTETTEN M/Y from 19,700', dropping 2.5 tons of bombs on the target but the target at 1307 hours on an axis of 35°.

6. The two forces totaling 38 a/c penetrated to the primary target but the target was obscured by clouds. The Group proceeded to the first Wing alternate, AMSTETTEN M/Y.

a. At 21,500', 18 a/c of First Force were over the target at 1322 hours. 17 a/c dropped 40.5 tons of 1000 lb GP bombs, .1N&.01T fusing on an axis of 355°. One a/c had four bombs hung up due to release malfunction and bombs were jettisoned in the ADRIATIC. One a/c failed to bomb the target because of toggle switch malfunction. Bombs were salvoed immediately after target.

b. The briefed IP for AMSTETTEN was obscured by clouds. Therefore, the town of LUNZ about eight miles east was selected as IP. The target was identified with no difficulty and a visual run was made.

c. At 20,300', 20 a/c of the Second Force were over the target at 1322 hours and dropped 50 tons of bombs on the target on an axis of 335°.

d. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by all box leaders. Bombing was visual and by the Charlie method.

7. First Force results: M/Y obscured by smoke from previous bombing. Some new hits noticed in center of M/Y. Balance of bombs not seen. (Charlie box of the 2nd Force of the 465th Gp which preceded this group to the target was quite a way behind the rest of its group. This box was observed to drop early and rallied almost under the lead box of the 460th Group shortly before bombs away. Their bombs were observed bursting short of the target. This is mentioned due to the fact that their bomb strikes were photographed by the 460th lead box.

Second Force results: Excellent concentration of bombs in M/Y causing damage to rolling stock and tracks.

8. Scant flak, believed to have been RR flak, was observed at CAKOVEC (4623N-1626E). A barrage of about thirty black and one red burst was seen. Scant flak was also observed at HODOSAN (4623N-1639E), approximately five bursts.

9. Four U/I SEFs were observed by First Force: at 1315 hours, two black SEFs were seen at (4737N-1450E), flying at the same altitude as the formation at 20,000'. At 1318 hours, two silver SEFs were seen at (4750N-1500E), flying 5000' below the formation at 21,000'.

10. Weather: generally clear on take off, over ADRIATIC and over YUGOSLAVIA and southern ALPS. 1-2/10<sup>th</sup> over northern ALPS, bases 27-28000'. Also over northern ALPS and to north variable 5-10/10<sup>th</sup> multilayer cirrus, bases 19-21000'. Vicinity of LINZ multilayer clouds appeared to go to the ground and were oriented on a N-S axis. Over AMSTETTEN, 8-10/10<sup>th</sup> cirrus, bases 21000' and 10/10<sup>th</sup> clouds, bases 27-28000'.

On return thick cirrus extended to the southern slopes of ALPS then broke to generally clear rest of route to base. Visibility 15-20 miles in south decreasing to 10-15 miles over ALPS and to the south.

11. Route was flown as briefed to the primary target and thence to the first Wing alternate. Return route was flown as briefed.

12. 19 a/c of First Force and 20 a/c of Second Force returned to base between the hours of 1545 and 1615.

13. Fighter escort, 12 P-38s, were first sighted at 1300 hours at (4700N-1440E). Escort furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1400 hours at (4625N-1645E).

14. Radio communication within the Group and with the fighter escort was excellent. The leader was able to contact the other groups in the Wing with the exception of the 465th.

15. Fourteen a/c attempted photos. Selected strike photos are attached.

16. Observations: M/Y (4605N-1510E), 400-500 cars at 1235 hours, 18700'. A/D (4712N-1445E), 7 SEFs on field at 1301 hours, 19300'. At FOHNSDORF (4713N-1440E), a plant resembling a steel works, apparently in operation with smoke from chimneys noted at 1302 hours, 19000'. A radio report: "KIDDIES ONE No. 422 COCKTAIL" was acknowledged by First Force leader at 1345 hours at (4716N-1606E), 19000' altitude. ("KIDDIES" was Call Sign for 5<sup>th</sup> Wing. "COCKTAIL" was code word for Russian landing.)

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Photos

Incl 2 - Track chart

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

22 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #33, Operations #143.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army.

1. On 21 March 1945, at 0700 hours, Thirty-one (31) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb parked a/c at Neuberg A/D, Germany. The Group was led by Major George S. Davis, Jr., C.O., 762nd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Assembly was over the base at 0809 hours.

3. The 460th departed ANDRIA at 0817 hours. The 485th was late at rendezvous so the 460th flew number three position in the Wing instead of the scheduled number four position.

4. Two a/c failed to reach the target:

a. A/c 44-49598 turned back at (4803N-1220E) with the #3 engine piston ring broken and #2 engine throwing oil. Bomb load was jettisoned at (4748N-1235E).

b. A/C 42-52365, which is missing, was seen leaving formation before the target at (4732N-1200E) at 1110 hours at 20,500' altitude with one engine smoking. Bomb load was jettisoned and a/c took a heading for NE YUGOSLAVIA. "MAYDAY" call was heard at 1110 and 1125 hours. No other information on this a/c.

5. 29 a/c were over the primary target at 1148 hours and on an axis of 290° from 20,000' dropped 60.72 tons of M1A1 frags clustered. A visual run was made.

a. Five a/c had a total of 32 clusters hung up which were jettisoned as follows: one cluster in ADRIATIC and 31 clusters on the rally.

b. Photo results show pattern in dispersal area 2,000' west of runway and another concentration just southwest of southwest dispersal area.

c. The auto pilot of the lead a/c was inoperative which made it necessary to make a manual run. The first attack unit dropped

on the deputy leader. The second attack leader used auto pilot on the bomb run.

6. No flak was encountered on the mission.

7. One encounter to place: An ME-262 approaching from 12 o'clock low passed about 400 yards beneath the formation at (4850N-1120E) at 1200 hours, 20,000', and the right waist and tail gunners of one a/c fired about ten rounds at this jet without apparent damage. Action of the ME-262 was not aggressive.

a. Four other e/a were observed on the mission: at 1155 hours three ME-262s were observed in a dogfight with P-51s at (4849N-1119E). The formation was at 20,000' and the e/a at 15,000'. At same time, one ME-109 was seen at (4847N-1125E). ME-109 was OD color and flying in opposite direction from the formation.

8. Weather: generally clear on take off and over ADRIATIC to south of RIMINI and then 6-8/10th stratocumulus, tops 6-8000'. 2-3/10th thin altostratus, bases 16,500', tops 17,000' started off ANCONA and extended to north ADRIATIC increasing to 8-10/10th over extreme north ADRIATIC, ITALY and southern slopes of ALPS. 10/10th stratocumulus over ALPS, tops 12-14000'. 1-3/10th cirrus at 22-24000' over ALPS increasing slowly north of ALPS to 4-6/10th in target area, tops 10-12000'.

On return, cirrus lowered slowly to 20,000' over ALPS becoming nil rest of route to base. Stratocumulus increased to 10/10<sup>th</sup> over ALPS breaking to 4-6/10<sup>th</sup> over YUGOSLAV coast with nil over central ADRIATIC. Visibility generally 15-20 miles.

9. Route was flown as briefed.

10. 29 a/c returned to base: 27 a/c between the hours of 1454 and 1511, and 2 a/c which had refueled at ZARA by 1605 hours. A/c 42-52365 is missing as explained in paragraph 4b.

11. Fighter escort, 30 P-51s, were first sighted at 1050 hours at (4644N-1222E). They furnished excellent close cover on penetration, target and withdrawal, leaving the formation at 1259 hours at (4614N-1422E).

b. One P-51 was fired upon. At 1330 hours at (4830N-1210E) 20,000', a/c #4 of Baker box, first attack unit, observed a P-51 at 2000 yards coming in from 7 o'clock high. The tail and left waist gunners fired short bursts across the nose of the P-51 at 1000 yards and he broke off immediately. P-51 had red nose and yellow tail markings and did not appear damaged.

12. Radio communication was good within the Group, with other groups in the Wing and with weather a/c.

13. Ten a/c attempted photos. Selected strike photos are attached.

14. Observations: A/D (4603N-1236E), 9 dark colored SEFs on field at 1035 hours, 19,800'. A/D (4843N-1130E), 50 e/a dispersed on field at 1157 hours, 20,000'.

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Track chart

Incl 2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

23 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #34, Operations #145.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army.

1. On 22 March 1945, at 0810 hours, forty-two (42) scheduled B-24s were dispatched to bomb the HEILIGENSTADT M/Y in VIENNA. The Group was led by Colonel J. M. Price, Group Commander, and the second attack unit by Captain Ruel W. Davis, 760th Bomb Sqdn.

2. Stratus clouds made it necessary to go eight miles north of the Group assembly area and to change assembly altitude from 7,000' to 8,500'.

3. At rendezvous, the Wing leader, the 485th, was approximately two minutes early causing a gap in order of flight between the two groups. The 460th departed ANDRIA at 0925 hours.

4. Five a/c returned early:

a. A/c 44-10563 left the formation over ITALY with #2 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

b. A/c 44-50381 turned back at (4328N-1538E) with #3 supercharger out. Bombs were jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

c. A/c 44-50399 turned back at (4643N-1447E) with #1 engine failure. Bombs were jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

d. A/c 42-51567 turned back at (4750N-1502E) with #1 turbo out and #4 turbo a runaway. Bomb load was jettisoned at (4740N-1458E).

e. A/c 42-51325 turned back at (4806N-1509E) with oil pressure out. Bombs were returned to base.

5. On route to the target, near the JUDENBURG turning point at (4710N-1440E) weather conditions indicated that bombing would be PFF. Since the Group leader's PFF equipment had become inoperative at the YUGOSLAVIAN coast and the deputy leader's equipment was also out, the leader of the second attack unit was ordered to assume the Group lead. This was accomplished at 1205 hours at (4730N-1448E). The IP was identified visually and a visual run was attempted although clouds

over the target area, and smoke and haze made identification of the target difficult. As the bomb run was started the PFF navigator was obliged to take over. The run was then made by PFF until the last twenty seconds when the bombardier sighted the M/Y and attempted a quick, last moment correction onto the target.

a. 37 a/c were over the primary target at 1246-1247 hours, dropping 65.5 tons of clustered 100 lb GP bombs, .1N&,025T fusing from 24,900' on an axis of 149°.

b. 14 a/c had 170 bombs hung up which were jettisoned as follows: 152 bombs on the rally and 18 bombs in the ADRIATIC.

c. Photo results show a large concentration in residential district SW of the HEILIGENSTADT M/Y.

d. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by both attack unit leaders.

6. Group experienced IAH flak over the target for six minutes. Black, some white and a few red bursts were noted, the concentration tracking the formation.

a. At each sixth flak burst, during one flak barrage, the shells appeared to break open rather than explode and large grey smoke rings shot upward at an angle of 60°.

b. Moderate flak was observed at BRUCK.

7. Weather: on take off altostratus deck from 7-8000' over field and to south breaking clear just north of base. Rest of route over ITALY and ADRIATIC to YUGOSLAV coast, clear becoming 10/10<sup>th</sup> altostratus along coast, bases 14000', tops 17-18,000' extending to YUGOSLAV MTS. Rest of route to target variable 2-7/10<sup>th</sup> altostratus, tops 17000', with 4-5/10 in target area.

a. Return route similar with altostratus deck breaking off YUGOSLAV coast to clear over ADRIATIC and ITALY. Visibility, ten to fifteen miles except five to ten miles in haze over ADRIATIC on return.

8. The route was flown as briefed.

9. Fighter escort, 20 P-38s, first sighted at 1128 hours at (4554N-1454E), furnished penetrations, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1414 hours at (4330N-1630E).

10. 35 a/c returned to base between the hours of 1513 and 1541.

a. One a/c, #44-40495, landed at ZARA with two engines damaged by flak.

b. One a/c is missing: The left wing of a/c 42-50940 was hit by flak over the target at 23,000', causing a fire in #3 engine at 1247 hours. Seven chutes were seen blossoming. This a/c was last observed at 1302 hours, 15 minutes after target time, straggling behind the formation but holding its altitude, and with the fire in #3 engine apparently dying down. A/c then appeared under control.

11. Two a/c received major damage and sixteen a/c minor damage. There were no reported casualties.

12. Great difficulty was experienced with radio communication. Contact could not be made with the weather a/c. The Group leader was unable to receive bombing intentions of the 485<sup>th</sup> and at 1200 hours all frequencies were jammed. No contacts were possible until jamming ceased at about 1346 hours, an hour after target time. Except during the period of jamming, communication within the Group on channel "B" was excellent.

13. Fourteen a/c attempted photos. A selected strike photo is attached.

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Track chart

Incl 2 - Photo

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

24 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #35, Operations #147.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 23 March 1945, at 0745 hours, thirty-nine (39) B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb the GMUND M/Y in AUSTRIA. The Group was led by Lt. Colonel James C. Watkins, Deputy Group Commander while the second attack unit was led by Captain Lavoid D. Wagner, 763rd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly was over the base at 0847 hours.

3. The Wing rendezvous was affected without incident. The 460<sup>th</sup> departed ANDRIA at 0856 hours.

4. Thirty-nine a/c penetrated to the primary target. The first attack unit was obliged to make two bomb runs. While on the first bomb run the Group leader had to break off to the right to avoid a collision with the 485<sup>th</sup>. The first attack unit, therefore, did not bomb at this time but made a 360 degree turn back to the IP for another, successful run. The second attack unit, however, was able to continue on course and drop its bombs on the first run without interference.

a. The total of 39 a/c dropped 71.9 tons of clustered 100 lb GO bombs, .1N&.025T fusing on the targets as follows:

(1) 20 a/c of the first attack unit dropped 39.7 tons at 1208½ hours, from 18,800' on a heading of 324°.

(2) 19 a/c of the second attack unit dropped 32.2 tons at 1154 hours, from 17,750' on a heading of 316°.

b. Photo results show:

(1) First attack unit: An excellent pattern across the M/Y, beginning in the area of repair shops, resulting in considerable damage and fires.

(2) Second attack unit: A heavy, full concentration beginning in area of loco depot and station and extending across NW and to W end of M/Y.

c. Twelve a/c of the two attack units had 122 bombs hung up over the target which were jettisoned as follows: 65 bombs on rally, 12 bombs at (4843N-1530E), 12 bombs at (4748N-1447E), 23 bombs at (4736N-1445E), 8 bombs at (4634N-1434E) and 2 bombs in the ADRIATIC.

d. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by both attack unit leaders.

5. No flak was experienced on the mission.

6. The route was flown as briefed except for the second bomb run of the first attack unit as explained in paragraph #4.

7. Weather: clear on take off with variable 2-4/10<sup>th</sup> thin low stratus off ITALIAN coast and breaking to clear over central ADRIATIC. Clear rest of route to target except for 0-1/10<sup>th</sup> cumulus over ALPS. Target clear.

Clear on return route with 3/10 thin cumulus over SPUR tops 4500'. Visibility generally 10-15 miles.

8. Thirty-nine a/c returned to base between the hours of 1455 and 1559.

9. Fighter escort, 30 P-38s, first sighted at 1120 hours at (4736N-1445E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1345 hours at (4356N-1528E).

10. Radio communication was excellent between groups and bombing intentions were clear. Communication within the Group was satisfactory but the weather a/c could not be contacted.

11. Fourteen a/c attempted photos. Selected strike photos are attached.

12. Observations:

a. M/Y ST. POLTON, 500 cars at 1135 hours, 18000'.

b. M/Y ZELTWEG, 400 cars at 1253 hours, 17400'.

c. DANUBE (4825N- 1522E), 15 tugs and 2 barges at 1142 hours, 17800'.

d. At (4500N-1507E), a probable P-51 observed on plateau at 1209 hours, 16000'. A/c appeared to have been there for some time and seemed to be in good condition.

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,

Captain, Air Corps,  
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Track chart

Incl 2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

25 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #36, Operations #149.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 24 March 1945, at 0805 hours, forty-one (41) scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb parked a/c on Neuburg A/D, Germany. The Group was led by Captain Ray E. Wells, 760th Bomb Sqdn, and the second attack unit by Captain Coleman C. Williams, 762nd Bomb Sqdn.

2. Group assembly was over GRAVINA at 0900 hours without incident.

3. One a/c of the second attack unit #42-64361 turned back at (4700N-1345E) with #1 engine failure. This a/c jettisoned bomb load in the ADRIATIC.

4. Forty a/c, comprising 21 a/c of the first attack unit and 39 a/c of the second attack unit, penetrated to the primary target.

5. Half way down the bomb run, an unidentified box of seven a/c had bombed under the 460<sup>th</sup> forcing the formation to make a dogleg to the left to avoid releasing bombs over this box. However, the Group was able to swing back on the run with ample time to synchronize.

a. 39 a/c dropped 83.8 tons of 36 clustered frags on the target at 1225½ hours from 21,000' on an angle of 285°.

b. Photos show that of the nine planes present in the portion of the NW dispersal area assigned as a target six were destroyed. A heavy and concentrated pattern covered the entire NW dispersal area from west edge of administration buildings to several hangars on the extreme western end of the field.

d. One a/c failed to bomb the target due to rack malfunction. Bombs were released prematurely between the IP and the target. Five a/c had seven clusters hung up: five were jettisoned on the rally and two in the ADRIATIC.

e. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by both attack unit leaders.

6. Two bursts resembling heavy flak were seen in the target area at 20,000' by several crews. One crew member reported a single gun firing from the NE corner of the field. This information is considered unreliable. It is believed that the so-called flak bursts may have been frag bombs exploding prematurely in the air.

7. Eleven e/a were observed on the mission:

a. Two FW-190s were seen at 1212 hours at (4842N-1118E). E/a were at 4000', our formation at 21,000'.

b. Six silver ME\_262s were seen on the bomb run at 1220 hours, flying in a formation of two Vees of three a/c each at 15000'.

c. Three FW-190s at 1234 hours passed about two miles in front of the formation at 4829N-1130E). E/a were at 14,000', our formation at 20,500'.

8. The route was flown as briefed.

9. Weather: Clear on take off with 2/10<sup>th</sup> fair weather cumulus over ALPS and 1/10<sup>th</sup> stratocumulus over DINARICE. North of ALPS to target, 2-4/10<sup>th</sup> thin cirrus above 24,000'. Target area clear with visibility 25-30 miles.

On return weather was same as route out except for increase in cumulus over DINARICE to 3/10<sup>th</sup>, tops 10,000'. Over ADRIATIC visibility reduced to 10-15 miles.

10. Thirty-nine a/c returned to base between the hours of 1517 and 1616.

a. One a/c #42-52372 landed at ZARA.

11. Fighter escort, 18 P-38s, first sighted at 1130 hours at (4652N-1408E), furnished good penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1400 hours at (4527N-1450E).

12. Radio communication between the groups in the Wing and within the Group on channel "B" was good.

13. Thirteen a/c attempted photos. Selected strike photos attached.

14. Observations: Mirror signals were flashed near south shore of Lake Balaton at approximately (4750N-1230E) toward the formation from ~~xxxxxx~~ to 1300 hours. Observed from 18,000'. B-24 on ground near KOPRIVNIK (4536N-1501E) at 1102 hours from 16,000'.

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Track chart

Incl 2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

26 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #37, Operations #151.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army.

1. On 25 March 1945, at 0750 hours, thirty-eight (38) of Forty (40) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb a target in CZECHOSLOVAKIA. One a/c failed to take off because of a broken engine gasket and one a/c because of failure of four superchargers. The Group was led by Major Glenn L. Chamberlain of the 762nd Bomb Sqdn, and the second attack unit by Lt. Thomas J. Griffin of the 761st Bomb Sqdn.

2. Group assembly was over the field at 0904 hours without incident.

3. The 460<sup>th</sup> departed ANDRIA at 0912 hours. The 485<sup>th</sup>, number three in the Wing, was late for the rendezvous making it necessary for the 460<sup>th</sup> as number four to fly a dogleg to allow the 485<sup>th</sup> to get into position.

4. Two a/c of the second attack unit failed to reach the primary target.

a. A/c #44-50399 had #2 engine damaged when hit by a live shell fired by an a/c clearing its guns. The resulting oil leak forced this a/c to turn back at (4900N-1524E). Bomb load was returned to base.

b. A/c #43-78302 turned back at (4750N-1450E) with #1 engine failure and #4 oil pressure low. This a/c jettisoned bomb load at (4654N-1450E) and landed at ZARA, the crew returning to this base via C-47.

5. Thirty-six a/c penetrated to the primary target. However, at about thirty seconds before time for bombs away, a group believed to be the 484th, 49th Wing, was observed flying 2,000' directly below the formation on a collision heading. The 460th turned off sharply to the right withholding its bombs. The Wing leader was notified and the 460th flew to the IP of the second alternate target, WELS A/D, AF Alt. #2.

a. 35 a/c dropped 75.6 tons of clustered frags on a briefed dispersal area of WELS A/D at 1320 hours from 21,000' on a heading of 187°.

b. One a/c failed to bomb the target due to rack malfunction; bomb load was salvoed on the WELS NE M/Y one minute after target time.

c. Bomb strike photos show a good concentration in the NE dispersal area. Of 19 parked SEF, ten were probably destroyed and two damaged.

d. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by both attack unit leaders.

6. No flak was encountered on the mission.

7. Nine e/a were seen on the mission.

a. One ME-109, dark colored, was seen at 1216 hours at (5000N-1500E) at 24,000'.

b. Seven U/I TEFs, believed to have been ME-110s, were seen at 1240 hours at (4945N-1402E) at 22,000'.

c. One FW-190 was seen at 1251 hours at (4920N-1340E) at 21,500'.

8. The route was flown as briefed, except as explained in paragraph #5.

9. Weather: On entire route, clear of low clouds with variable amounts of thin cirrus above 25,000' west of course. Considerable amount of ground haze in valleys of ALPS. Visibility entire route 20 miles or more. Over target, 8/10<sup>th</sup> thin cirrus at 25,000' with visibility 20 miles.

On return route, cirrus moving east with 7-10/10<sup>th</sup> on course, bases 25,000' in north. Cirrus lowered to 22,000' in south.

10. Thirty a/c returned to base between the hours of 1624 and 1649.

a. Six a/c, #4925, 4848, 8302, 2428, 1325 & 2062, landed at ZARA.

11. Fighter escort, 15 P-51s, first sighted at 1120 hours at (4708N-1440E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1400 hours at (4633N-1430E).

12. Radio communication was good within the Group and the Wing except that the 485<sup>th</sup> could not be contacted.

13. Fourteen a/c attempted photos. Selected strike photos are attached.

14. Observations: Reflectors on the ground which appeared to be tracking the formation were seen at 1224 hours at (5008N-1416E) from 24500'. Long motor transport column south of LJUBLJANA on highway heading toward that city was observed at 1410 hours, 23500'. 30 three & four engine a/c on Ebely A/D, PRAGUE area, 1220 hours, 24000'. 500 cars in two M/Ys LJUBLJANA at 1412 hours, 16500'.

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Track chart

Incl 2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

27 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #38, Operations #152.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army.

1. On 26 March 1945, at 0910 hours, thirty-one (31) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb a communication target in CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The Group was led by Major Duncan L. Cushing of the 760th Bomb Sqdn, and the second attack unit by Captain Lavoid D. Wagner of the 763rd Bomb Sqdn.

2. Group assembly was over the base at 1014 hours.

3. No Wing rendezvous was scheduled. The 460th departed ANDRIA at 1021 hours.

4. The thirty-one a/c penetrated to the primary target where 10/10<sup>th</sup> undercast made visual bombing impossible. Because of reduced visibility in thin cirrus clouds, the Baker box lost sight of the lead box at (4833N-1540E). This box went back to the area of the primary target, finding it still closed in, then returned to the base. Meanwhile the Group formation, less Baker box proceeded to AF Alt. #4, WIENER NEUSTADT M/Y. The turn on the IP for this target was made on DR and the bomb run was made by PFF.

5. The seven a/c of the first attack unit (Able box) dropped 15.75 tons of 250 lb GP bombs, .1N&.025T fusing at 1428 hours from 18,700' on an axis of 120°.

a. After bombs away, a break in the clouds disclosed that the bomb run had been made on BADEN, about fifteen miles north of WIENER NEUSTADT. Bombs were seen hitting in the fields just south of BADEN.

6. The second attack unit, after turning on the IP for AF Alt. #4, WIENER NEUSTADT M/Y, started a PFF bomb run in adverse weather conditions. The leader continued to lose altitude and broke out of the clouds at 17,100' but there was insufficient time for a change to a visual run.

a. Fifteen a/c of the second attack unit dropped 33 tons of bombs on the target at 1341 hours from 17,000' on an axis of 165°.

b. Bomb strike photos show a good concentration across M/Y in area of Loco Depot with at least thirty hits within limits of the yard.

7. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by both leaders.

8. In the first attack unit:

a. Able box, 7 a/c, dropped all bombs on the target.

b. In Baker box which as explained in para #4 returned without bombing:

3 a/c jettisoned bomb load (totaling 6.75 tons) in ADRIATIC.

1 a/c returned bombs (2.25 tons) to base.

3 a/c landed at ZARA, disposition of bombs (totaling 6.75 tons unknown.

9. In the second attack unit:

a. 15 a/c dropped bombs on the target.

b. 1 a/c jettisoned 6 bombs (.75 tons) on the rally due to a rack malfunction.

c. 2 a/c jettisoned their complete bomb loads (totaling 4.50 tons) as follows: one at (4833N-1633E) due to #3 engine failure and lack of power; one on rally due to rack malfunction.

10. The lead box encountered IAH flak from the VIENNA defenses on the BADEN bomb run for two and one half minutes. No flak was encountered at WIENER NEUSTADT.

11. Route was flown as briefed to the primary target and on return from BADEN and WIENER NEUSTADT.

12. Weather: on take off, 8/10<sup>th</sup> altocumulus, bases 12000' dispersing rapidly and becoming 3/10<sup>th</sup> during rendezvous. 10/10<sup>th</sup> cirrus extended over ADRIATIC, YUGOSLAVIA, HUNGARY and AUSTRIA, bases 24-25000' in the south lowering to 23000' near the primary target, and then lowering abruptly to 17500'-18000' in VIENNA area.

On return route, 10/10<sup>th</sup> altostratus persisted across ADRIATIC and ITALY, bases 7500-8000' with low stratus over hills east of base, tops 700-800'. Visibility generally 15-20 miles lowering to 3-5 in precipitation.

13. Twenty-seven a/c returned to base between the hours of 1722 and 1751.

a. Four a/c, #0417, 9372, 9332 & 0399 landed at ZARA.

14. No fighter escort was observed on the mission nor could it be contacted by radio. Two P-38s were seen momentarily at 1226 hours at (4638N-1852E).

15. Radio communication was good within the groups. Weather reports were received from the 485th and bombing intentions were made clear to the second attack unit.

16. Ten a/c attempted photos. A selected strike photo is attached.

17. Six a/c received minor flak damage. There was no reported casualties.

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Track chart

Incl 2 - Photo

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

31 March 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #39, Operations #157.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army.

1. On 30 March 1945, four scheduled B-24 PFF a/c were dispatched to bomb a target in Austria employing LONE WOLF tactics. The first a/c #1651, piloted by Lt. Walter E. Maciejewski, took off at 0747 hours, followed by a/c #0400, Lt. Richard N. Malesheetz, at 0753 hours, a/c #9672, Lt. John M. Huston, at 0755 hours, and a/c #9707, Lt. Donald G. Albright, at 0756 hours.

2. The first a/c departed ANDRIA at 0827 hours as scheduled.

3. There was one non-effective sortie. A/c #9672 at 1105 hours at (4741N-1803E) received a radio message from a/c ahead that weather at the primary was clear. This a/c proceeded to AF Alt #11 which was also found open. A/c then flew to area of AF Alt #12 but the PFF set was weak and the target could not be picked up on the scope. A return was made to AF Alt #11 which was again found open. A/c then came back to base, landing at 1351 hours.

a. The four delayed action bombs were jettisoned in the ADRIATIC and the remaining four bombs were returned to base.

b. A/c #9672 used PFF navigation for fifteen fixes covering six tenths of the route. However, as explained above, the PFF set was weak and could not be used on AF Alt #12.

4. Three a/c, receiving the report that the primary was open, were successful in bombing briefed alternate targets by PFF:

a. A/c #9707 dropped two tons of 8x500 lb RDX bombs, of which 4 were fused .1N&.01T, and 4 fused LD from ten minutes to two hours, on the KAPFENBURG TANK WORKS at 1157 hours from 24,000' on an axis of 310°.

b. Two a/c bombed the GRAZ M/Y: A/c #1651 dropped two tons of 8x500 lb TDY bombs, of which 4 were fused .1N&.01T, and 4 fused LD from ten minutes to two hours, at 1124 hours from 26,000' on an axis of 275°, and a/c #0400 dropped two tons of 8x500 lb RDX bombs of which 4 were fused .1N&.01T and 4 fused LD from ten minutes to two

hours and one propaganda bomb at 1236 hours from 24,900' on an axis of 265°.

c. On a/c #1651 turn onto the target was made by PFF. Two course corrections were given the pilot and five sighting angles were given to the bombardier. There were no malfunctions. Twenty PFF fixes were given to the DR navigator on route and on return.

d. An a/c #0400 the target was picked up by the PFF navigator through 8/10<sup>th</sup> undercast. Three course corrections were given the pilot and five sighting angles were given to the bombardier. No malfunctions were encountered. On the route flown, about fifteen fixes were given to the DR Navigator.

e. On a/c #9707 PFF was used for the turn on the briefed axis of attack. PFF navigator furnished three course corrections and six sighting angles. There were no malfunctions. PFF was also used for navigation; thirty fixes were given the DR Navigator on route and return.

f. Results of a/c #9707 at KAPFENBURG and of a/c #0400 at GRAZ are unknown.

g. A strike photo by a/c #1651 taken through a break in the clouds shows a concentration of bombs in the GRAZ goods yard just north of the Wagon Factory.

h. A/c #1651 used PDI on the bomb run because auto pilot corrections were not fast enough; the other two a/c used auto pilot.

5. A/c #1651 experienced MAH flak over GRAZ for 1½ minutes. Bursts were accurate for altitude but trailing the a/c in a box barrage. A/c #0400 experienced SIH flak at the same target for thirty seconds. A/c #9707 received SIH flak from the BRUCK area for thirty seconds.

6. Route was flown as briefed by a/c #9672, #1651 and #9707, until turn was made north of GYOR toward alternate target. A/c #0400 penetrated to area north of VIENNA before circling back to find alternate. On return all a/c flew briefed route home from area of alternate targets.

7. Weather: on take off 9/10th stratocumulus, tops 6-7000' breaking rapidly to clear over ADRIATIC, YUGOSLAVIA and SW Hungary. Lake Balaton to GYOR area, 7-8/10th thin altocumulus, tops 18-19000'. GYOR to GRAZ altocumulus decreasing slowly with crews reporting 5/10th in GRAZ area, tops 16,000' while weather in KAPFENBURG area was reported as 9-10/10 with tops at 23,500'.

On return, altocumulus broke to nil over northern YUGOSLAVIA. Clear rest of route to ITALY except for very thin altocumulus off YUGOSLAVIAN coast. Over ITALY and base, 3-4/10th stratocumulus.

8. A/c #1651, 0400 and 9707 returned to base at 1325, 1445 and 1406 hours respectively.

9. Radio communication was good. A/c were able to contact the other Wings but a/c #1651 could not contact a/c #0400 and #9707 of this Group.

10. Four a/c were equipped with cameras. A strike photo of GRAZ is attached.

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Track chart

Incl 2 - Photo

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF  
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

1 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #40, Operations #159.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),  
APO 520, U.S. Army.

1. On 31 March 1945, at 0755 hours, thirty-one (31) scheduled B-24 PFF a/c were dispatched to bomb a target in AUSTRIA. The Group was led by Lt. Colonel Rayford H. Whitley II, Operations Officer, and the second attack unit by Lt. John T. Bilek, 763rd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. During assembly the 464th flew over the base on a collision heading forcing the 460th Group leader to dive 500' to get under them. After this incident, the 460th completed assembly at 0854 hours.

3. Briefed Wing order of flight was 460th, 485th, 465th, 464th. The 460th departed ANDRIA on time at 0902 hours but a dogleg was flown to allow the other groups to assume their proper positions. The Wing rendezvous was accomplished at 0905 hours at (4119N-1617E) at 7,000'.

4. Three a/c failed to reach the target:

a. A/c #42-51913 turned back at (4520N-1244E) with #3 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

b. A/c #44-49592 turned back at ANDRIA with #1 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

c. A/c #44-49598 turned back at (4330N-1420E) with #1 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

5. On route a front was encountered at (4338M-1421E) off ANCONA, the Group making a climbing 360° turn to the left in an unsuccessful attempt to get above the clouds. The Wing formation was dispersed by the weather, then 460th proceeding on alone, continuing to climb, finally breaking out on top at the north ADRIATIC coast.

On course at (4708N-1233E) at 1205 hours, it was apparent that weather conditions would make it impossible to reach the primary target. The decision was made to proceed to AF Alt #11 and the other three groups and fighter escort were notified. Acknowledgement was not obtained from the 465th.

The fighter escort asked for further explanation of the words "AF Alt #11," apparently being unable to identify this target. The position of the target was made clear by its relation to AF Alt #1 with which the fighter leader was familiar.

6. 28 a/c dropped 61 tons of 250 lb GP bombs, .1N&.025T fusing, on AF Alt #11, the Villach North M/Y, at 1226 hours from 23,500' on an axis of 197° T.H.

a. Photographs reveal bomb strikes in the M/Y in vicinity of the station. Other results are obscured by clouds.

b. The IP was picked up and the turn on the bomb run was made by PFF. About two minutes before bombs away, after course and one sighting angle had been given, the PFF equipment went out. The target then came into view through a break in the clouds, allowing a visual run of 75 seconds.

c. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by both attack leaders.

d. Three a/c had sixteen bombs hung up by release malfunction: twelve bombs were jettisoned immediately after target time and four bombs were jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

7. The Group experienced SAH flak over the target for one to two minutes.

8. One enemy U/I SEF was seen making a head-on pass on a B-24, apparently an early return from another group, at (4530N-1300E), 1125 hours, at 21,000'. E/a then made a 180° turn, starting an attack from astern but the 460th Group escort drove e/a into the clouds. B-24 appeared undamaged.

9. Route was flown as briefed to (4708N-1233E) southeast of INNSBRUCK on penetration and thence direct to the briefed IP for VILLACH.

During rally to the left, as briefed, to (4618N-1442E), it was necessary because of weather to climb an additional two thousand feet to 25,500'.

From the rally point the course was directly back to the base except for a 360° turn at the SPUR to lose altitude.

10. Weather: Generally clear on take off with cirrus forming over ITALY and increasing to 7/10th off SPUR, bases 18000', and 4/10th stratocumulus, tops 5000'.

Cirrus thickened and lowered rapidly, becoming multi-layer off ANCONA with 8-10/10th alto or stratocumulus, tops 12-14000', and variable 3-7/10th cirrus, bases 26000'.

Over north ITALY and ALPS 8-10/10th cirrus, tops 20-23000' and 3-5/10th cirrus, bases 26-27000'.

Similar conditions extended to well north of VILLACH and cirrus decks appeared to merge. North of VILLACH clouds broke momentarily to 3/10th cirrus, tops 22000' and 4/10th altocumulus, tops 14000'.

On return 10/10th cirrus over YUGOSLAVIA with tops lowering slowly to 20000' over ADRIATIC. Clouds broke abruptly off SPUR to 2-4/10th stratocumulus.

Visibility generally 15-20 miles when not in clouds. Persistent and thick vapor trails were encountered on route.

11. 28 a/c returned to base between the hours of 1422 and 1455.

12. Fighter escort, 25 P-51s, first sighted at 1136 hours at 4258N-1239E), furnished excellent penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1315 hours at (4345N-1520E).

13. Radio communication within the Group was excellent except that on return channel "B" appeared jammed from 1230 hours until 1325 hours.

Contact was good with the 485th, the 464th, the fighter escort, and weather a/c. The 465th could not be reached.

Communication with the Wing ground station on 6015 KC was jammed from 1300 hours until about 1350 hours on arrival at the SPUR.

14. Two a/c received minor flak damage. There were no reported casualties.

15. Ten a/c attempted photos. Selected prints are attached.

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Track chart

Incl 2 - Photo



Annex #8

C O M M E N D A T I O N S

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE  
Office of the Commanding General  
APO 633

5 March 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation.

TO: Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force, APO 520, I.S.  
Army. Thru: Commanding General, Mediterranean allied Air  
Force, APO 650, U.S. Army.

1. The month of February has witnessed the immense might of American air power striking some of the greatest aerial blows of the war, forcing Germany closer and closer to the brink of ultimate defeat. However, the merit of the month's operations and the staggering tonnage of bombs lies in the destructiveness of this might and the efficiency with which it has been employed against the enemy's economic and military resources.

2. The outstanding characteristic of the month's operations was the fervor and spirit with which the Fifteenth Air Force carried on the battle of oil, relentlessly pounding the Achilles' heel of Germany. Flying in the face of adverse weather conditions, the Fifteenth Air Force has permitted the enemy no rest and has seized every opportunity to destroy the vital roots of the enemy's power. The continued employment of this intense aerial might against the foundations of German military power will guarantee a more speedy victory.

3. The commanders, flight crews, and ground force personnel of the Fifteenth Air Force are to be commended for their magnificent achievement. They can be sure that their Air Force is playing a major role in the destruction of the German war machine

/s/ Carl Spaatz  
/t/ CARL SPAATZ  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Commanding

1st Ind.

15 March 1945

HEADQUARTERS, MAAF, APO 650, U. S. Army

TO: Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force, APO 520, US Army

It gives me the greatest pleasure to forward to you the above commendation from General Spaatz because I know how well deserved it is. My own official commendation to your headquarters' Staff and operating units was previously forwarded. However, I desire to add my own full appreciation of the comments by General Spaatz in the above letter.

/s/ Ira C. Eaker  
/t/ IRA C. EAKER  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Commanding

2nd Ind.

20 March '45

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, APO 520, U.S. Army

TO: See Distribution

1. It is a source of deep satisfaction to me to pass this well earned tribute to all units of the Air Force. Outstanding team-work on the part of all commander, flight crews, and by all staff and service personnel has made it possible for us to deliver these sustained and effective blows to the enemy.

2. It is desired that this communication be posted upon all bulletin boards for a period of one week subsequent to its receipt.

/s/ N. F. Twining  
/t/ N. F. TWINING  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION "H"

COPY

William C Palmer  
Captain, Air Corps

COMMENDATION:- The following commendation from Fifteenth Air Force, with its indorsement is quoted for your information.

I have noted with pleasure the fine strides which have been made in your command in steadily reducing the number of ground accidents during the past three months. Records at this headquarters reveal that you have effected a reduction in accidents of approximately sixty-four per cent (64%) during this period.

You and the responsible personnel are to be heartily commended for this fine effort. Your continued interest in, and effective prosecution of the Ground Safety program will be appreciated.

/s/ N. F. Twining  
/t/ N. F. TWINING  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

Bulletin No. 44 Headquarters 460<sup>th</sup> Bomb Group dtd 4 April 1945

Hq. 55<sup>th</sup> Bomb Wg (H), APO 520, U.S. Army 1 April 1945

TO: Commanding Officer, 460<sup>th</sup> Bomb Group, APO 520, US Army  
Commanding Officer, 464<sup>th</sup> Bomb Group, APO 520, US Army  
Commanding Officer, 465<sup>th</sup> Bomb Group, APO 520, US Army  
Commanding Officer, 485<sup>th</sup> Bomb Group, APO 520, US Army

1. The above commendation is passed with pride and great satisfaction to all personnel of this command. I attribute this fine record to excellent administration and supervision, self-discipline, and the cooperation of personnel of all echelons.

2. The reduction of accidents increases our effectiveness by the conservation of manpower; therefore, it behooves us to do the right thing always. Do not take chances.

/s/ George R. Acheson  
/t/ GEORGE R. ACHESON  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

BY ORDER OF COLONEL PRICE

SAMUEL WILNER  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Asst. Adjutant

OFFICIAL: COPY

U.S.O. CAMP SHOWS #390  
"The Novilaires"

5 March 1945

SUNJECT: Commendation.

TO: Commanding General, 55<sup>th</sup> Bombardment Wing, APO 520, U.S. Army  
Commanding Officer, 460<sup>th</sup> Bombardment Group, APO 520, US Army  
Commanding Officer, 464<sup>th</sup> Bombardment Group, APO 520, US Army  
Commanding Officer, 465<sup>th</sup> Bombardment Group, APO 520, US Army  
Commanding Officer, 485<sup>th</sup> Bombardment Group, APO 520, US Army  
Colonel David, S.S.S. Comzone, A.F.H.Q., MTOUSA, APO 512, US Army  
Don Byones, U.S.O. Camp Shows, Field Rep., APO 512, U.S. Army

1. The U.S.O. Camp Show Unit 390 (The Novilaires) have been shown every consideration and cooperation in carrying on their camp shows. Out efficiency is much greater in our work when given such splendid aid.

Please accept our appreciation for your efforts.

Sincerely: Johnny Gill

JOHNNY GILL  
Mgr., USO Camp Show #390  
"The Novilaires."

COPY

William C. Palmer  
Captain, Air Corps

HEADQUARTERS  
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
APO 520 US ARMY

3 April 1945

BULLETIN  
NO. 43

OFFICIAL

1. COMMENDATION:- The following letter of commendation from Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, and it's indorsements is quoted for your information:

The venereal disease rate in the Air Forces in this theatre has been a matter of great concern to me for the past few months. Consequently, it was gratifying to find that your organization had the extremely low rate of five (5%) per 1,000 per annum for the month of February 1945.

As the Commanding Officer of this Group you are to be commended for the results achieved and the low rate bespeaks the exercise of command function and the cooperation of all the officers and enlisted personnel under your command.

It is desired that each individual in your unit be advised of the substance of this communication with the confidence that your record will continue to set a standard of accomplishment for the other units in this command.

Signed by Lieutenant General EAKER

1st Ind.

HQ DIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, APO 520, 31 March 45

THRU: CG 55th Bomb Wing, APO 520.

TO: CO, 460th Bomb Group, APO 520.

It is a source of deep satisfaction to me to pass this well earned tribute to the personnel of your organization. This low rate show by your command reflects credit upon your organization and the Air Force as a whole.

It is desired that this commendation be brought to the attention of all personnel of your command.

Signed by Major General TWINING

2nd Ind.

Hq, 55th Bomb Wg (H), APO 520, US ARMY, 1 Apr. 45

TO: CO, 460th Bomb Group (H), APO 520, US Army.

The unusually low venereal rate of your organization for the months of January and February has been the causes of considerable favorable comment by higher headquarters. Therefore it gives me particular pleasure to note the recognition of the high standards of the personnel of your command.

Signed by Brigadier General ACHESON

COPY

William C. Palmer  
Captain, Air Corps

ANNEX #9

I N C L O S U R E S

A N D

S U P P O R T I N G   D O C U M E N T S

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