

sufficiently to cause condensation of fog in the immediate area, raising visibility so that planes could land safely. By this device heavy bombers were able to operate against Von Rundstedt's supply lines during the Battle of the Bulge.

The problem of unexpected bad weather enroute to target sometimes caused missions to abort. To obviate this, a new role was designed for the already invaluable 8th AF escort fighter. A Scouting Force was established to act as a "seeing eye" for the heavies. The advance unit consisted of a flight of fighters manned by experienced bombardment pilots who had been retrained on single-engine planes. These men, many of whom had completed their tour of duty, preceded bomber formations, investigated weather conditions and advised wing or division commanders by VHF of the best possible courses to take. They also rendered invaluable assistance to large formations attempting assembly during hampering cloud conditions. Here is the attitude of one 8th AF group CO on their value:

"Time and again the Scouting Force was able to make the necessary exploration in advance and relay the vital information needed. Many times it has suggested changes in course and altitude which brought the formation around weather obstructions or through safe channels. On some occasions information that an apparently impenetrable cloud formation was actually 'thin' enough to be safely penetrated has been promptly forwarded by Scouting Force units."

By the war's end almost all operational problems had been overcome except that of German flak. End of report.

***Hermann Goering,
Chief of the GAF (Luftwaffe), speaks***



"I knew first that the Luftwaffe was losing control of the air when the American long-range fighters were able to escort the bombers as far as Hanover. It was not long before they were getting to Berlin. We then knew we must develop the jet planes. Our plan for their early development was unsuccessful only because of your bombing attacks.

"Allied attacks greatly affected our training program, too.

For instance, the attacks on oil retarded the training because our new pilots couldn't get sufficient training before they were put into the air.

"I am convinced that the jet planes would have won the war for us if we had had only four or five months' more time. Our underground installations were all ready. The factory at Kahla had a capacity of 1,000 to 1,200 jet airplanes a month. Now with 5,000 to 6,000 jets, the outcome would have been quite different..

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producing a sufficient quantity for the jets. The transition to jets was very easy in training.

The jet-pilot output was always ahead of the jet-aircraft production. "Germany could not have been defeated by air power alone, using England as a base, without invasion— because German industry was going underground, and our countermeasures would have kept pace with your bombing. But the point is, that if Germany were attacked in her weakened condition as now, then the air could do it alone. That is, the land invasion meant that so many workers had to be withdrawn from factory production and even from the Luftwaffe.

"We bombed cities in England instead of concentrating on aircraft and engine factories despite my original intention to attack only military targets and factories, because after the British attacked Hamburg our people were angry and I was ordered to attack indiscriminately.

"Allied precision bombing had a greater effect on the defeat of Germany than area bombing, because destroyed cities could be evacuated but destroyed industry was difficult to replace.

"Allied selection of targets was good, particularly in regard to oil. As soon as we started to repair an oil installation, you always bombed it again before we could produce one ton.

"We didn't concentrate on four-engined Focke-Wulf plane heavy bombers after the Battle of Britain, because we were developing the He-177 and trying to develop the Me-264, which was designed to go to America and return. Because our production capacity was not so great as America's, we could not produce quickly everything we needed. Moreover, our plants were subject to constant bombing.

"If I had to design the Luftwaffe again, the first airplane I would develop would be the jet fighter— then the jet bomber. It is now a question of fuel. The jet fighter takes too much. The Me-264 awaited only the final solution of the fuel-consumption problem. According to my view the future airplane is one without fuselage (flying wing) equipped with turbine in combination with the jet and propeller.

"Before D-Day, the Allied attacks in Northern France hurt us the most because we were not able to rebuild in France as quickly as at home. The attacks on marshaling yards were most effective, next came low-level attacks on troops, then attacks on bridges. The low-flying planes had a terror effect and caused great damage to our communications. Also demoralizing were the umbrella fighters, which after escorting the bombers would swoop down and hit everything, including the jet planes in the process of landing.

"The Allies owe the success of the invasion to the air forces. They prepared the invasion; they made it possible; they carried it through.

"Without the U. S. Air Force the war would still be going on elsewhere, but certainly not on German soil."